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I.
INTRODUCTION
Employment practices that are not intended to disadvantage older
workers can nonetheless have an adverse effect on them vis-a.-vis younger
workers.1 Accordingly,the issue arises whether the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 ("Age Act") allows disparate impact as a method
of proving discrimination.2 The Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue,3
and the federal courts of appeals4 and the commentators are divided.5 This
imination
47
"""""'"''''''
49
ed , 51
52
53
54
"""""'"''''''
54
54
56
58
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 63
, 64
64
66
67
67
71
71
71
"""'"''''''''''
72
) and the
72
, 73
73
1. The terms "older worker" and "older workers" are used in this article to include alJ workers
who are protected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. 1. No. 90-202, 81 Stat.
603 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994».
2. Id.
3. The Court granted a writ of certiorari on the issue, heard oral arguments, then dismissed the
writ as improvidently granted. Adams v. Florida Power Corp., 534 U.S. 1054 (2001), cert. dismissed,
535 U.s. 228 (2002). Previously, the Court had indicated that it had not decided the issue. Hazen Paper
Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) ("We have never decided whether a disparate impact theory of
liability is available under the ADEA. . .and we do not do so here.").
4. See Criley v. Delta Air Lines, 119 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1997) (disparate impact is allowed). See
also Frank v. United Air Lines, 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); EEOC v. McDonnelJ Douglas Co.,
191 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 1999) (same). But cf Adams v. Florida Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir.
2001) (disparate impact is not alJowed), cert. granted, 534 U.S. 1054 (2001), and cert. dismissed, 535
U.S. 228 (2002); MulJin v. Raytheon, 164 F.3d 696 (1st Cir. 1999) (same); Blackwell v. Cole Taylor
Bank, 152 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 1998) (same); Ellis v. United Airlines, 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996)
(same).
5. Alfred W. Blumrosen, Interpreting The ADEA: Intent or Impact, in AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT, A COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL
PRACTITIONERS 68 (Monte B. Lake ed., 1982); Jennifer J. Clemons & Richard A. Bayles, ADEA
Disparate Impact in the Sixth Circuit, 27 OHIO N.U. 1. REv. I (2000); Howard Eglit, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act's Forgotten Affirmative Defense: The Reasonable Factors Other
Than Age Exception, 66 B.U. 1. REv. 155 (1986); Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, Title VIL and The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts And a Dog That Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE 1.
REv. 1093 (1993); Keith R. Fentonmiller, The Continuing Validity of Disparate Impact Analysis For
Federal-Sector Age Discrimination Claims, 47 AM. U. 1. REv. 1071 (1998); Jan W. Henkel, The Age
Discrimination In Employment Act: Disparate Impact Analysis and the Availability of Liquidated
Damages After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 47 SYRACUSE1. REv. 1183 (1997); Douglas C. Herbert &
Lani Schweiker Shelton, A Pragmatic Argument Against Applying the Disparate Impact Doctrine in Age
Discrimination Cases, 37 S. TEX. 1. REv. 625 (1996); Judith 1. Johnson, Semantic Cover For Age
Discrimination: Twilight of the ADEA, 42 WAYNE 1. REv. I (1995); Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of
Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. 1. REv. 229
(1990); Michael D. Moberly, Reconsidering the DiscriminatOl)' Motive Requirement in ADEA Disparate
Treatment Cases, 24 N.M. 1. REv. 89 (1994); Mack A. Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied To The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Is a Transplant Appropriate?, 14 U. ToL. 1. REV. 1261 (1983);
Mack A. Player, Wards Cove Packing or Not Wards Cove Packing? That is Not the Question: Some
Thoughts on Impact Analysis Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 31 U. RICH. 1. REv.
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article is composed primarily of new evidence and arguments on the issue.
Disparate impact evolved under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII").6 A plaintiff proves disparate impact by establishing that
(1) a particular employment practice has an adverse effect on workers of the
plaintiff s race or sex,? regardless of the intent of the employer;8 that is, the
practice disadvantages disproportionally more workers of the plaintiffs
group than workers of another race or sex (the comparators), and (2) the
practice is not related to job performance or a business necessity.9 In
Griggs v. Duke Power Company, for example, the employer required
workers seekingpromotion to pass a written test.10 The test had an adverse
effect on African-American workers because they passed at a significantly
lower rate than did European-American workers. The test was not job
related; a passing score on the test did not predict success on the job.
In contrast, the plaintiff in a disparate treatment case proves
discrimination by establishing that (1) the employer treated a worker less
favorably, regarding the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
than a worker of another race or sex was or would have been treated, and
(2) the worker's race or sex was at least part of the employer's reason for
the act. Proof of intent is indispensable in a disparate treatment case. For
819 (1997); Marc Rosenblum, The Prerogative To Downsize
-
A Commentary on Blumrosen, et aI., 2
EMPL. RTS. & EMPL. POL'y J. 417 (1998); Jonas Saunders, Age Discrimination: Disparate Impact
Under the ADEA After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins: Arguments in Favor, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REv.
591 (1996); Donald R. Stacy, A Case Against Extending the Adverse Impact Doctrine to ADEA, 10
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 437 (1984); Roberta Sue Alexander, Comment, The Future of Disparate Impact
Analysis for Age Discrimination in a Post-Hazen Paper World, 25 U. DAYTON L. REv. 75 (1999); Miles
F. Archer, Note, Mullin v. Raytheon Company: The Threatened Vitality of Disparate Impact Under the
ADEA, 52 ME. L. REV. 149 (2000); Brett Ira Johnson, Comment, Six of One. Half-Dozen of Another:
Mullin v. Raytheon Co. as a Representative of Federal Circuit Courts Erroneously Distinguishing the
ADEA From Title VII Regarding Disparate Impact Liability, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 303 (2000); Evan H.
Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate Impact Theory Should Not Apply to
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. REv. 267 (1995); 'Michael C. Sloan, Comment,
Disparate Impact in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Will The Supreme Court Permit It?,
1995 WIS. L. REV. 507 (1995); Brendan Sweeney, Comment, "Downsizing" The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: The Availability of Disparate Impact Liability, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1527 (1996). The
author thanks Stephanie Hutchinson for her help with these articles.
6. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000a-2000h-6 (2000)).
7. The term "race or sex" is used in this article to refer to all the bases on which discrimination is
prohibited by Title VII, namely, race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII) §703, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2 (2000).
8. Unless the context indicates otherwise, the term "employer" is used in this article to refer to
include all parties who must obey the laws against employment discrimination.
9. See BARBARA LrNDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW chs.4-
7 (Paul W. Cane, Jr. ed., 3d ed. 1996) (discussing disparate impact) [hereinafter "LrNDEMANN &
GROSSMAN, 3d ed."].
10. 40l U.S. 424 (1971). The Griggs case involved employee testing and high school diploma
requirements that were not "directed or intended to measure the ability to learn to perform a particular
job or category of jobs." Id. at 428.
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example, the employer in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation was
guilty of disparate treatment for hiring men, but not women, who had young
children.]] The employer intentionally denied employment opportunities to
women, in part, because of their sex.
For the purposes of this article, the crucial feature of disparate impact
is the lack of intent.12 The plaintiffs in Griggs prevailed without proving
that the employer intended to disadvantage them because of race. The lack
of scienter gives rise to a puzzle. Title VII prohibits disadvantaging a
worker because of race or sex. Causation is clear in a disparate treatment
case: the employer knowingly uses race or sex as a basis of decision; to say
the same thing, race or sex is a fact in the employer's reason for action. The
puzzle is this: in what sense is race or sex a cause of the employer's action
in a disparate impact case? In Griggs, for example, the employer refused to
promote the plaintiffs because they failed the written test. In what sense
was race the cause of this refusal? The solution to the puzzle lies in the fact
that the test was not job related. A job related test accurately selects
qualified workers. A test that is not job related selects at random with
respect to qualifications. In Griggs scores on the test were not related to
success on the job. But the test did not select altogether at random.]3 For
some reason, the test selected a significantly greater proportion of
European-Americans than of African-Americans (which is to say, the test
had an adverse effect on African-Americans).14 This is all the test did. It
gave each black a lesser chance to succeed than each white. Thus, the test
selected on the basis of race. By using the test to decide whom to promote,
the employer - albeit unknowingly - made decisions based on race. In
this way, the employer disadvantaged the plaintiffs because of their race.
Thus is proved the element of causation in a disparate impact case.
Arguments for and against recognizing disparate impact under the Age
Act follow. For convenience of exposition, the opposing arguments will be
voiced by advocates named PRO and CON. Part II is a brief legislative
history of the act. Part III contains PRO'S and CON'S arguments on Justice
Powell's theorem that disparate treatment and disparate impact are not
separate claims, but different methods of proving the same claim. Part IV
contains the PROSand CONSregarding the meaning of section 4(a)(2) of the
Age Act, and Part V, regarding the meaning of section 4(£)(1) (the RFOA
Blumrosen, et al., 2
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12. Intent is all that distinguishes disparate treatment from disparate impact. See Michael Evan
Gold, Towards a Unified TheOlY of the Law of Employment Discrimination, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 175 (2001) [hereinafter "Gold, Towards a Unified Theory"].
13. If the test had truly selected at random, the success rates of African-Americans and European-
Americans would have been equal. The test would have had no adverse effect, and would have been
legal.
14. The reason why the test had an adverse effect was not established in Griggs and need not be in
disparate impact cases.
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clause). Part VI is the author's evaluation of the competing arguments, and
Part VII states the author's arguments on the purpose of the act.
II.
A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGE ACT
The next
workers "beca
do a job when
added, "[I]t i~
Section 715
discrimination
"A third
something elsl
particular job
between his a,
that this type (
or religious di:
The fourt
Beginning in 1951, representatives and senators introduced many bills
to prohibit age discrimination. Prior to 1964, none of these efforts was
successful. In 1964, some legislators sought to add age as a protected class
to Title VII. 15 Because age differed from race or sex and Congress had
insufficient information about the differences, age was not included in that
statute. Instead, section 715 directed that the Secretary of Labor
shall make a full and complete study of the factors which might tend to
result in discrimination because of age and... make a report to
Congress. . . containing the results of such study and shall include in such
report such recommendations for legislation to prevent arbitrary
discriminationin employmentbecauseof age. . . .16
The Secretary of Labor was Willard Wirtz!? and his report dated June
1965, is a major element of the legislative history of the Age ActY
The Secretary's Report was divided into three sections. The initial
section, entitled "Introduction," identified four types of discrimination that
plagued older workers. The first type of discrimination led to "non-
employment resulting from feelings about people entirely unrelated to their
ability to do the job."19 As the Report later clarified, this type of
discrimination was "based on the kind of dislike or intolerance that
sometimes exists in the case of race, color, religion, or national origin, and
which is based on considerations entirely unrelated to ability to perform a
job. "20
15. Senator Smathers offered an amendment that would have added age to Title VII, but the
amendment was defeated "due to the parliamentary situation." Age Discrimination in Employment:
Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 90th Congo 29 (1967) [hereinafter "Senate Hearings"] (statement of Sen. Smathers). See also
113 CONGoREc. 31254 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits).
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), sec. 715 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14
(2002)).
17. U.S. Department of Labor, Wirtz Labor Library,
http://www.dol.gov/oasamllibrarylbib/wirtzbib.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
18. The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment (1965) (report of the
Secretary of Labor to the Congress under section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). The report was
presented in two, separately bound parts. The first part of the report, comprising 25 pages of readable
text and graphs, will be cited and referred to hereinafter as the "Secretary's Report" or the "Report."
The second part of the report, composed of statistics and summaries of technical studies, will be cited
hereinafter as "Secretary's Research Materials."
19. Secretary's Report, supra note 18, at 2.
20. Jd. at 5.
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The next type of discrimination resulted in non-employment of older
workers "because of assumptions about the effect of age on their ability to
do ajob when there is infact no basis for these assumptions."2! The Report
added, "[I]t is this [type of discrimination] which Congress refers to, in
Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act [of 1964], as 'arbitrary
discrimination."'22
"A third type of discrimination - which should perhaps be called
something else entirely - involves decisions not to employ a person for a
particular job because of his age when there is in fact a relationship
between his age and his ability to perform the job. "23 The Report opined
that this type of discrimination "does not exist so far as, for example, racial
or religious discrimination are concemed.,,24
The fourth type of discrimination occurred
when an employer turns an older man or woman away, not because of
concern about the individual's ability to perform the work, but because of
programs and practices actually designed to protect the employment of
older workers while they remain in the work force, and to provide support
when they leave it or are ill. Seniority and promotion-from-within systems,
and pension and insurance programs, are a mark of civilization. They
vastly enhance the dignity, the security, the quality of the later years oflife
in the United States. At the same time, ironically, they sometimes have
tended to push still further down the age at which employers begin asking
whether or not a prospective employee is too old to be taken on.25
The next section of the Secretary's Report, entitled "Findings," found
"clear evidence of the Nation's waste today of a wealth of human resources
that could be contributed by hundreds of thousands of older workers, and of
the needless denial to these workers of opportunity for that useful activity
which constitutes much of life's meaning."26 The Report proceeded to
discuss each of the four types of discrimination previously identified.
The Secretary's Report found "no significant evidence" of the first
type of discrimination, which was based on dislike or intolerance.27 In
contrast, the Report found "substantial evidence of arbitrary practice in the
second category of discrimination - discrimination based on unsupported
general assumptions about the effect of age on ability - in hiring practices
that take the form of specific age limits applied to older workers as a
T
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21. !d. at 2 (emphasis in original).
22. Id.
23. Id. (emphasis in original).
24. Id. The Report was partially mistaken in this regard. In the third type of "discrimination," age
is a bona fide occupational qualification for a job. Under Title VII, religion may also be a BFOQ, but
race cannot be.
25. Id. (emphasis in original).
26. Id. at 5
27. Id. at 2, 5.
~\J.f.\ \ \
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group. "28 Whether discrimination of the third type occurred, in which age
was in fact related to job performance, or of the fourth type, in which
"institutional arrangements. . . operate indirectly to restrict the employment
of older workers," depended on the circumstances of individual cases.29
The second section ended with the consequences of age discrimination
for the economy and for individual workers. Beginning with the economy,
the Report observed:
[A] million man-years of productive time are unused each year because of
unemployment of workers over 45 A substantial portion of the
unemployment insurance payments of $1 billion a year to workers 45 and
over can be attributed to unemployment resulting in one way or another
from the fact of the employee's age. . . . Only a hypothetical calculation can
be made of the potential contributions of those who have retired
involuntarily. Such a calculation would easily yield several billion dollars a
year. . . .30
Turning to individual workers, the Report noted:
The unemployment rate of male workers 45 and over last year was one-fifth
greater than the rate in the 35-44 year group. Older workers (45 and over)
experienced more long-term unemployment than younger groups. . . . On
the average this unemployment lasted. . . about 75 percent longer than the
average duration of unemployment for workers under 45. The proportion of
the very long-term unemployed (over 27 weeks) made up of men 45 and
over has been rising in the face of a generally improved employment
situation. . .. This development is often accompanied by . . . deterioration
of skill and motivation, with consequent reduced acceptability to
employers. . .. The consequences of discrimination on individuals affected
go far beyond those attributable to arbitrary refusal to employ on the basis
of age. They show up in widespread uncertainty concerning the role of
vigorous older persons in our society, and in personal frustrations and
anxieties.31
The last section of the Secretary's Report, entitled "Conclusions and
Recommendations," contained four recommendations. The first
recommendation was a federal statute to prohibit
the persistent and widespread use of age limits in hiring that in a great many
cases can be attributed only to arbitrary discrimination against older
workers on the basis of age and regardless of ability. . . . The possibility of
new nonstatutory means of dealing with such arbitrary discrimination has
been explored. That area is barren.32
The second recommendation was a series of steps "to adjust those
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32. [d. at 21 (emphasis in original).
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36. H.R. 1371.
37. 112 CONG
38. [d. at 2082
39. ll3 CONGo
40. [d. at 2464
41. See id. at 2
42. See H.R. 3,
t
_L
.r-
4W Vol. 25:1 2004 DISPARATE IMPACT 9
great many
~ainst older
ossibility of
lination has
present employment practices which quite unintentionally lead to age limits
in hiring. This will require special arrangements to overcome employer
reluctance [sic] to hire qualified workers under present pension and
seniority arrangements."33 Such arrangements included vesting and
portability provisions in private pension plans, new fonns of private
annuities for older workers who were not covered by pension plans, a
review of workers' compensation and disability insurance systems, and aid
to unions and employers in developing procedures for hiring of older
workers while protecting the seniority rights of workers already employed.
None of these steps would be required by law.34
The third and fourth recommendations, which were increasing jobs for
older workers and augmenting their educational opportunities,35 are not
relevant to the issue of whether the Age Act prohibits disparate impact.
Congress did not act on the Secretary's Report in 1965. In 1966 the
Senate considered a bill, already passed by the House of Representatives, to
raise the minimum wage.36 Senator Javits moved an amendment that would
have outlawed age discrimination by employers and unions,3? and the
Senate agreed to the amendment.38 The conference committee deleted the
amendment, but added section 606 to Public Law 89-601, which directed
the Secretary of Labor to submit specific legislative proposals for banning
age discrimination in employment.
The Secretary complied on January 25, 1967,39and on February 3rd
Senator Yarborough introduced S. 830,40which reflected the Secretary's
proposals.41 On the same date Representative Perkins introduced H.R.
3651, a twin to S. 830.42 Section 2 of the bills contained the findings of
Congress and the purpose of the proposed act. The findings summarized
the central findings of the Secretary's Report:
SEC.2.
(a) The Congressherebyfinds and declaresthat -
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers
find themselvesdisadvantagedin their effort to retain employment,
and especiallyto regain employmentwhen displacedfromjobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job
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33. Id. at 22.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 23-25.
36. H.R. 13712, 89th Congo (1966). See S. REp. No. 89-1487, at 1 (1966).
37. 112 CONGoREc. 20819 (1966) (discussing amendment no. 764).
38. Id. at 20825.
39. 113CONG.REC.1480,1484(1967).
40. Id. at 2464; S. 830, 90th Congo (1967).
41. See id. at 2199,7076 (statement of Sen. Javits).
42. See H.R. 3651, 90th Congo (1967).
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performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise
desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term
unemployment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and
employer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high among
older workers; their numbers are great and growing; and their
empldyment problems are grave. . . .43
Likewise, the purpose of the proposed act reflected the
recommendations of the Secretary's Report:
(b) It is therefore the purpose of this Act to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find
ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment. 44
In line with the Secretary's recommendations to enlighten the public
about the abilities and problems of older workers, and to encourage
employers and unions voluntarily to adjust practices that, though intended
to protect older workers, actually led to age limits in hiring - practices
such as seniority systems, promotion ftom within, and pension and
insurance plans - the bills provided:
SEC.3.
(a) The Secretary of Labor shall undertake studies and provide
information to labor unions, management, and the general public
concerning the needs and abilities of older workers, and their potentials
for continued employment and contribution to the economy. In order to
achieve the purposes of this Act, the Secretary of Labor shall carry on a
continuing program of education and information, under which he may,
among other measures:
(1) undertake research, and promote research, with a view to
reducing barriers to the employment of older persons, and the
promotion of measures for utilizing their skills;
(2) publish and otherwise make available to employers, professional
societies, the various media of communication, and other interested
persons the findings of studies and other materials for the promotion
of employment. . . .45
Section 4 of the bills reflected the Secretary's recommendation for a
statutory ban on age discrimination in employment:
SEC.4.
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
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otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's age.46
The Secretary's Report had recognized that some age "discrimination" occurred
because of a genuine relationship between a worker's age and ability to perform
the job. Accordingly, section 4(f) of the bills provided:
(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer. . .
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under. . . this section
where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, or
where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than
age. . . .47
The Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare held hearings on S. 788 and 83048 and, with some
amendments, reported S. 830 favorably to the full Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare.49 The full committee approved an amendment in the nature
of a substitute and reported it favorably to the Senate.5o The passages of S.
830 quoted above were not changed. The Senate passed S. 830, as
amended, on November 6, 1967 and sent it to the House.51
The General Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on
Education and Labor held hearings on H.R. 3651, 3768, and 4221.52 With
some amendments, the subcommittee reported favorably on H.R. 422153 to
the full Committee on Education and Labor.54 The full committee approved
some additional amendments and reported a clean bill, H.R. 13054, to the
House.55 This bill contained word for word the provisions ofS. 830 that are
quoted above. The House passed H.R. 13054 on December 4, 1967.56
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48. Senate Hearings, supra note 15. S. 788 was essentially Senator Javits' 1966 amendment to
the Pair Labor Standards Act.
49. S. REp. No. 90-723, at 3 (1967).
50. Id.
5!. 113 CONGoREc. 31257 (1967).
52. Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on HR. 3651, HR. 3768, and HR. 4221 Before
the General Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Education and Labor, 90th Congo (1967)
[hereinafter "House Hearings"].
53. Except for having been introduced by Representative Dent, who was the chair of the
subcommittee, H.R'. 4221 was identical to the Secretary's bill, H.R. 3651.
54. H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 3 (1967).
55. Id.
56. 113 CONGoREC. 34753 (1967).
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Immediately thereafter, the House struck the contents of S. 830, substituted
therefore the contents of H.R. 13054, passed S. 830 (as thus revised), and
sent it back to the Senate.57
On December 5, 1967, the Senate amended the House's version of S.
830 (i.e., H.R. 13054), passed the bill, and returned it to the House.58 The
Senate amendments did not affect the passages from S. 830 quoted above.
The following day, the House accepted the Senate's amendment and sent
the bill to the President, 59 who approved it on December 15, 1967.60 Thus,
sections 2(a) and (b), 3(a), and 4(a) and (f) of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 contain, and bear the same numeration, as the
sections of S. 830 quoted above.
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A. PRO: Justice Powell's Theorem Is True
Justice Powell's theorem postulated that disparate treatment and disparate
impact were not separate claims, but separate legal theories or methods of
proving the claim of discrimination.
Disparate treatment and disparate impact are normally thought of as
distinct rights or claims under Title VII. In 1982, however, Justice Powell
proposed the theorem that they were separate methods of proving the same
claim. He proposed this theorem in Connecticut v. Teal, in which the
employer used a two-step process to decide which workers to promote to
supervisorY The plaintiffs claimed (and the employer conceded) that the
first step in the process, a written test, had an adverse effect on the
plaintiffs' group and was not job related. The employer defended on the
ground that the second step of the process compensated for the first. In the
second step, proportionally more members of the plaintiffs' group than of
the comparators' were promoted, and the selection process, taken as a
whole, had no adverse effect on the plaintiffs. The majority of the Court
held that the plaintiffs could attack the first step in the process, regardless of
the final result. Justice Powell dissented, arguing that the plaintiffs should
be permitted to attack only the final result. In the process, he advanced the
theorem that disparate treatment and disparate impact were not separate
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claims; rather, they were separate methods of proof that shared the same
aim, namely, proving that employment discrimination has occurred. He
wrote:
[W]hile disparate-treatment cases focus on the way in which an individual
has been treated, disparate-impact cases are concerned with the protected
group. . .. The Court, disregarding the distinction drawn by our cases,
repeatedly asserts that Title VII was designed to protect individual, not
group, rights. It emphasizes that some individual blacks were eliminated by
the disparate impact of the preliminary test. But this argument confuses the
aim of Title VII with the legal theories through which its aims were
intended to be vindicated. It is true that the aim of Title VII is to protect
individuals, not groups. But in advancing this commendable objective,
Title VII jurisprudence has recognized two distinct methods of proof. In
one set of cases - those involving direct proof of discriminatory intent -
the plaintiff seeks to establish direct, intentional discrimination against
him. . . . In disparate-impact cases, by contrast, the plaintiff seeks to carry
his burden of proof by way of inference - by showing that an employer's
selection process results in the rejection of a disproportionate number of
members of a protected group to which he belongs. From such a showing a
fair inference then may be drawn that the rejected applicant, as a member of
that disproportionately excluded group, was himself a victim of that
process' "built-in headwinds."62
Justice Powell's theorem was plausible on its face. Disparate treatment
and disparate impact were not mentioned in the statute, but were developed
as legal theories or methods of proof by lawyers and judges in much the
same way that common law principles of evidence evolved. Plausibility,
:'s version of S.
Ie House.58 The
°
quoted above.
ldment and sent
;, 1967.60 Thus,
iscrimination in
neration, as the
and disparate
or methods of
62. Id. at 458-459 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (italics in original) (boldface
added). Justice Powell's theorem may have been prompted by a suggestion in the Brief Amici Curiae,
Equal Employment Advisory Council, Robert E. Williams et al. at 9, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440
(1982) (No. 80-2147) ("In implementing the nondiscrimination requirements of Title VII, this Court has
adopted two methods of proof of discrimination
-
disparate treatment and disparate impact."). The
author thanks Ms. Alyssa Razook for bringing this passage to his attention.
A few years later, Justice O'Connor repeated the same theorem about the nature of disparate
treatment and disparate impact. In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust she wrote:
Several of our decisions have dealt with the evidentiary standards that apply when an
individual alleges that an employer has treated that particular person less favorably than others
because of the plaintiffs race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In such "disparate
treatment" cases. . . the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant had a discriminatory
intent or motive. . . . In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., this Court held that a plaintiff need not
necessarily prove intentional discrimination in order to establish that an employer has violated
§ 703. . .. The factual issues and the character of the evidence are inevitably somewhat
different when the plaintiff is exempted from the need to prove intentional discrimination.
The evidence in these "disparate impact" cases usually focuses on statistical disparities, rather
than specific incidents, and on competing explanations for those disparities. The
distinguishing features of the factual issues that typical1y dominate disparate impact cases do
not imply that the ultimate legal issue is different than in cases where disparate treatment
analysis is used. . . .
487 U.S. 977, 985-987 (1988) (citations omitted) (boldface added). All eight justices who participated
in the decision joined in this part of the Watson opinion.
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however, would not justify using the theorem to resolve issues or decide
cases; for these purposes, proof is necessary. But like Pythagoras and
Fermat, Justice Powell left to others the task of proving the truth of his
theorem.
The proof is stated in full in the following text, but a summary of it
may be helpful at the outset. A student of Title VII has argued that
disparate treatment and disparate impact are indistinguishable except for
intent. 63 This argument was correct in most regards, and it is incorporated
into the following proof; but the argument was mistaken in one regard: it
treated disparate treatment and disparate impact as proving separate claims.
In fact, they are different theories for proving the same claim. That claim is
discrimination. The difference between disparate treatment and disparate
impact as theories is the way in which they prove causation. Both theories
must establish that race or sex was a cause of the plaintiff's injury.
Disparate treatment establishes causation with proof of intent. Disparate
impact establishes causation with proof that an employment practice
(commonly, a selection criterion like a written test) has an adverse effect on
the plaintiffs' class and is not job related. Because the practice has an
adverse effect, it disadvantages the plaintiffs' group. Because the practice
is not job related, it does not serve any legitimate interest of the business.
Therefore, the practice does only one thing: it selects on the basis of race or
sex. This analysis establishes that Justice Powell's theorem was true: that
disparate impact and disparate treatment were different methods of proving
causation in Title VII cases prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991.64 Justice
Powell's theorem also applies to the Age Act, which was not amended in
any relevant way in 1991.
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In disparate impact, causation was proved by the facts that an employment
practice had an adverse effect on a protected class and that the practice
was not job related. Because the practice was not job related, it did not
select qualified workers. Because the practice also had an adverse effect, it
selected on the basis of race or sex.
Disparate impact as a legal theory or method of proving discrimination
was developed under Title VII, and Justice Powell's theorem applied to
Title VII. For these reasons, the following proof of the theorem will draw
upon Title VII cases. The proof will focus on the period before the 1991
amendments. After these amendments, the theorem was no longer true of
63. Gold. Towards a Unified Theory, supra note 12.
64. Pub. L. No. 102-166,105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of42 U.S.c.).
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issues or decide
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Title VII; that is, the amendments made disparate treatment and disparate
impact into genuinely separate claims under that statute. The 1991
amendments, however, did not change the Age Act in any relevant way, and
therefore Justice Powell's theorem remains true ofthis statute.
The proof in a disparate impact action under Title VII pertained to how
an employer treated many workers; therefore, statistical evidence was
always used in disparate impact cases. Although any employment practice
could be analyzed under disparate impact, this method of proving
discrimination was applied most frequently to selection criteria.65 Dothard
v. Rawlinson provides a good example.66 The Board of Corrections of the
State of Alabama was hiring correctional counselors. In the first stage of
the hiring process, applicants were eliminated if they did not stand a
minimum of 5 feet 2 inches tall and weigh a minimum of 120 pounds.
These minima had an adverse effect on women because only 59 percent of
them, as compared to 99 percent of men, were tall and heavy enough. The
employer failed to prove that the minima were job related; that is, the
minima did not distinguish between workers who were qualified to be
correctional counselors and workers who were not qualified.
The first step in proving disparate impact was conventional evidence
that the employer was covered by the act. In Dothard, the employer was
the Board of Corrections, a state agency; Title VII covered states and their
political subdivisions.
The second step was conventional evidence that an
opportunity was available. The Board of Corrections
correctional counselors.
Ideally, the third step in disparate impact was for the plaintiffs to
identify the "qualified labor pool." This term named the group of workers
who were willing and able to perform a job. Then the plaintiffs calculated
the percentages of their group and of the comparators in the pool.
Practically, however, it was far easier to describe the qualified labor pool
than to designate it, and plaintiffs normally resorted to a proxy. A fair
proxy had two characteristics: it was reasonably similar to the qualified
labor pool, and the representations of the plaintiffs' group and of the
comparators in the proxy could be readily calculated. In Dothard, the
proxy was the national population.67
employment
was hiring
a summary of it
has argued that
hable except for
t is incorporated
in one regard: it
separate claims.
m. That claim is
:nt and disparate
n. Both theories
,laintiffs injury.
1tent. Disparate
oyment practice
adverse effect on
practice has an
ause the practice
of the business.
;:basis of race or
m was true: that
thods of proving
f 1991.64 Justice
not amended in
m employment
2t the practice
lted, it did not
iverse effect, it
19discrimination
:orem applied to
eorem will draw
before the 1991
10 longer true of
ections of 42 U.S.C.).
65. An example of disparate impact applied to another employment practice is Bazemore v.
Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (multiple regression analysis used regarding a claim of discrimination in
compensation).
66. 433 U.S, 321 (1977).
67. Not every person in the nation was willing and able to perfonn the job of correctional
counselor in Alabama, but the defendant offered no evidence to rebut the following reasoning: The
height and weight characteristics of adults (HWCA) in the nation were similar to the HWCA in Alabama.
The HWCA in Alabama were similar to the HWCA in the labor force in Alabama. The HWCA in the labor
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When a court in a disparate impact action accepted the plaintiffs' proxy
as fair (of course, the employer had an opportunity to challenge it), the
proxy thereafter stood for the qualified labor pool. Accordingly, workers in
the proxy were presumed to be willing and able to perform the job.
The fourth step in the disparate impact method of proof was a showing
that the employer afforded the plaintiffs a lesser chance than the
comparators to benefit from the employment opportunity. This showing
was made with evidence that the employer used a selection criterion that
favored the comparators over the plaintiffs.68 It was commonly said that the
selection criterion had an "adverse effect" on the plaintiffs, or that a
disparity existed between the plaintiffs' and the comparators' rates of
success on the criterion. In Dothard, the selection criteria were the height
and weight minima, and a disparity existed because men's rate of success
was 99 percent and women's rate was only 59 percent.
Because the adverse effect was established by statistics, the question
necessarily arose, was the disparity in success rates statistically significant,
or was it merely a random variation that should be ignored? A test of
statistical significance had to be applied. If the disparity was statistically
significant, then it proved that the employer had afforded a lesser chance of
success to the plaintiffs than to the comparators. In Dothard, did
proportionally fewer women than men satisfY the height and weight
minima, or was the disparity so small that it was meaningless? Given the
size of the proxy and the degree of the disparity, it was obviously
significant.
The final issue was causation. The disparate impact method of proof
established but-for causation. To prove but-for causation, it must be
demonstrated that race or sex was a necessary cause of the disparity. At
first blush, such proof may seem impossible: for the cause of the disparity
was the selection criterion, and the criterion, both on its face and in its
administration, was neutral with respect to race or sex. But the criterion
was not neutral in its results. It was not job related. It did not select
qualified workers. Thus, it selected randomly with respect to qualifications.
Fully random selection would have been lawful; it would not have
disadvantaged a protected class.69 But a selection criterion might be
random with respect to qualifications, yet not random with respect to race
or sex. A CI
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68. Satisfying a selection criterion is an opportunity protected by Title VII. Connecticut v. Teal,
457 U.S. 440 (1982) (holding plaintiffs proved disparate impact with evidence that their rate of success
on a scored test was lower than the comparators').
69. For example, if an employer hired only Virgos, selection would have been random with
respect to qualifications, but would not have disadvantaged blacks vis-a-vis whites or women vis-a-vis
men.
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or sex. A criterion that was not job related, but yielded a significant
disparity, was not random with respect to race or sex. Such a criterion
selected on the basis of race or sex. Indeed, it did nothing else but favor
comparators over plaintiffs. It gave each comparator a better chance of
being selected than each plaintiff, as the following diagram illustrates.
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Thus, race or sex was a but-for cause of the plaintiffs' disadvantage
whenever the employer used a selection criterion that had an adverse effect
on the plaintiffs' group (that is, created a disparity) and was not job related.
In Dothard, the height and weight minima were not job related.
Consequently, they selected at random with respect to qualifications. But
they did not select at random with respect to sex. Because 99 percent of
men but only 59 percent of women satisfied minima, they favored men over
women. Each qualified man had almost twice the chance of satisfying the
minima as each qualified woman had. Hence, sex was a but-for cause of
the plaintiffs' disadvantage.7o
It is apparent, therefore, that an employer's use of a selection criterion
that had an adverse effect and was not job related was "in operation. . .
functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination,"71 that is, equivalent to
explicit use of race or sex as a selection criterion.72 In Dothard, the
defendant's use of the height and weight minima had the same effect as if
the defendant had said, "I will allow 99 percent of qualified men, but only
59 percent of qualified women, to advance in the hiring process."
Lejob of correctional 70. Women tend to be smaller than men. This fact caused women to be less successful than men
on the defendant's selection criteria. Women's lack of success on the selection criteria was the
defendant's reason for not hiring them.
71. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (J 988).
72. Every member of the plaintiffs' group had a lesser chance of success than every comparator.
However, not evelY plaintiff was rejected, and not every comparator was selected. Therefore, the
selection criterion had an adverse effect and was not job related, did not select exclusively on the basis
of race or sex; but race or sex was one of the bases on which it selected.
Connecticut v. Teal,
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Although the absence of job relatedness was crucial to the plaintiffs'
proof of causation in a disparate impact case, the existence of job
relatedness was an affirmative defense during most of th~ time prior to
1991.73 Accordingly, at the close of the plaintiffs' evidence, the employer
had the burden of proving that the selection criterion predicted success on
the job (was job related). Proof that a selection criterion was job related
undermined the plaintiffs' evidence of their qualifications. The reason was
that a job-related selection criterion identified qualified workers. If a job-
related selection criterion happened to produce a disparity, the disparity was
legitimate: proportionally more comparators than plaintiffs were in fact
qualified. Thus, proof of job relatedness refuted the evidence that qualified
plaintiffs were denied an employment opportunity.74
CON argues that disparate impact may not be used to prove
discrimination under the Age Act because, unlike Title VII, the Age Act
demands that age be the sole cause of the employer's act; and sole causation
is consistent only with disparate treatment.1s The short answer to this
argument is that sections 4(a)(1) and (2) prohibit discrimination "because of
such individual's age," not "solely because." In addition, neither the Senate
Report nor the House Report mentioned sole causation, though both reports
used the phrases "because of age" or "based on age" several times.76
Although some senators and representatives may have expressed the idea of
sole causation, others spoke in the broader terms that are used in the
statute.77 Even more significantly, some of the very Congress members
73. Between 1971 and 1989 it was generally thought that job relatedness was an affirmative
defense, with the result that the burdens of production and persuasion on job relatedness fell on the
employer. BARBARA SCRLE! & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1160 (1st ed.
1976); BARBARA SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1328 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter "SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, 2d ed.]; BARBARA SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW, FIVE-YEAR CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT TO SCHLEI AND GROSSMAN 496 (2d ed.
1989). In Wards Cove Packing Company v. Atonia, 490 U.S. 642, 659-660 (1989), the Supreme Court
held that the burden of production belonged to the employer, but the burden of persuasion rested on the
plaintiffs. The 1991 amendments moved the burden of persuasion back to the employer. Civil Rights
Act of 1991 § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
74. For example, suppose plaintiffs allege sex discrimination in hiring for a job. The proxy is the
pool of applicants, which includes 100 men and 100 women. The employer requires applicants to pass a
written test. The test appears to have an adverse effect because 70 of the men and only 30 of the women
pass. This disparity being statistically significant, it seems that the test unfairly favors men over women.
But suppose the employer proves the test is job related. It distinguishes qualified from unqualified
applicants. Therefore, whereas the plaintiffs' evidence assumes that the men and women who take the
test are equally qualified, the employer's evidence proves that 70 of the men but only 30 of the women
are in fact qualified.
75. See infra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
76. S. REP. No. 90-723, supra note 49, at 3-4 (summarizing the major provisions of the bill), 8-9
(section-by-section analysis); H.R. REP. No. 90-805, supra note 54, at 3-4 (summarizing the major
provisions of the bill), 8-9 (section-by-section analysis).
77. 113 CONGo REC. 34742 (1967) (statement of Rep. Burke) ("In the last several years, significant
legislation to bar employment discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, and sex has been
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Most likely, when legislators said "sole cause," they were thinking of
explicit age limits and were not specifying a test of causation.
The text of the Age Act and the committee reports indicate that
Congress intended the traditional but-for test of causation. This test allows
discrimination to be proved by disparate impact, as Griggs, Dothard, and
other cases under Title VII before the 1991 amendments demonstrated.
When plaintiffs proved disparate impact, they established that the employer
afforded them a lesser chance than comparators to benefit from an
opportunity in which plaintiffs were interested and for which they were
qualified. Thus, if the plaintiffs in Dothard had been the same sex as the
comparators - that is, but for the plaintiffs' sex - then they would have
been afforded a greater chance to receive the opportunity.
The table below summarizes how the facts of Dothard proved the
components of the disparate impact method of proof.
used to prove
VII, the Age Act
md sole causation
i answer to this
ation "because of
leither the Senate
)Ugh both reports
several times.76
'essed the idea of
are used in the
mgress members
enacted. It is only just that we do the same against discrimination on the basis of age. "). See also id. at
34746 (statement of Rep. Daniels) ("a provision is included which would make it unlawful for an
employer, employment agency, or labor organization to discriminate against a worker on the basis of
age"), 34750 (statement of Rep. Hechler) ("there are many older workers who have held jobs in the
mines who are now being discriminated against because of age"), 34750 (statement of Rep. Pepper) ("It
will prohibit. . . any employer, employment agency, or labor union employing more than 50 people
from discriminating against any employee on account of age. After 1968 it will prohibit any employer,
employing more than 25 employees from discriminating on account of age."), 34751 (statement of Rep.
Dwyer) ("Of the multitude of ways in which man discriminates against his fellow man, one of the most
difficult to oppose effectively
-
and to overcome personally
- is discrimination in employment because
of age.").
78. 113 CONGo REC. 35056 (1967) (statement of Sen. Yarborough) ("As a member of the full
Committee on Aging of the Senate, I, too, have participated in those hearings, and we have learned
much, on that Committee, of the problems of tens of millions of Americans who are barred arbitrarily
from employment on account of age .. ."). See also id. at 31252 (statement of Sen. Yarborough) ("The
bill is intended to ban discrimination in employment because of age. . ."), 31253 (statement of Sen.
Yarborough) ("our national policy as declared by this bill will be to stop invidious distinctions in
employment because of age"), 31254 (statement of Sen. Javits) ("1 have a very special interest in this
particular piece of legislation for I have been introducing bills to outlaw discrimination in employment
on the grounds of age ever since 1 was a Member of the House of Representatives in 1951."),31255
(statement of Sen. Yarborough) ("It was not the intent of the sponsors of this legislation. . . to permit
discrimination in employment on account of age, whether discrimination might be attempted between a
man 38 and one 52 years of age, or between one 42 and one 52 years of ago [sic]."), 34740 (statement of
Rep. Perkins) ("H.R. 13054... makes it unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire such a person
because of his age or to discharge him. . . because of his age. . . [or] for an employment agency or a
labor union. . . to discriminate against him because of his age."), 34747 (statement of Rep. Dent) ("there
was no parallel legal prohibition of discrimination because of age. . . . Section 4 of the bill [makes it]
unlawful for an employer. .. to fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge or discriminate against any
individual. . . because of age. ").
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Components of Dothard v. Rawlinson
Disparate Impact
1. Conventional evidence of coverage. 1. The Board of Corrections was a state
agency, and states were covered.
2. Conventional evidence of an employment 2. The employer was hiring correctional
opportunity. counselors.
3. A fair proxy for the qualified labor pool. 3. The national population was a fair proxy
for the qualified labor pool for the job of
correctional counselor.
4. The employer awarded the opportunity 4. The height and weight minima were
according to a selection criterion that satisfied by 99% of men but only 59% of
favored the comparators over the plaintiffs women. This disparity was statistically
in the proxy. The disparity in success rates significant.
was statistically significant.
5. The selection criterion did not identify 5. The height and weight minima were not
qualified workers. Because the criterion job related.
also had an adverse effect, race or sex was
in fact the chain of events that culminated in
the employer's reason for action.
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In disparate treatment, causation was proved by the fact that the employer
knowingly used race or sex as a basis of selection.
It has just been shown that causation in disparate impact actions was
established with proof that an employment practice had an adverse effect on
the plaintiffs' group and served no legitimate interest of the business. In
disparate treatment actions, causation was proved with evidence that race or
sex was a fact in the employer's reason for action, in other words, that the
employer intentionally disadvantaged the plaintiff because of race or sex.
Because proof of causation was the only distinction between disparate
treatment and disparate impact, the most profitable way to categorize
disparate treatment cases is according to how they proved intent. Two
major categories existed: cases that used only conventional evidence such
as testimony and documents ("conventional disparate treatment"), and cases
that used both conventional and statistical evidence ("statistical disparate
treatment"). The proof in conventional disparate treatment pertained to
how an employer treated one or a small number of persons; in statistical
79. 411 U.S.
was covered by the
80. The case
and the employer (
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disparate treatment, to how an employer treated many persons.
wlinson a. Conventional Disparate Treatment
the employer
In conventional disparate treatment, the dominant paradigm was the
formula provided by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the
statute of establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination. This may
be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv)
that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.79
The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas satisfied the formula. He was an
African-American who had been laid off from ajob due to lack of business.
He applied for recall when business improved, but the employer rejected
him.8O
The McDonnell Douglas formula called for conventional evidence that
the employer was covered by the act, that the plaintiff was qualified for the
job, and that the employer denied the job to the plaintiff. The employer's
seeking of applicants with the plaintiffs qualifications proved that a job
was available. The application proved the plaintiffs willingness to accept
the job. When the plaintiffs race or sex was added to these facts, the
formula permitted the inference that race or sex was a cause of the
employer's act. Justice Rehnquist later explained the basis of this
inference:
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise
unexplained, are more likely than not based on consideration of
impermissible factors. . .. [W]hen all legitimate reasons for rejecting an
applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's
actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume
acts only with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible
consideration such as race.81
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79. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (citation omitted). The fonnula omitted evidence that the employer
was covered by the act, but we will assume the fonnula included such evidence.
80. The case was remanded to give the employer an opportunity to rebut the plaintiffs evidence,
and the employer did. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 390 F. Supp. 501 (E.D. Mo. 1975), afi'd,
528 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1976). However, we are focusing on the components of disparate treatment and
how the McDonnell Douglas fonnula proved them. For this purpose, the plaintiff prevailed, and the
subsequent history of the case can be ignored.
81. Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (emphasis in original).
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In statistical disparate treatment cases, perhaps the most common focus
was hiring. The statistical evidence showed that the employer hired
proportionally fewer qualified members of the plaintiff s group than
comparators, and the conventional evidence showed that race or sex
influenced the hiring. Hazelwood School District v. United States provides
a good examp1e.82
Conventional evidence proved that the employer was covered by the
act and offered an employment opportunity. In Hazelwood, the employer
was a school district and it was hiring teachers.
Statistical evidence functioned in the same way in statistical disparate
treatment actions as in disparate impact actions. The plaintiffs identified a
fair proxy for the qualified labor pool, and thereby proved they were willing
and able to do the job. In Hazelwood, the plaintiff proposed as a proxy the
teachers in the county in which the school district was located; 84.6 percent
of them were white and 15.4 percent were black. When a court accepted
the plaintiffs' proxy as fair, the proxy thereafter stood for the qualified labor
pool, and whatever was proved about the proxy was presumed to be true of
the qualified labor pool. In Hazelwood, the plaintiffs proxy indicated that
15.4 percent of persons willing and able to take teaching jobs in the school
district were black. 83
The next step in statistical disparate treatment was a showing that the
employer denied employment opportunities to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
made this showing with evidence of a disparity between their representation
in the proxy and their representation among beneficiaries of the opportunity
in question. In Hazelwood, the district had hired 405 new teachers. Being
15.4 percent of the proxy, blacks would have received approximately (.154
x 405 =) 62 jobs if race had played no role in hiring; but only 15 or (15 +
405 =) 3.7 percent of the new teachers were black. Thus, the plaintiff
proved a disparity between the expected outcome in a non-discriminatory
process (62 black teachers) and the actual outcome in this case (15 black
teachers). Applying a standard technique, the Court noted that the disparity
was statistically significant. 84 This meant that the disparity was highly
unlikely to have occurred by chance in a process not influenced by race. It
82. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
83. The defendant challenged this proxy by pointing out that the major city in the county had an
affirmative action program that attracted a large share of the black teachers in the county. Accordingly,
the defendant argued that the plaintiffs proxy was inappropriate because it included the city; the
defendant proposed as a proxy the teachers in the county excluding the city. Approximately 94 percent
of the teachers in this proxy were white and 6 percent black. The Supreme Court remanded the case to
the district court for a finding as to the appropriate proxy. [d. at 310-12. In the text we will use the
plaintiffs proxy.
84. See id. at 310 n.17 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977)).
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Then the issue became causation. Why did the disparity occur?
Statistical evidence can suggest the reason for an act, but cannot prove a
reason.85 Only conventional evidence can prove a reason. Therefore, the
last step in statistical proof of disparate treatment was for the plaintiff to
present conventional evidence of causation. In Hazelwood, the plaintiff
proved that the defendant had openly refused to hire black teachers in the
past, recruited only at predominantly white colleges, and left hiring
decisions to the unsupervised discretion of principals, who used subjective
criteria. In addition, the plaintiff proved, using the McDonnell Douglas
formula, that the defendant had discriminated against 16 individuals. This
evidence proved that race was a cause of the employer's act.
The principal defense to disparate treatment was the bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ). Title VII allowed an employer to limit
an employment opportunity to members of a particular religion, sex, or
national origin if the characteristic was "reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise."86 For present purposes,
the important aspect of this defense is that a BFOQdestroyed the element of
qualifications in the prima facie case (as did the defense of job relatedness
in disparate impact)Y If a characteristic like sex or religion was genuinely
a BFOQfor a job, then anyone lacking the characteristic was not qualified
for the job. For example, men are not qualified for the job of modeling
women's bathing suits.88 Being qualified for the job was a component of
disparate treatment.
It was shown above that proof of job relatedness in a disparate impact
action rebutted the plaintiffs' proof of qualifications for the job. Here it has
been shown that proof of a BFOQ also rebutted the plaintiff s proof of
qualifications.
The table below summarizes how the facts of McDonnell Douglas and
Hazelwood proved the components of disparate treatment.
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85. Int'I Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 43 I U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977) ("Statistics showing
racial or ethnic imbalance are probative. . . because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful
discrimination. . .").
86. Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) §703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
87. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
88. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex,
29 C.F.R. § l604.2(a)(2) (2003). See also LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, 3d ed., supra note 9, at 393-396.
Components of McDonnell Hazelwood
Disparate Douglas v.
Treatment Formula United States
1. Conventional evidence of 1. The employer had 15 or 1. The employer was a
coverage. more employees. public school district, and
public employers were
covered.
2. Conventional evidence of 2. The employer sought 2. The employer hired 405
an employment opportunity. applicants. teachers.
3. Conventional 3. The plaintiffformerly 3. Teachers in the county
Conventional evidence of held the job and applied for were a fair proxy for the
interest and qualifications. recall. qualified labor pool.
Statistical
A fair proxy for the
qualified labor pool.
4.Conventional 4. The plaintiffs 4. The employer hired 47
Conventional evidence that application was rejected. fewer blacks than would
the employer denied the have been expected in a
opportunity to the plaintiff. non-discriminatory process.
Statistical
A statistically significant
disparity between the
plaintiffs and the
comparators to whom the
employer awarded the
opportunity.
5. Race or sex was a cause 5. The plaintiff was an 5. The employer had openly
of the employer's act in that African-American, was refused to hire black
the employer intentionally qualified, and applied for a teachers in the past,
denied the plaintiff an job that was available. The recruited only at
employment opportunity legitimate reasons for predominantly white
because of race or sex. rejecting the plaintiff colleges, and left hiring
having been ruled out, race decisions to the discretion
or sex was a cause of the of principals who used
employer's refusal to rehire subjective criteria. Sixteen
the plaintiff. qualified blacks applied and
were rejected. Thus race or
sex was a cause of the
employer's hiring decisions.
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3. Overlap afDisparate Treatment and Disparate Impact
°nited States
nployer was a
hool district, and
1ployers were
nployer hired 405
Disparate treatment and disparate impact overlapped almost entirely; they
differed only in the methods used to establish that race or sex was a cause
of the employer's act. Relief under Title VII before 1991 was the same,
whether the plaintiff used disparate treatment or disparate impact; this is
further evidence that disparate treatment and disparate impact were
methods of proof, not claims.
~.
f
f
,
1:
If disparate treatment and disparate impact were different methods of
proving the same claim, as Justice Powell's theorem held, it would not be
surprising if they overlapped substantially. And overlap they did in all
regards except for the way of proving causation.
Disparate impact and both forms of disparate treatment used
conventional evidence to show that the employer was covered by the act
and offered an employment opportunity.
Conventional disparate treatment used conventional evidence to
establish the plaintiffs interest in the opportunity and qualifications for it.
Statistical disparate treatment and disparate impact established these facts
via a fair proxy for the qualified labor pool.
Conventional disparate treatment also used conventional evidence to
prove that the employer denied the opportunity to the plaintiff. Disparate
impact and statistical disparate treatment proved this fact by means of a
statistically significant disparity between the success rates of the plaintiffs
and the comparators in the proxy.
Both forms of disparate treatment proved that race or sex was a but-for
cause of the employer's act by showing that the employer intentionally
rejected the plaintiff because of race or sex. The employer's intent was
proved with conventional evidence, both direct and circumstantial, such as
that the employer recruited only at predominantly white colleges and that
all legitimate reasons for rejecting the plaintiff were ruled out.
Disparate impact proved that race or sex was a but-for cause of the
employer's act by showing that the selection criterion did not identify
qualified workers, but did favor comparators over plaintiffs.
The defenses were also the same. If sex, religion, or national origin
was a BFOQ for a job, then individuals who lacked the relevant
characteristic were not qualified to do the work. A man was not qualified to
portray Cleopatra. If a selection criterion was job related, individuals who
failed to satisfy the criterion were not qualified to do the work. If a job
required the ability to type at 75 words per minute, a man who scored 50
words per 111inuteon a typing test was not qualified for the job, even if
proportionally fewer men than women passed the test.
In sum, disparate treatment and disparate impact were
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indistinguishable, except for the way of proving that race or sex was a cause
of the employer's act. Both proved that race or sex influenced the
employer's act, but disparate treatment proved that the employer knew of
the role played by race or sex (it was a fact in the reason for action),
whereas disparate impact proved that race or sex was a fact in the chain of
events that culminated in the employer's reason for action.
The conclusion follows that causation was an element of the claim of
discrimination, but intent was not. Intent was one of two ways of proving
causation.
This conclusion is fortified by the relief that was available under Title
VII. Whichever method of proof the plaintiff used - disparate treatment or
disparate impact - the relief was the same: back pay and an injunction.89
4. The Claim of Discrimination
The elements of the claim of discrimination are stated.
This analysis of disparate treatment and disparate impact establishes
that the elements of the claim of discrimination were
1.The employer was covered by the act.
2. The employer offered an employment opportunity.
3. The plaintiff was protected by the act -
a.was qualified for the opportunity
b.was willing to accept the opportunity.
4. The employer denied the opportunity to the plaintiff.
5. Race or sex was a cause ofthe denial.
The table below summarizes the components of disparate treatment
and disparate impact and shows how they proved the elements of the claim
of discrimination.
89. See SCRLE!& GROSSMAN,2d ed., supra note 73, cbs. 37-38 (discussing back pay and
injunctions).
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Elements of
the Claim of
Discrimination
1. The employer was
covered by the act.
2. The employer offered an
employment opportunity.
3. The plaintiff was
protected by the act
-
was
qualified for and willing to
accept the opportunity.
4. The employer denied the
opportunity to the plaintiff.
5. Race or sex was a cause
of the denial.
5.
DISPARATE IMPACT
Components of
Disparate Treatment
1. Conventional evidence of
coverage.
2. Conventional evidence of
an employment opportunity.
3. Conventional
Conventional evidence of
interest and qualifications.
Statistical
A fair proxy for the
qualified labor pool.
4. Conventional
Conventional evidence that
the employer denied the
opportunity to the plaintiff.
Statistical
A statistically significant
disparity between the
plaintiffs and the
comparators to whom the
employer awarded the
opportunity.
5. The employer
intentionally denied an
opportunity to the plaintiff
because of race or sex.
Application to the Age Act
27
Components of
Disparate Impact
1. Conventional evidence of
coverage.
2. Conventional evidence of
an employment opportunity.
3. A fair proxy for the
qualified labor pool.
4. A statistically significant
disparity between the
plaintiffs and the
comparators to whom the
employer awarded the
opportunity.
5. The selection criterion
according to which the
opportunity was awarded
did not identify qualified
workers, but favored the
comparators over the
plaintiffs.
Justice Powell's theorem, which characterized Title VII before 1991,
applies to the Age Act, which was not amended in any relevant way in 1991.
Justice Powell's theorem is no longer true of Title VII. The overlap of
disparate treatment and disparate impact remains true, but the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 has created separate claims with different relief for intentional
and unintentional discrimination; the former is proved by disparate
~~1(
\.~rJ
. \ \ \ ~,"'\
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treatment, and the latter, by disparate impact. Nevertheless, the theorem
continues to apply to the Age Act, which Congress did not amend in any
relevant way in 1991. Disparate treatment and disparat~ impact remain
alternative methods of proof under the Age Act.
B. CON: Justice Powell's Theorem Is False
SEC. 4. (a) It sha
employer -
(I) to fail or reft
any individual 0
against any indi,
compensation, tt
privileges of em]
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°Pf
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A claim is a group of facts which gives rise to relief Thefacts of disparate
treatment differ from the facts of disparate impact, and therefore, disparate
treatment and disparate impact are separate claims.
PRO is mistaken. Justice Powell's theorem is false. Disparate
treatment and disparate impact have always been separate claims. A claim
is "a group of facts which give rise to one or more rights of relief."9O If
group A, comprising facts 1, 2, and 3, justifies relief of some sort, and if
group B, comprising facts 2, 3, and 4, also justifies relief, groups A and B
are different claims. For example, the torts of assault and battery are
similar, except that the plaintiffs apprehension of an intentional harmful or
offensive contact is an element of assault only, and physical contact is an
element of battery only.91 Likewise, disparate treatment and disparate
impact are similar, but they are distinguished by the fact of intent. Intent is
an element of the former but not the latter, and therefore, they are and
always have been separate claims.
Whether 1
section 4( a)( 1)
The term
(4)(a)(1) of tb
IV.
PROHIBITIONOF AGE DISCRIMINATIONIN EMPLOYERPRACTICES:SECTION
4(a)(2)
A. PRO: Section 4(a)(2) Includes Disparate Impact
Sections 703(a)(l) of Title VII and 4(a)(I) of the Age Act are aimed at
intentional discrimination. i.e., disparate treatment. The bases of disparate
impact are sections 703(a)(2) and 4(a)(2).
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The surest indication of the will of. Congress is the text of an act.
Begin with the prohibitory sections of the Age Act. Because these sections
are practically identical to the corresponding sections of Title VII (except
for the classes protected), and the two statutes are so often compared, below
are quoted the relevant prohibitory sections of both acts.
90. FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 76 (1965) (emphasis in original) (citing CHARLES
EDWARD CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 137 (2d ed. 1947) and Elliott v.
Mosgrove, 93 P.2d 1070 (Or. 1939)).
91. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 41 (1964).
See also \i
ed. 1952) (unabridg.
edition); WEBSTER'
~
J-
Age Act Title VII
SEC.4. (a) It shall be unlawful for an SEC.703. (a) It shall be an unlawful
employer
-
employment practice for an employer-
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise to discriminate any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age; individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classifY his national origin; or
employees in any way which would deprive (2) to limit, segregate, or classifY his
or tend to deprive any individual of employees in any way which would deprive
employment opportunities or otherwise or tend to deprive any individual of
adversely affect his status as an employee, employment opportunities or otherwise
because of such individual's age.92 adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin?3
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Whether the Age Act embraces disparate impact depends on whether
section 4(a)(l) or section 4(a)(2) require proof of intent.
The term "to discriminate" in sections 703(a)(l) of Title VII and
(4)(a)(l) of the Age Act is so obviously aimed at intentional acts94 that
~inal) (citing CHARLES
. 1947) and Elliott v.
92. 29 U.S.c. § 623 (2003).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
94. The root meaning of the verb "to discriminate" is simply to distinguish. The verb derives
from the Latin word "discriminatus, past part[iciple] of discriminare to divide, distinguish, fr[om]
discrimin-, discrimen division, distinction, decision, fr[om] discern ere to separate, distinguish
between. . .." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 648
(1981) (unabridged). The verb began to carry a negative connotation, as in "to discriminate against," as
early as 1880. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY VOLUME III 436 (1st. ed 1897) ("10 discriminate
against: to make an adverse distinction with regard to; to distinguish unfavourably from others. 1880
MARK TWAIN (Clemens) Tramp. Abr. II 153, I did not propose to be discriminated against on account of
my nationality."). By 1930 "to discriminate against" had come into common usage. See WEBSTER'S
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 637 (1 st. ed 1930) (unabridged)
("discriminate, v.i. . . . 2. To make a difference in treatment or favor (of one as compared with others);
as, to discriminate in favor of one's friends; to discriminate against a special class.").
Mark Twain in 1880, the Oxford English Dictionary in 1897, and Webster's New International
Dictionary in 1930 must have had intentional discrimination in mind. No one suggests that the idea of
unintentional discrimination existed in those days. Although we have not pinpointed when the idea of
disparate impact first developed, we can assert that it was not generally understood in the 1960's when
Title VII and the Age Act were passed. See Michael Evan Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory,
Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a
Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429, 520-564 (1985) [hereinafter "Gold, Griggs'
Folly"].
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See also WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONALDICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 745 (2d
ed. 1952) (unabridged) (giving exactly the same definition of "to discriminate" that appeared in the first
edition); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 648 (3d
~\\
i. \. \ \ \ \.t~
~~\i..~\ \ \ \
. ,
30 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vo1.2S:l 2004
sections 703(a)(2) of Title VII and 4(a)(2) of the Age Act are more
appropriate as the statutory bases for disparate impact.95 The question,
therefore, is whether intent is an element of section 4(a)(2):
impact. T
section 703
1. The Text o/Section 4(a)(2)
The Sup
prohibitions c
By copying s
VII, CongresE
section 703(a
703(a)(2) ofl
Evans, the C<
purpose, the I
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practices with
An employment practice with a disparate impact "limit[s}" or
"classif{ies}" workers so as to deny them employment opportunities.
The first phrase of section 4(a)(2) of the Age Act names three specific
acts - "to limit, segregate, or classify. . . employees." Given the long
history of intentional racial segregation in this country, let us accept that
"segregate" refers to an intentional act. The other two words in the phrase,
however, have no such history, and they are modified so as to give them
maximum reach: "to limit. . . or classify in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities..."
(emphasis added). An employment practice with a disparate impact limits
the advancement of qualified workers and classifies them so as to deprive
them of employment opportunities.
3. Causation
2. Precedent
The words
denial of al
act of a frt
case, which
aware of th
a chain of
case, whic!
need not beThe Supreme Court has held that section 703(a)(2) embraces disparate
ed. 1961) (unabridged) (changing the wording but not the sense of the definition: "to make a difference
in treatment or favor on a class or categorical basis in disregard of individual merit <- in favor of your
mends><habitually - against a certain nationality>"). Abridged versions of these works, appearing as
various editions of Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, were likely to have been used by many
representatives and senators. See NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 237 (1960) (using an abbreviated
version of the definition found in the first and second editions of Webster's New International
Dictionary, unabridged: "to make a difference in treatment or favor (of one as compared with others)");
WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 238 (1965) (abridged) (using the same definition
as the third edition of Webster's New International Dictionary, unabridged: "to make a difference in
treatment or favor on a basis other than individual merit").
Dictionaries ITom other publishers were similar. See RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 41 I (1966) (unabridged) (defining "to discriminate" similarly to the definition in
Webster's Third New International, unabridged, of 1961: "to make a distinction in favor of or against a
person or thing on the basis of the group, class, or category to which the person or thing belongs, rather
than according to individual merit: He discriminates against foreigners"); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 418 (WORLD PUBLISHING CO., 1966) (offering substantially
the same definition: "to make distinctions in treatment; show partiality (in favor oj) or prejudice
(against).").
That the same or very similar words were used to define "to discriminate" between 1930 and
1966 implies that the meaning of this verb was also the same: it referred to intentional discrimination.
95. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426, n.1 (1971) (holding employer liable
for violating section 703(a)(2) on the disparate impact theory); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 445
(1982) (same).
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The Supreme Court stated the obvious in Lorillard v. Pons: "the
prohibitions of the [Age Act] were derived in haec verba from Title VII."96
By copying section 4(a)(2) of the Age Act from section 703(a)(2) of Title
VII, Congress intended section 4(a)(2) of the Age Act to mean exactly what
section 703(a)(2) of Title VII meant. The Court held in Griggs that section
703(a)(2) of Title VII embraced disparate impact. In Oscar Mayer & Co. v.
Evans, the Court added that "the [Age Act] and Title VII share a common
purpose, the elimination of discrimination in the workplace."97 It follows
that Congress meant section 4(a)(2) of the Age Act to outlaw employment
practices with a disparate impact.
"limit[sj" or
'tunities.
3. Causation
~aces disparate
The words "because of age" require a causal connection between the
denial of an employment opportunity and a worker's age. The cause of the
act of a free agent may be a fact in the agent's reason for acting; in this
case, which in the present context, is called disparate treatment, the agent is
aware of the fact. The cause of an act of a free agent may also be a fact in
a chain of events that culminates in the agent's reason for acting; in this
case, which in the present context, is called disparate impact, the agent
need not be aware of thefact.
G: "to make a difference
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ese works, appearing as
ve been used by many
) (using an abbreviated
er's New International
ompared with others)");
sing the same definition
to make a difference in
The words "because of. .. age" in section 4(a)(2) of the Age Act
indicate that the denial of an employment opportunity is unlawful only if
the denial is caused by age. (A denial caused by personal animosity, for
example, or political affiliation would not violate the statute.) There being
no indication to the contrary, it is appropriate to assume that Congress had
ordinary ideas of causation in mind. Two of them are presently relevant.
The first idea of causation holds that a fact in a person's reason for action is
a cause of the act; the disparate treatment method of proving discrimination
incorporates this idea. The second idea of causation holds that a fact in a
chain of facts that culminates in a reason for action is a cause of the act; the
disparate impact method of proving discrimination incorporates this idea.
These ideas require explication.
Let us begin with what may be called "empirical causation."
Regarding all things empirical except humans, causation is an hypothesis.
We want to explain why event E occurs, usually because we want to
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replicate it or prevent it, or simply to understand it. We observe that event
C regularly precedes E, and we conclude that C is the cause (or one of the
causes) of E. We observe rain precede floods, and we conclude that rain
causes floods. We observe a white billiard ball roll towards and strike a
colored billiard ball, which then moves, and we conclude that the white ball
caused the colored ball to move. Yet we never observe empirical causation.
It is not a sensible phenomenon. Rather, causation is an hypothesis, an
idea, a mental construct. We observe, and our minds supply the
connections.
Empirical causation is perhaps the most successful hypothesis in
history. Most people believe in it so firmly that they reject any challenge to
it out of hand. Who would say that the theory of causation might be false?
Who would disagree that every event has a cause?
And yet, in the realm in which we have the most constant and
immediate evidence, the realm of our own behavior, all of us (except
determinists) reject empirical causation. The hypothesis of causation does
not explain the subjective experience of human decision making. Instead,
we employ the doctrine of free will to explain this experience. Lawyers and
most other persons believe that the human will does not have empirical
causes. Human agents make free choices, and then are responsible for
them. Indeed, in those rare circumstances in which a person is not a free
agent, in which one's will is overborne - in which empirical causation
genuinely exists - we hold that the person has not truly acted and is not
responsible, even though the person was not physically manipulated. Our
laws are not concerned with such acts. Our laws are concerned only with
acts reflecting choice and emanating from free will.
Although we believe that human acts have no empirical causes, we
continue to explain human acts in causal terms. The question, therefore,
arises: what do we have in mind when we speak of "human causation?"
What does it mean to say that free agent A acted "because of' cause C?
This question is more easily addressed in another form, namely, what
causes a human act? An empirical fact may not be such a cause; if it were,
it would be tantamount to an empirical cause, which is inconsistent with
free will. Rain does not cause an agent to carry one's umbrella. Rain may
cause a flood, but a free agent who observes rain has a choice about
whether to carry one's umbrella.
If an empirical fact does not cause a human act, what does? The
answer is a reason. A reason may be the cause of a human act because a
free agent can decide whether a given reason warrants action. Thus, it is
entirely correct to say:
(1) A carried her umbrella because she wanted to protect herself from
the rain.
Statement (1) means that A performed the act of carrying her umbrella,
and her reason fOl
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and her reason for this act was her desire to protect herself from the rain.
We are now prepared to answer the prior question above, namely, what
does it mean to say that free agent A acted "because of' cause C? Human
acts are caused, not by empirical facts, but by reasons upon which a free
agent decides whether or not to act. Therefore, C must be a reason in the
agent's mind, and to say that A acted "because of' C is to say that C was
A 's reason for action.
Nevertheless, we commonly say that a human act was caused by an
empirical fact. Suppose that rain was falling to the west of A 's home in the
early morning hours. The wind was blowing from the west, and the
National Weather Service predicted a 90 chance that the rain would reach
A's city by noon. Before leaving for work, A listened to the weather
forecast, which said, "There is a 90 percent chance of rain today," and she
decided to carry her umbrella. It would be correct to say:
(2) A carried her umbrella because the wind was blowing from the
west.
A statement like (2) is not meant to repudiate the doctrine of free will.
Although the literal meaning of the statement is that an empirical fact
caused the agent's act, we understand the statement to mean that the fact is
a proximate part of a chain of facts that culminates in a reason for action.
When we say A carried her umbrella because the wind was blowing from
the west, we mean that the westerly wind was a fact in a chain of facts that
culminated in her reason for action.
The idea of causation reflected in a chain of facts is, in essence, the
idea of causation in science. Consider lung cancer and smoking tobacco.
In what sense does smoking cause lung cancer? Not every victim of lung
cancer smokes tobacco; thus, smoking is not a necessary cause of lung
cancer. Not every long-time smoker develops lung cancer; thus, smoking is
not a sufficient cause of cancer. Yet the data reveal such a strong
association between smoking and lung cancer that we reasonably believe
that a causal connection exists between them. Our belief would turn to
certainty if we understood the chain of facts in greater detail. For example,
suppose DNA in humans breaks spontaneously with a certain frequency;
that such damage to DNA can lead to cancer; that smoking also damages
DNA; that certain enzymes repair damage to DNA; and that the production
of such enzymes varies with individuals.98 If these facts turn out to be true,
they would explain why some non-smokers develop lung cancer - they
produce too few enzymes to repair spontaneous damage to their DNA; why
some long-time smokers do not develop lung cancer - they produce
sufficient enzymes to repair all damage to their DNA, whether generated
spontaneously or by smoking; and why smokers as a group develop lung
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cancer more than non-smokers do - many smokers produce enough repair
enzymes to cope with spontaneous damage to their DNA, but not enough to
cope with the additional damage caused by smoking. In this example,
smoking, which we call a cause of cancer, is an element in a chain of facts
that often culminates in lung cancer.
One further dimension of causation requires discussion, namely, the
agent's awareness of facts that are identified as causes. In statements like
(1), the agent's reason includes an empirical fact (rain), and the agent is
necessarily aware of this fact. But in statements like (2), the fact identified
as a cause (the westerly wind) is not a part of the agent's reason, and the
agent mayor may not be aware of this fact. A heard the weather forecast;
she did not know about the rain to the west or the westerly wind.
Nonetheless, facts which are part of the chain of facts that culminates in the
agent's reason for action are properly identified as causes if they are
sufficiently proximate to the agent's reason. We may say that A carried her
umbrella because of the weather forecast, of which she was aware, or
because of the rain to the west or the westerly wind, of which she was
unaware.
These ideas may be applied to the Age Act. Assuming that Congress
believed in free will and used the ordinary ideas of causation, the words
"because of... age" refer either to a reason for action which, as the
employer knew, contained age as a fact, or to a reason for action which,
albeit without the employer's knowledge, was the culmination of a chain of
facts that contained age as a proximate fact.
In describing disparate treatment cases above, it was noted that
causation is satisfied because the employer intentionally uses race or sex as
a basis of decision. This description corresponds to one of the ordinary
ideas of causation that Congress incorporated into the Age Act, namely, a
reason for action which, as the employer knows, contains age as a fact. For
example, suppose an employer refuses to hire anyone over the age of 40 for
a certain job. The employer's reason for action includes the worker's age.
The employer knowingly uses this fact as a basis of action. This example is
analogous to statement (1).
(1 ') The employer denied an older worker a job because the worker
was too old.
In describing disparate impact cases above, it was noted that causation
is satisfied because the employer, albeit unknowingly, uses race or sex as a
basis of action. This description corresponds to the other ordinary idea of
causation that Congress incorporated into the Age Act, namely, a reason for
action which, without the employer's knowledge, is the culmination of a
chain of facts that contains age as a proximate element (scientific
causation). For example, suppose that an employer decides whom to hire
according to scores on a written test that includes questions about
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In this example,
t in a chain of facts
contemporary youth culture, and the test has a disparate impact on older
workers. Not being job related, the test does not select qualified candidates;
having an adverse effect as well, the test disadvantages older workers. This
employer unknowingly uses age as a basis of decision, and age is a
proximate fact in the chain of facts that culminates in the employer's action.
The chain comprises the facts that youth culture changes rapidly, that older
persons tend to be disinterested in youth culture, that the test contains
questions about contemporary youth culture, that proportionally more
younger workers than older workers pass the test, that the test does not
predict success on the job, that the employer hires only workers who pass
the test, and that the employer hires proportionally more qualified younger
workers than qualified older workers. This example is analogous to
statement (2).
(2) The employer denied jobs to older workers because the test
contained question about contemporary youth culture.
This examination of the text of section 4(a)(2) of the Age Act leads to
the conclusion that causation is an element of the section, that causation
may be established with or without proof of intent, and, therefore, that the
section bars disparate impact as well as disparate treatment. This
conclusion is reinforced by the differences between the Age Act and Title
VII.
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Congress differentiated the Age Act from Title VII where age discrimination
differs from race or sex discrimination. That section 4(a)(2) is not
differentiated from section 703(a)(2) shows that Congress wanted the
sections to carry the same meaning.
-.:ause the worker
It was noted above that Congress decided not to include age in Title
VII and directed the Secretary of Labor to study the matter. The
postponement was wise because the Secretary found significant differences
between race or sex discrimination and age discrimination. In his Report to
Congress the following year, the Secretary wrote:
The Nation has faced the fact - rejecting inherited prejudice or contrary
conviction - that people's ability and usefulness is [sic] umelated to the
facts of their race. . . . Having accepted this truth, the easy thing to do would
be simply to extend the conclusions derived from it to the problem of
discrimination in employment based on aging, and be done with the matter.
This would be easy -and wrong.99
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It would have been wrong because unique issues pertained to age
discrimination. 100
One issue unique to age was fringe benefits, such as pensions and life
insurance. For this purpose, an employer could treat whites and people of
color the same, but an employer could not treat a newly hired worker aged
27 the same as a newly hired worker aged 47.101 Under most plans, the
latter was a more costly employee.l02 Congress dealt with fringe benefits in
section 4(£)(2). It allowed an employer, "to observe the terms of. . . any
bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance
plan. . . except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure
to hire any individual. "103According to two leading proponents of the Age
Act, Senators Javits and Yarborough, this section meant that an employer
could exclude a newly hired older worker from a pension or insurance plan
or provide the older worker with reduced benefits. 104
Another issue unique to age was time. Older workers might die or
become disabled before getting justice if remedial procedures were too
elaborate. Time was a lesser concern under Title VII, which required
victims of race or sex discrimination to proceed through local agencies and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")before going to
COurt.105As originally introduced, the Secretary of Labor's bill (S. 830 and
H.R. 3651) was not sensitive to the issue of time. The first version of the
bill would have placed enforcement in the hands of the Secretary. Section 7
of the bill contemplated that a victim of age discrimination would file a
charge against an employer with the Secretary. The Secretary would then
investigate. The bill directed that if the Secretary determined that the
employer had committed an unlawful practice, then efforts be made to settle
the matter "by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion." 106 If these methods failed, the Secretary would conduct an
administrative
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100. Legislators and witnesses before legislative committees agreed. For example, consider the
following exchange between Representative Dent and Norman Sprague, director, Committee on
Employment and Retirement of the National Council on the Aging:
MR. DENT. There is some demand that this legislation be put under the Equal Opportunities
Office [that is, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission]. Would you favor such a
motion?
MR. SPRAGUE. No. I would not and I think the National Council on the Aging would not
favor that. We feel that other forms of prejudice are distinctly different from age
discrimination. We think age discrimination has with it too many other economic factors and
should not be dealt with by equal-opportunities legislation.
MR. DENT. It seems to this member that this is a sound observation.
HOUSE HEARINGS, supra note 52, at 49.
101. Secretary's Research Materials, supra note 18, at 21-45.
102. [do at 40-45.
103. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 4(t)(2), 26 U.S.c. § 623 (2003).
104. 113 CONGo REc. 31254-55 (1967) (statements of Sen. Javits and Sen. Yarborough).
105. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(t) (2000).
106. S. 830, 90th Cong., § 7 (1967).
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pertained to age administrative hearing. If the result of the hearing was a detennination that
the employer had broken the law, the Secretary could issue a cease-and-
desist order. The order, however, would not be self enforcing. To secure
enforcement, the Secretary would have to petition a federal court of
appeals.
Senator Javits urged the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare to strike this lengthy procedure,lo7 and the committee complied. It
adopted a much speedier procedure, which was enacted and which took
account of the fact that time works against older workers: a victim of age
discrimination could file a lawsuit sixty days after notifying the Secretary of
Labor of the intent to sue. 108
Where Congress saw significant differences between age
discrimination and race or sex discrimination, the Age Act was
differentiated from Title VII. It is fair to infer that where the two acts were
not differentiated, Congress did not see significant differences between age
discrimination and race or sex discrimination. Congress did not
differentiate between sections 703(a)(2) of Title VII and 4(a)(2) of the Age
Act; the sections are virtually identical. The conclusion is obvious: the
meaning of the sections is also identical.
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B. CON: Section 4(a)(2) Precludes Disparate Impact
Legislative history demonstrates that Congress did not intend disparate
impact under Title VII or the Age Act.
1. Precedent
Griggs misread the intent of Congress.
)r example, consider the
director, Committee on PRO'S reliance on Griggs v. Duke Power Company is misplaced. It is
time to recognize that the Griggs' construction of section 703(a)(2) of Title
VII was mistaken. Congress was largely innocent of disparate impact whileEqual Opportunities
Id you favor such a
Ie Aging would not
different from age
;onomic factors and
-~
107. The Administration's bill. . . would require the establishment of a wholly new and
separate bureaucracy within the Labor Department, replete with regional directors, attorneys
and investigators, as well as trial examiners. Aside from the needless duplication of functions
involved, one result of the Administration's approach will surely be the same delays which
plague so many of our agencies, such as the EEOC and the NLRB [National Labor Relations
Board]. The EEOC, for example, is already years behind in disposing of its docket. Such
delay is always unfortunate, but it is particularly so in the case of older citizens to whom, by
definition, relatively few productive years are left. By utilizing the courts rather than a
bureaucracy within the Labor Department as the forum to hear cases arising under the law,
these delays may be largely avoided.
Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 24 (statement of Sen. Javits).
108. S. REp. No. 90-723, supra note 49, at 5. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §§
7(c)-7(d), 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2003).
§ 623 (2003).
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3. The Legislative History of Section 4(a)(2)
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Title VII was being debated, and, further, in the few instances in which
practices that have an adverse effect were considered (nepotism in
admission to labor unions, seniority systems, and professionally developed
written tests), Congress decided that they were beyond the reach of the
statute.109The error of Griggs should not be repeated under the Age Act.
2. The Text of Section 4(a)(2)
PRO'S argument based on the text of section 4(a}(2) is anachronistic.
PRO'S argument about the meaning of the words "limit" and "classifY"
in section 4(a)(2) interprets those words with today's dictionary in mind,
not the dictionary of 1967.110 The following sections of this article
demonstrate that the proponents of the Age Act meant to prohibit only
intentional discrimination.
The legislative history of section 4(a}(2) reveals that Congress did not mean
to outlaw disparate impact in 1967.
PRO argues that disparate impact establishes but-for causation. III Sole
112. 113 CONC
113. [d. at 312:
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a. Sale Cause as the Test of Causation
Congress intended sole causation to be the test of causation under the Age
Act.
109. Gold, Griggs' Folly, supra note 94, at 530c549. An additional piece of evidence is an
amendment offered in the House of Representatives that would have made it unlawful to prefer one
employee over another "for reasons which may have the indirect effect of causing discrimination
because or race. .." 110 CONGo REc. 2593 (1964) (amendment offered by Rep. Cahill). Representative
Griffin explained why he could not support the amendment:
The amendment... refers to other practices which "may" have the "indirect effect" of
discriminating on the basis of race, color, and so forth. [should like to say for the record and
for the purpose of establishing legislative history, that if a union, or an employer, for that
matter, engage in a practice which is a subterfuge amounting to discrimination on the basis of
race, color, or creed in some indirect fashion then a court would probably find that such a
practice would fall within the scope of this bill. However, so far as the gentleman's
amendment is concerned, there are factors such as seniority, length of employment, and other
factors which could affect union membership, union rights, and so forth, and have nothing to
do with color, race, or creed. . . . I hesitate to support the amendment for the reasons [ have
indicated.
[d. at 2594. The amendment was defeated. [d. at 2595.
110. See supra Part IV(A)(I).
Ill. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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nstances in which
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causation, however, is the appropriate test under the Age Act. Senator
Yarborough, the floor manager of S. 830, and Senator Javits, the leading
proponent of a bill against age discrimination, each indicated their belief
that sole causation would be the test of causation under the Age Act.
Senator Yarborough stated, "In simple terms, this bill prohibits
discrimination in hiring and firing workers solely because they are over 40
and under 65."]]2 Senator Javits stated:
[1]f two individuals ages 52 and 42 apply for the same job, and the
employer selected the man aged 42 solely
- and 1 emphasize that word
"solely" - because he is younger than the man 52, then he will have violated
the act. . . . The question here is: Was the individual discriminated against
solely because of his age?]]3
In the House of Representatives, similar statements were made by
Representative Perkins,114who was the chair of the House Committee on
Education and Labor;ll5 by Representative Dent,]16 who was chair of the
General Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and
Labor;1l7 and by Representatives Pucinski,ll8 Hawkins,ll9 Olsen, 120
Matsunaga, ]2]and Randall. 122
Sole causation plainly refers to an action based on a single, illegal
reason, such as an explicit age limit (which is clearly disparate treatment).
:hronistic.
oit" and "classify"
ictionary in mind,
os of this article
t to prohibit only
?SSdid not mean
n under the Age
112. 113 CONG.REc. 31252 (1967).
113. Id. at 31255.
114. "A person at age 40 or 45 . . . often finds that his age is a great handicap in finding a
job. . . . Despite the fact that these men are educable, retrainable, and desirous of gainful employment,
they have been denied employment opportunities merely because they have reached or passed age 40."
Id. at 34740.
115. CCH CONGRESSIONAL INDEX, 90TH CONGRESS6007 (1967-68).
116. The bill. . . provides relief only when a qualified person who is ready, willing, and able
to work is unfairly denied or deprived of a job solely on the basis of age. . . . The bill recognizes
two distinct types of unfair discrimination based on age: First, the discrimination which is the result
of misunderstanding of the relationship of age to usefulness; and second, the discrimination which
is the result of a deliberate disregard of a worker's value solely because of age.
113 CONGoREc. 34747 (1967).
117. CCH CONGRESSIONAL INDEX, 90TH CONGRESS 6008 (1967-68).
118. "But these programs will not help if the older worker with a newly learned skill and high
expectations runs into arbitrary discrimination based solely on his chronological age." 113 CONGo REc.
34744 (1967).
119. "[T]he time has now come for a concerted effort to eliminate job discrimination based solely
on age. H.R. 13054 would make a major contribution to that effort. . .
"
Id.
120. "Very often, the older worker is excluded from consideration for positions for which he is
eminently qualified solely because of his age." Id. at 34746.
121. "Title VII . . . does not encompass the important area of age, and it is vital that Federal
legislation now be enacted to correct the widespread discriminatory employment practices found in this
area. Twenty-four States. . . have already passed legislation making it unlawfuJ to discriminate merely
on the basis of age. . ." Id. at 34742.
122. "It seems irrational for society on the one hand to do everything possible to extend the life
span of a man, and on the other hand throw him out to a sort of scrap heap as unusable, solely because of
his chronological age." Id. at 34750.
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PRO may be correct that disparate impact establishes but-for causation, but
disparate impact does not establish sole causation and, therefore, should not
be permitted under the Age Act.
c. The Secre
b. The Absence of Debate
The Repor.
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As it discussed the Age Act, Congress did not consider any of the issues
pertinent to disparate impact.
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The legislative history of section 4(a)(2) of the Age Act reveals that
Congress knew no more about disparate impact in 1967 than in 1964.
Issues obviously central to disparate impact were never mentioned in
committee hearings,123in committee reports,124or in discussiQns on the floor
of Congress.125 No representative or senator asked questions that would
have been obvious to anyone who understood disparate impact. For
example, how much of a disparity would be necessary to constitute an
adverse effect? How strongly must a selection criterion be correlated with
success on the job in order to be job related? How costly would it be to
prove that a test is job related, and could a small employer afford the cost?
Would it be fair to award damages against an employer who used a test in
good faith, not knowing it had an adverse effect and was not job related? In
addition, no witness or legislator described an employment practice with a
disparate impact and said the act would or should outlaw the practice. Nor
was disparate impact understood outside of Congress at this time.126
123. Senate Hearings, supra note 15; House Hearings, supra note 52.
124. S. REP. No. 90-723, supra note 49; H.R. REp. No. 90-805, supra note 54.
125. The word "discussions" is used instead of the word "debates" because no one opposed the bill
on the floor of Congress. The House and Senate discussions are recorded at I I3 CONGo REc. 31248-57,
34738-55,35053-57,35153 (1967).
126. For example, Senator Yarborough ordered printed, as Appendix A to the testimony of
Anthony Obadal, Secretary of the Advisory Panel on Older Workers of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
a document entitled "Summary of State Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in Employment Because of
Age," printed by the Department of Labor as Fact Sheet 6-B, dated August, 1966. Senate Hearings,
supra note 15, at 115. The Senator also ordered printed, as Appendix B to Mr. Obadal's testimony,
another document entitled "Age Discrimination Prohibited Under State Laws," printed by the
Department of Labor as Fact Sheet 6-C, dated February, 1966. [d. at 119. Neither document mentioned
practices with an adverse effect.
Judge J. Edward Conway, Commissioner of the New York State Commission on Human
Rights, testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor and brought with him a document entitled
"The Older Worker: Rulings Interpretive of the Age Provisions of the Law Against Discrimination." Id.
at 233, 245. The document comments on pre-employment tests, an area rife with practices that have a
disparate impact: "Pre-employment physical examinations relating to minimum physical standards for
employment are lawful, provided the minimum physical standards are reasonably necessary for the work
to be performed and are unifonnly applied to all applicants for the particular job category." [d. at 249.
Thus, the New York commission was approaching the theory of disparate impact. Physical
examinations had to be job related. However, the commission had not yet articulated the other element
of disparate impact, namely, that the practice in question has an adverse effect on a protected class (New
York apparently [I
practice need not
recognizing dispal
127. Secretar
128. [d. at 2 (
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-for causation, but
~refore, should not
c. The Secretary's Report
'ny of the issues
The Report of the Secretary of Labor referred to practices that
"unintentionally affect the employment of the older worker, though they
were not developed for this purpose." The Report was referring, not to
disparate impact, but to practices that motivated employers to establish age
limits in hiring older workers, i.e., disparate treatment.
Although disparate impact lacked a name and a theory in 1967, some
practices that unintentionally disadvantaged older workers were known.
All of them, however, led to age limits - that is, to disparate treatment, not
to disparate impact.
A few such practices were discussed in the Secretary's Report. A
subsection of the section Findings was entitled "Institutional Arrangements
that Indirectly Restrict the Employment of Older Workers," and it began
with a passage that today might be read as an apt description of practices
that have a disparate impact on older workers: "A broad range of personnel
programs and practices affect the employment ofthe older worker, although
they were not developed for this purpose. Instituted to bring efficiency,
equity, order, and improved fringe benefits, they operate with some force
against older workers not within their compass."127 At the time it was
written, however, this passage referred only to disparate treatment. The
passage described practices that unintentionally motivated employers to
adopt age limits in hiring, or that, coupled with age limits, disadvantaged
older workers. An earlier passage in the report makes clear that this reading
is correct. After describing three kinds of discrimination that affect older
workers, the Introduction stated:
There is finally, so far as age is concerned, that kind of "discrimination"
which results when an employer turns an older man or woman away, not
because of concern about the individual's ability to perform the work, but
because of programs and practices actually designed to protect the
employmentof older workers while they remain in the work force, and to
provide support when they leave it or are ill. Seniority and promotion-
from-within systems, and pension and insurance programs, are a mark of
civilization. They vastly enhancethe dignity,the security,the quality of the
later years of life in the United States. At the same time, ironically, they
sometimes have tended to push still further down the age at which
employers begin asking whether or not a prospective employee is too
old to be taken on.128
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Yark apparently required that aU physical examinations be job related; under disparate impact theory, a
practice need not be job related unless it has an adverse effect). New York was only one step shy of
recognizing disparate impact, but shy nonetheless.
127. SecretGl)"s Report, supra note 18, at 15.
128. Id. at 2 (italics in original) (boldface added).
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The Secretary also wrote, "The explanations given by employers for
the adoption of age limits include. . . a policy of promotion-from-within
and accompanying restriction of hiring to younger ages and entry jobS."129
Thus promotion from within, coupled with disparate treatment, cost older
workers jobs; the firm hired only at the entry level, and those jobs were
reserved for younger workers. 130
Would promotion from within have had an adverse effect on older
workers even if they had been eligible for entry-level jobs?l3I The Report
did not consider this question. The Secretary's only concern was that
promotion from within, coupled with age limits for entry-level jobs, made it
difficult for unemployed older workers to find jobs.
Although seniority often benefited older workers, one aspect of it could
be harmful, namely, the breadth of the seniority unit. A worker who was
laid off had recall rights only within one's seniority unit. When the unit
was narrowly drawn, an older worker often found oneself laid off from
one's unit while the employer brought new hires into other units. 132
Did narrow seniority units have an adverse effect on older workers?
The Secretary knew both that narrow units disadvantaged some older
workers, and that seniority aided many others by protecting them from lay
offs, giving them preferences in promotion, entitling them to higher wages,
and so forth. If the Secretary had been aware of disparate impact, his report
would have weighed these opposing effects.
The practices that led to perhaps the most detrimental effects on older
workers were fringe benefits such as pensions and medical insurance.
Because of such programs, older workers were (or were thought to be) more
costly to employ; and, therefore, employers had an incentive to hire
younger workers. I33 Once again, it was not disparate impact that concerned
the Secretary. His concern was that these practices motivated employers to
impose age limits.
This interpretation
change. The third
is reinforced by the Secretary's proposals for
section of his Report, "Conclusions and
129. Jd. at 8 (boldface added).
130. The adverse effect of promotion from within on older workers had been known for many
years. KERRY SEGRAVE, AGE DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS (2001) [hereinafter "SEGRAVE, AGE
DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS"] 33,45,57,65,94,97, 105, 121 (noting various sources from 1929,
1931, 1937, 1949, 1952, 1961 and 1965 asserting that finns held out promotion-from-within as a reason
for not hiring older workers).
131. On the one hand, older workers outside the firm still would not have been considered for
higher-level jobs for which the outsiders' skiJI and experience qualified them, as those jobs would have
been reserved for workers inside the firm. On the other hand, older workers inside the finn would not
have had to compete for promotion against workers outside the finn. The result of these opposing
effects is uncertain.
132. Secretary's Report, supra note 18, at 15.
133. !d. at 16.
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Recommendations," contained proposals for remedial action that confirm
the judgment that the Report addressed only disparate treatment.
The first subsection of "Conclusions and Recommendations" was
entitled "Arbitrary Discrimination: Specific Age Limits," and its topic
sentence stated: "The most obvious kind of age discrimination in
employment takes the form of employer policies of not hiring people over a
certain age, without consideration of a particular applicant's individual
qualifications."134 As the remedy for this evil, which today we would call
disparate treatment, the Secretary proposed a federal statute banning age
limits.135
The second subsection of "Conclusions and Recommendations" was
entitled "Action to Adjust Institutional Arrangements Which Work to the
Disadvantage of Older Workers. "136 This title might be interpreted today to
apply to practices that have a disparate impact on older workers, but two
facts demonstrate that this interpretation would be incorrect for 1965. First,
this subsection addressed the practices mentioned earlier in the Secretary's
Report (pension plans, promotion from within, and seniority); as has been
demonstrated, those practices were understood to lead to age limits in
hiring, which are disparate treatment. Second, the initial sentence under
this title read, "To eliminate discrimination in the employment of older
workers, it will be necessary not only to deal with overt acts of
discrimination, but also to adjust those present employment practices which
quite unintentionally lead to age limits in hiring."137 Age limits in hiring
are disparate treatment. If the remedy addressed only disparate treatment,
the problem could not have been disparate impact.
Even if this analysis is mistaken and this passage of the Secretary's
Report did address practices with a disparate impact, the proposed remedy
was not to outlaw the practices, but to encourage further study,
development of new ideas, and voluntary change.138 "Methods should be
developed for assisting private parties in collective bargaining to work out
procedures which would open opportunities for hiring unemployed workers
with long industrial service, while protecting seniority rights of workers
who are already employed."139 Such methods might ameliorate the effects
of hiring from within and narrow seniority units. Extra cost for older
workers in pension plans could be reduced by amending benefit formulae,
or could be eliminated by excluding new employees beyond a certain age
from coverage. Hiring older workers could be encouraged by adopting
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d. Congressional Action
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or by enabling workers to carry earned pension credits to new companies. 140
Thus, if the Secretary understood disparate impact, he did not propose to
outlaw it.
Congress prescribed the remedy of research and education for practices
that "unintentionally affect the employment of the older worker.
"
Congress dealt specifically with some of the practices identified by the
Secretary as unintentionally affecting the employment of older workers.
The way Congress dealt with these practices demonstrates that Congress
understood the unintentional effects to be explicit age limits in hiring,
which are disparate treatment; Congress did not understand the practices in
terms of disparate impact.
Senator Yarborough gave an example of a practice with an
unintentional effect on older workers. He was discussing section 4(£)(2),
which provided that it shall not be unlawful for an employer "to observe the
terms of... any bona fide employee benefit plan such as retirement,
pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purpose
of this Act, except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the
failure to hire any individual."141 Perhaps because the meaning of this
section was not evident on its surface, Senator Yarborough gave his
colleagues an example. Suppose a company retires workers at age 65 (as
the Age Act originally allowed). The company's labor contract provides for
a pension plan. To be eligible for a pension, a worker must accrue at least
twenty years of service. During these twenty years, the company
contributes sufficient money to the plan to fund the worker's benefits. The
company refuses to hire older workers because they cannot work long
enough to be eligible for pensions. Section 4(£)(2), said Senator
Yarborough, would require this company to hire older workers, but would
allow it to exclude them from the pension program. 142
Note that the unintended effect on older workers was not that they
were denied pensions. Rather, the unintended effect was that the pension
plan led the employer to impose age limits in hiring. If Congress had
understood disparate impact, the statute would have addressed two evils:
both the age limits (which were disparate treatment) and the denial of
pensions (which might be understood as a disparate impact). But Congress
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141. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 4(£)(2), 26 U.S.c. § 623 (2003).
142. 113 CONGo REC. 31255 (1967) (statement of Sen. Yarborough).
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1S not that they
that the pension
f Congress had
~ssed two evils:
j the denial of
. But Congress
understood only disparate treatment. The act outlawed the age limits, but
permitted the denial of pensions.
Representative Dent clearly understood the difference between what
the Secretary had called "overt acts of discrimination" and "practices which
quite unintentionally lead to age limits in hiring;" and like the Secretary,
Representative Dent understood that the remedy for the latter was
education:
The bill recognizes two distinct types of unfair discrimination based on age:
First, the discrimination which is the result of misunderstanding of the
relationship of age to usefulness; and second, the discrimination which is
the result of a deliberate disregard of a worker's value solely because of
age. The results of the two types of discrimination are the same, but the
remedies called for are different.
The obvious remedy for discrimination born of misunderstanding is the use
of education, information, and research - as provided for in section 3.
The second type of unfair discrimination is more pernicious. To eliminate
this more serious discrimination, H.R. 13054 provides prohibitions against
specific practices of arbitrary discrimination. 143
It is evident that Representative Dent understood a significant aspect of
disparate impact, namely, that it produces the same results as disparate
treatment does. Nevertheless, he stated plainly that the remedy in the bill
for such practices was education.
Congress agreed with Representative Dent. For the practices identified
by the Secretary as unintentionally disadvantaging older workers, Congress
prescribed exactly what the Secretary had recommended:
SEC.3.
(a) . . . In order to achieve the purposes of this Act, the Secretary of
Labor shall carry on a continuing program of education and information,
under which he may, among other measures -
(1) undertake research, and promote research, with a view to
reducing barriers to the employment of older persons. . .144
Some practices with a disparate impact, such as seniority, Congress
protected. Other practices with a disparate impact, such as promotion from
within, Congress ordered the Secretary of Labor to study. No senator or
representative named a practice with a disparate impact and said the Age
Act would outlaw the practice. The conclusion is inescapable: Congress
did not intend the Age Act to outlaw disparate impact.
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]44. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of ]967, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 62]-634 (2003).
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4. The Origin of Section 4(a)(2)
(1) Race Bills
Representative
not only on ra
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enacted, and R
H.R. 405.150 ~
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Rights Act of ]
A student
segregate, or c
that the claus
discrimination
a. Bills Introduced Before Title VII Was Enacted
The origin of section 4(a)(2) is a bill against race discrimination introduced
in 1947 by Senator Ives. In this bill, and in race bills for the next fzfteen
years, the clause "limit, segregate, or classify. . .
"
was applied only to
intentional discrimination by labor unions.
The true origin of sections 4(a)(2) of the Age Act and 703(a)(2) of
Title VII is older by a factor of five than the Supreme Court realized in
Griggs. As PRO correctly acknowledged, the crucial clause in these
sections is, "limit, segregate, or classify."145 The earliest use of this clause
was in a bill against race discrimination introduced in the Senate in 1947 by
Irving Ives of New York.146 Section 5(a) of Senator Ives's bill would have
made it illegal for an employer "to discriminate against any individual. . . ."
The next section of the bill read:
SEC.5
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any labor
organization to discriminate against any individual or to limit,
segregate, or classify its membership in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive such individual of employment opportunities, or
would limit his employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, or would
affect adversely his wages, hours, or employment conditions, because of
such individual's race, religion, color, national origin, or ancestry. 147
The words "its membership" make clear beyond peradventure that the
clause "limit, segregate, or classify" contemplated the relationship of labor
union to member.
For fifteen years in race discrimination bills, this clause was applied
only to labor unions; not until 1962 did a bill apply the clause to employers
as well as unions.148 This bill was H.R. 10144, introduced by
(2) The /I
Senator Javi
against age
1965, and d~
unions.
Bills in C(
race discrimin:
discrimination
of Representat:
representatives
Against Age
discriminati on
SEe. 5
(a) It shal
(1) t(
agam:
privill
indivi
(b) It sl
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145. The full clause, for which "limit, segregate, or classifY" serves as an abbreviation, reads: "It
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer. .. to limit, segregate, or classifY his
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's" race,
sex, or age.
146. S. 984, 80th Congo (1947) (introduced by Sen. Ives).
147. [d. (emphasis added).
148. Gold, Griggs' Folly, supra note 94, at 572-78.
149.
150.
151.
(1965).
152. Gold, Grigl
153. H.R.4731,
154. H.R. 4733,
(introduced by Rep. ~
87th Congo
88th Congo
Francis J. .
~
I
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lion introduced
the next fifteen
'Pplied only to
Representative Roosevelt. 149 It would have outlawed discriminationbased
not only on race, but also on age. The bill was the first to apply "limit,
segregate, or classify" to employers as well as unions. The bill was not
enacted, and Representative Roosevelt reintroduced it the following year as
H.R. 405.150Without the provisions on age discrimination and with other
changes that are not relevant here, H.R. 405 became Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.]5]
A student of Title VII has studied this history of the clause "limit,
segregate, or classify" in Title VII. The evidence compelled the conclusion
that the clause was aimed, not at disparate impact, but at intentional
discrimination as practiced by labor unions. 152
and 703(a)(2) of
:ourt realized in
clause in these
Ise of this clause
,enate in 1947 by
; bill would have
r individual. . . ."
(2) The National Act Against Age Discrimination in Employment
Senator Javits copied the clause" limit, segregate, or classifjJ" into his bills
against age discrimination, which were introduced from 1947 through
1965, and during all of those years the clause referred to discrimination by
unions.
'or any labor
or to limit,
would deprive
portunities, or
dversely affect
nent, or would
ms, because of
illcestry.
]47
jventure that the
tionship of labor
Bills in Congress against age discrimination ran parallel to bills against
race discrimination. The leader of the effort to enact a bill against age
discrimination was Jacob Javits of New York. As a member of the House
of Representatives, he introduced the first such bill in 1951;153 two other
representatives introduced identical bills.154 Entitled the "National Act
Against Age Discrimination in Employment," the bill prohibited age
discrimination by employers and by labor unions in these terms:
SEC.S
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, otherwise lawful, because of such
individual's age;
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any labor
organization to discriminate against any individual or to limit,
segregate, or classifj; its membership in any way which would deprive
use was applied
lse to employers
introduced by
Ibbreviation, reads: "It
~egate, or classifY his
'idual of employment
uch individual's" race,
149.
150.
151.
(1965).
152. Gold, Griggs' Folly, supra note 94, at 568-578.
153. H.R. 47:31, 82d Congo(1951).
154. H.R. 4733, 82d Congo (1951) (introduced by Rep. Fulton); H.R. 4734, 82d Congo (1951)
(introduced by Rep. Morano).
87th Congo (1962).
88th Congo (1963).
Francis J. Vaas, Title VJ1: Legislative Histmy, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 433-7
Rep. Javits' Bill, H.R. 4731 Sen. Ives' Bill, S. 984
Section 1 Section 1
Section 2(a) Section 2( a)
Section 2( c) Section 2(b)
Section 2( d) Section 2( d)
Section 3 Section 3
Section 4 Section 4
Section 5 Section 5
Secti on 6( a) Section 6( d)
Section 6(b) Section 6(f)
Secti on 6( c) Section 6(g)
Section 7 Section 7
Section 8 (misnumbered as Section 9) Section 8
Section 9 Section 9
Section 10 Section 10
Section 11 Section 11
Section 12 Section 12
Section 13 Section 13
Section 14 Section 14
Section 15 Section 15
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or tend to deprive such individual of otherwise lawful employment
opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as such an employee or as such an
applicant for employment, or would affect adversely his wages, hours,
or employment conditions, because of such individual's age.155
It is evident that Representative Javits borrowed section 5 of his bill
almost word for word from section 5 of the bill of his fellow New Yorker,
Senator Ives. (Indeed, Representative Javits copied nearly every section of
his bill from Senator Ives's bill.Y56 As in Senator Ives' bill, the words "its
membership" in the clause "limit, segregate, or classify" in Representative
Javits' bill make clear that the clause applied to the behavior of unions.
Thus, it is beyond doubt that the clause carried the same meaning in both
bills: it applied to intentional discrimination by labor unions against their
members.
The Eighty-second Congress paid little attention to the National Act
Against Age Discrimination in Employment, so Representative Javits
introduced it again in 1953,157as did two other representatives; 158but the
Eighty-third Congress also neglected the bill. Because Mr. Javits was
elected Attorn
serve in the
colors in 1955
Eighty-fifth Cc
seven represer
nine represent
National Act \
have been pre
1964.166 Sene
1965.167
Although
our purposes t
years. The 0
same in the m
the identical c]
segregate, or c
impact; rathe
discrimination
155. H.R. 4731, 82d Congo (1951) (emphasis added).
156. Except for the classes protected, the sections of Representative Javits' bill listed in the
following table are identical to the corresponding sections of Senator Ives' bill.
(3) Bills
Between 19.
age discrimi
157. H.R. 1585, 83d Congo (1953).
158. H.R. 1579, 83d Congo (1953) (introduced by Rep. Fulton); H.R. 1593, 83d Congo (1953)
(introduced by Rep. Morano).
159. H.R. 537(
160. S. 1073,8
161. H.R. 5741
(introduced by Rep
85th Congo (1957)
Fulton); H.R. 10201
(introduced by Rep.
162. S. 738, 8E
163. H.R. 118C
(introduced by Rep
86th Congo (1959)
McFall); H.R. 600t
(introduced by Rep
86th Congo (1959) (
164. S. 350, 87
165. H.R. 591,
(introduced by Rep
87th Congo (1961)
Hagen).
166. Senator Jf
on grounds of age
REc. 31254 (1967)
introduced such a bl
167. S. 1752,8
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age.155
:ction 5 of his bill
:llow New Yorker,
ly every section of
bill, the words "its
,
in Representative
ehavior of unions.
le meaning in both
nions against their
elected Attorney General of New York in 1954 and, consequently, did not
serve in the Eighty-fourth Congress, Representative Fulton carried the
colors in 1955.159When Mr. Javits returned to Congress as a senator in the
Eighty-fifth Congress, he introduced the National Act in 1957,160and so did
seven representatives.161 Senator Javits tried again in 1959162along with
nine representatives,163 and in 1961164with five representatives.165 The
National Act was not introduced in the Eighty-eighth Congress, which may
have been preoccupied with the bill that became the Civil Rights Act of
1964.166 Senator Javits introduced the National Act for the last time in
1965.167
Although the National Act never became law, the bill is important for
our purposes because the text of section 5 stayed exactly the same over the
years. The only reasonable conclusion is that its meaning was also the
same in the minds of a significant number of members of Congress. Like
the identical clause in the bills against race discrimination, the clause "limit,
segregate, or classify" in the National Act had nothing to do with disparate
impact; rather, the clause was meant to outlaw intentional age
discrimination as practiced by unions against their members.
) the National Act
presentative Javits
:ntatives; 158 but the
se Mr. Javits was
(3) Bills to Amend Other Statutes
Javits' bill listed in the
Between 1958 and the enactment of Title VIL bills were introduced to bar
age discrimination via amendments to the National Labor Relations Act andBill,s. 984
.. 1593, 83d Congo (1953)
159. H.R. 5370, 84th Congo (1955).
160. S. 1073, 85th Congo (1957).
161. H.R. 5740, 85th Congo (1957) (introduced by Rep. Dom); H.R. 6951, 85th Congo (1957)
(introduced by Rep. Osmers); H.R. 8982, 85th Congo (1957) (introduced by Rep. O'Hara); H.R. 8991,
85th Congo (1957) (introduced by Rep. Widnall); H.R. 9486, 85th Congo (1957) (introduced by Rep.
Fulton); H.R. 10206, 85thg Congo (1958) (introduced by Rep. Madden); H.R. 12214, 85th Congo (1958)
(introduced by Rep. Bennett).
162. S. 738, 86th Congo (1959).
163. H.R. 1180, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Van Zandt); H.R. 2508, 86th Congo (1959)
(introduced by Rep. Widnall); H.R. 3271, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Bennett); H.R. 3649,
86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Halpern); H.R. 4382, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep.
McFall); H.R. 6006, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Fulton); H.R. 6042, 86th Congo (1959)
(introduced by Rep. Dom); H.R. 6129, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Hosmer); H.R. 7285,
86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Kowalski).
164. S. 350, 87th Congo (1961).
165. H.R. 591, 87th Congo (1961) (introduced by Rep. Van Zandt); H.R. 3445, 87th Congo (1961)
(introduced by Rep. Hosmer); H.R. 4421, 87th Congo (1961) (introduced by Rep. Fulton); H.R. 6760,
87th Congo (1961) (introduced by Rep. McFall); H.R. 6838, 87th Congo (1961) (introduced by Rep.
Hagen).
166. Senator Javits claimed to "have been introducing bills to outlaw discrimination in employment
on grounds of (lge ever since 1 was a Member of the House of Representatives in 1951," 113 CONGo
REc. 31254 (1967), but the indicies to 109 and 110 Congressional Record contain no record that he
introduced such a bill during the 88th Congress.
167. S. 1752, 89th Congo (1965).
so BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW I
I
I
I
Val.2S:l
the Fair Labor Standards Act; bills were also introduced to bar age
discrimination by federal contractors. In these bills, the clause "limit,
segregate, or classifY" was applied only to intentional discrimination by
unions.
This conclusion is fortified by three other lines of bills against age
discrimination in employment Begin with bills introduced before Title VII
was enacted, that is, before Congress applied "limit, segregate, or classify"
to employers as well as unions. (Bills introduced between Title VII and the
Age Act will be discussed in the next section of this article.) The
consistency of words, over time and across bills, is strong evidence that the
sponsors intended the clause "limit, segregate, or classify" to describe and
outlaw the ways in which labor unions practiced intentional discrimination.
A number of bills would have made age discrimination an unfair labor
practice. Identical bills to this end were introduced by three representatives
in 1960,168by two representatives in 1961,169by one representative in
1963,170and by another representative in 1964.171 All of these bills
proposed adding two sections to the National Labor Relations Act172
Section 8(a)(6) would have applied to employers - and never used the
clause "limit, segregate, or classify."173 Section 8(b)(8) would have applied
to unions - and always used "limit, segregate, or classify."174 In addition,
a bill in the Senate in 1961 would have applied only to employers and did
not use "limit, segregate, or classify."175 Purpose was an element of
discrimination under the Labor Act176 Thus, it is evident that the sponsors
of these bills understood the clause to apply only to intentional age
discrimination by labor unions.
Bills in 1958177and 1963178would have prohibited age discrimination
with an amendment to the Pair Labor Standards ActI79 These bills applied
only to employers and did not use "limit, segregate, or classify."
168. H.R. 11671, 86th Congo (1960) (introduced by Rep. Dingell); H.R. 12348, 86th Congo (1960)
(introduced by Rep. Wolff); H.R. 12880, 86th Congo (1960) (introduced by Rep. Pucinski).
169. H.R. lOn, 87th Congo (1961) (introduced by Rep. Pucinski); H.R. 2413, 87th Congo (1961)
(introduced by Rep. Dingell).
170. H.R. 3810, 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep. Dingell).
171. H.R. 11102, 88th Congo (1964) (introduced by Rep. Royball).
172. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2003).
173. See infra text following note 250.
174. Id.
175. S. 60, 87th Congo (1961) (introduced by Sen. Smathers).
176. CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 115 (1st ed. 1977). The illicit purpose
was encouraging or discouraging membership in a labor organization.
177. H.R. 6793, 85th Congo (1957) (introduced by Rep. Dellay).
178. H.R. 4935, 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep. Denton).
179. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2003).
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ed to bar age
,
clause "limit,
.crimination by
A line of bills would have outlawed age discrimination by finns that do
business with the federal government. The first such bills were introduced
in 1958 by thirteen representatives.]80 Similar bills were introduced in the
Eighty-sixth Congress by a senatorl81 and eleven representatives;]82 in the
Eighty-seventh Congress by two representatives;183and in the Eighty-eighth
Congress by one representative.184 All of these bills were identical; they
applied only to employers and did not use "limit, segregate, or classify."
Six other bills pertaining to government contractors would have
prohibited them from dealing with unions that discriminated on the basis of
age.185 These bills would not have prohibited unions from discriminating,
did not define discriminatory practices by unions, and did not use "limit,
segregate, or classify."]86
bills against agej before Title VII
:gate, or classify"
Title VII and the
is article.) The
evidence that the
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~erepresentatives
representative in
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Relations Act.] 72j never used the
mId have applied
."]74 In addition,
nployers and did
, an element of
that the sponsors
intentional age
b. Bills Introduced After Title VII Was Enacted
Now consider bills against age discrimination that were introduced
after Title VII was enacted. The authors of these bills were surely aware of
the text of Title VII, in particular, the meaning of section 703(a)(2). Their
~e discrimination
1ese bills applied
,ify ."
180. H.R. 10455, 85th Congo (1958) (introduced by Rep. Porter); H.R. 10502, 85th Congo (1958)
(introduced by Rep. Ruess); H.R. 10594, 85th Congo (1958) (introduced by Rep, Barnett); H.R. 10806,
85th Congo (1958) (introduced by Rep. O'Hara); H.R. 10866, 85th Congo (1958) (introduced by Rep.
Moore); H.R. 10979, 85th Congo (1958) (introduced by Rep, Zablocki); H.R. 11053, 85th Congo (1958)
(introduced by Rep. Price); H.R. 11112, 85th Congo (1958) (introduced by Rep. Bray); H.R. 11114, 85th
Congo (1958) (introduced by Rep. Collier); H.R. 11420, 85th Congo (1958) (introduced by Rep. Gray);
H.R. 11542, 85th Congo (1958) (introduced by Rep. Baring); H.R. 11637, 85th Congo (1958) (introduced
by Rep. Santangelo); H.R. 12940, 85th Congo (1958) (introduced by Rep. Wheaton).
] 81. S. 1172, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Sen. Newberger).
]82. H.R. 25, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Baring); H.R. 236, 86th Congo (1959)
(introduced by Rep. Price); H.R. 1113, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Collier); H.R. 1206, 86th
Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Zablocki); H.R. 2209, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep.
O'Hara); H.R. 3202, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Santangelo); H.R. 4906, 86th Congo (1959)
(introduced byRep. Bennett); H.R. 6908, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Moore); H.R. 7098,
86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Porter); H.R. 7734, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep.
Ruess); H.R. lOllS, 86th Congo (1960) (introduced by Rep. Murphy).
183. H.R. 599, 87th Congo (1961) (introduced by Rep. Zablocki); H.R. 1146, 87th Congo (1961)
(introduced by Rep. Collier).
184. H.R. 1169, 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep. Zablocki).
185. S. 3433, 85th Congo (1958) (introduced by Sen. Javits); S. 351, 87th Congo (1961) (introduced
by Sen. Javits); H.R. 3650, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Halpern); H.R. 6044, 86th Congo
(1959) (introduced by Rep. Dorn); H.R. 12106, 86th Congo (1960) (introduced by Rep. Donohue); H.R.
2480, 87th Congo (1961) (introduced by Rep. Halpern).
186. A unique bill by Senator McNamara, S. 3726, 86th Congo (1960), would have given the
President the power to adopt rules against age discrimination by federal contractors.
There is an exception that proves the rule. Of all the bills in the four lines of bills mentioned
in the text, exactly one bill falls outside the pattern. H.R. 4896, 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep.
Pelly), pertained to government contractors. Section 11O(b) of this bill applied the clause "limit,
segregate, or classify" to employers. However, this bill was introduced after Rep. Roosevelt's bills,
H.R. 10144 in 1962 and H.R. 405 in 1963, had applied the clause to employers.
348, 86th Congo (1960)
Pucinski).
113, 87th Congo (1961)
7). The illicit purpose
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use of the clause "limit, segregate, or classify," exactly as that clause had
been used before the enactment of Title VII, confirms our understanding
that the clause was aimed at intentional discrimination as practiced by labor
unions against their members.
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Between the enactment of Title VII and the enactment of the Age Act,
further bills were introduced to bar age discrimination via amendments to
the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act. All of
these bills applied the clause "limit, segregate, or classify" only to labor
unions. Bills were also introduced to add age as a protected class to Title
VII. In these bills, "limit, segregate, or classify" meant what it meant when
Title VII was enacted, namely, disparate treatment.
Consider, first, the bills that would have outlawed age discrimination
by employers and unions under existing statutes. In 1965, three
representatives proposed making it an unfair labor practice for an employer
or a union to discriminate on the basis of age. 187 So did another
representative in 1966188and four representatives in 1967.189 These bills
used "limit, segregate, or classify" only in relation to unions. A senator
offered a bill that would have applied only to employers in 1965,190as did a
representative in 1965 and 1967.191 These bills did not use "limit,
segregate, or classify."
Bills by two representatives in 1965192and in 1967193would have
outlawed age discrimination only by employers under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. These bills did not use "limit, segregate, or classify."
Other proposed amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act would
have applied to both unions and employers. Senator Javits' amendment,
which the Senate adopted in 1966 but the House did not, would have
outlawed age discrimination by employers and unions. 194 The amendment
(2) Bill
Bills track.
mean whal
Turn, fir
187. H.R. 665, 89th Congo (1965) (introduced by Rep. Pucinski); H.R. 9754, 89th Congo (1965)
(introduced by Rep. Randall); H.R. 10813, 89th Congo (1965) (introduced by Rep. Dwyer).
188. H.R. 12164, 89th Congo (1966) (introduced by Rep. Hathaway).
189. H.R. 529, 90th Congo (1967) (introduced by Rep. Dwyer); H.R. 2893, 90th Congo (1967)
(introduced by Rep. Hathaway): H.R. 4993, 90th Congo (1967) (introduced by Rep. Cleveland); H.R.
6908, 90th Congo (1967) (introduced by Rep. Cramer).
190. S. 1416, 89th Congo (1965) (introduced by Sen. Smathers).
191. H.R. 6640, 89th Congo (1965) (introduced by Rep. Cramer); H.R. 6908, 90th Congo (1967)
(introduced by Rep. Cramer).
192. H.R. 2803, 89th Congo (1965) (introduced by Rep. Denton); H.R. 10812, 89th Congo (1965)
(introduced by Rep. Dwyer).
193. H.R. 53 I, 90th Congo (1967) (introduced by Rep. Dwyer); H.R. 4994, 90th Congo (1967)
(introduced by Rep. Cleveland).
194. 112 CONGo REC. 20819 (1966) (discussing amendment no. 764).
195. S. 788, ,
196. H.R. 54
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197. 29 Fed.
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s that clause had
ur understanding
Iracticed by labor
used "limit, segregate, or classify" only in regard to unions.
The following year, Senator Javits introduced his amendment in the
form of a bill,195and three representatives introduced identical bills.]96 All
of these bills used "limit, segregate, or classify" only with respect to unions.
No bills in 1965-1967 proposed outlawing age discrimination by
federal contractors, probably because in 1964 President Lyndon Johnson
had issued Executive Order 11141, which made it the policy of the
executive branch that contractors and subcontractors may not discriminate
on the basis of age.]97 Unions are not mentioned in the order and "limit,
segregate, or classify" is not used.
Between 1965 and 1967, a senator]98 and fifteen representatives
introducedbills to add age as a protected class to Title VII. ]99 Had any of
these bills been enacted, section 703(a)(2) would have included age as an
illegal basis of discrimination. As shown above, Congress at this time
understood section 703(a)(2) to apply to intentional discrimination,zoo The
bills to add age to Title VII were unsuccessful, but revealing nonetheless.
They reveal that when the Age Act was passed in 1967, each of the
sponsors of these bills must have understood section 4(a)(2) of the Age Act,
which tracked the text of section 703(a)(2) of Title VII, to mean the same as
section 703(a)(2): both outlawed only intentional discrimination.
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,
only to labor
i class to Title
it meant when
e discrimination
In 1965, three
for an employer
So did another
.
]89 These bills
ons. A senator
1965,]90as did a
not use "limit, (2) Bills to Enact a New Statute
']93 would have
the Fair Labor
:lassify.
"
lrds Act would
ts' amendment,
Jt, would have
[he amendment
Bills tracking Title VII intended the clause "limit, segregate, or classify" to
mean what it meant in Title VII.
Turn, finally, to bills that proposed a new statute. Aside from Senator
~, 89th Congo (1965)
)wyer).
]95. S. 788, 90th Congo (1967) (introduced by Sen. Javits).
196. H.R. 5481, 90th Congo (1967) (introduced by Rep. Reid); H.R. 6389, 90th Congo (1967)
(introduced by Rep. Reid); H.R. 6280, 90th Congo (1967) (introduced by Rep. Morse); H.R. 8218, 90th
Congo (1967) (introduced by Rep. Riegle).
197. 29 Fed. Reg. 2477 (Feb. 12,1964),3 C.F.R. § 179 (1964-1965).
198. S. 2674, 89th Congo (1965) (introduced by Sen. Talmadge).
199. H.R. 9338, 89th Congo (1965) (introduced by Rep. Pucinski); H.R. 11682, 89th Congo (1965)
(introduced by Rep. Burke); H.R. 11793, 89th Congo (1965) (introduced by Rep. Mize); H.R. 11829,
89th Congo (1965) (introduced by Rep. Mueller); H.R. 11898, 89th Congo (1966) (introduced by Rep.
Horton); H.R. 11915, 89th Congo (1966) (introduced by Rep. Price); H.R. 11919, 89th Congo (1966)
(introduced by Rep. Roncalio); H.R. 11975, 89th Congo (1966) (introduced by Rep. Race); H.R. 11989,
89th Congo (1966) (introduced by Rep. Dole); H.R. 12266, 89th Congo (1966) (introduced by Rep.
Olson); H.R. ]2376, 89th Congo (1966) (introduced by Rep. Teague); H.R. 12430, 89th Congo (1966)
(introduced by Rep. Saylor); H.R. 12432, 89th Congo (1966) (introduced by Rep. Schisler); H.R. 13050,
89th Cong (1966) (introduced by Rep. Gubser); H.R. 13355, 89th Congo (1966) (introduced by Rep.
Schmidhauser); H.R. 328, 90th Congo (1967) (introduced by Rep. Burke); H.R. ]094, 90th Congo 1967)
(introduced by Rep. Price).
200. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
,90th Congo (1967)
ep. Cleveland); H.R.
:, 90th Congo (1967)
~, 89th Congo (1965)
,90th Congo (1967)
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lavits's National Act,2O'these bills were introduced in 1967 by a senator 202
and ten representatives.203 Except for the classes protected, all of them
followed word for word the corresponding text of Title VII.
This evidence shows that, in the period between 1964 and 1967,
Congress understood the clause "limit, segregate, or classify" to mean what
it had meant in the period between 1947 and 1964. No evidence indicates
that the meaning of the clause changed in any way in the mind of Congress.
In sum (not counting Representative Roosevelt and his bills in 1962
and 1963) sixty-six senators and representatives introduced 121 bills against
age discrimination over a span of sixteen years, and in each bill save one,
"limit, segregate, or classify" was applied only to labor unions. The
conclusion is inescapable: the Ninetieth Congress intended the clause to
outlaw intentional discrimination as practiced by labor unions. Not a shred
of evidence as much as hints that Congress intended the clause to outlaw
disparate impact.
V.
DEFENSES TO AGE DISCRIMINATION: SECTION 4(f)(1)
The text of the RFOA clause, its legislative history and origin, as well as the
practices protected by section 4(f)(2), combine to demonstrate that
Congress intended the Age Act to bar disparate impact discrimination.
1. The Text of Section 4(j)(1)
The BFOQ clause is the defense to disparate treatment, and the RFOA clause
is the defense to disparate impact; but a "reasonable factor[J other than
age" need not be strictly job related.
The Age Act states exceptions to the general rule against age
discrimination. Section 4(f)(1) reads:
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201. S. 1752, 89th Congo (1965).
202. S. 830, 89th Congo (1965) (introduced by Sen. Yarborough).
203. H.R. 3651, 89th Congo (1967) (introduced by Rep. Perkins); H.R. 3768, 89th Congo (1967)
(introduced by Rep. Holland); H.R. 4221, 89th Congo (1967) (introduced by Rep. Dent); H.R. 8125, 89th
Congo (1967) (introduced by Rep. Matsunaga); H.R. 8535, 89th Congo (1967) (introduced by Rep.
Kelly); H.R. 8937, 89th Congo (1967) (introduced by Rep. Ford); H.R. 9586, 89th Congo (1967)
(introduced by Rep. Eilberg); H.R. 10355, 89th Congo (1967) (introduced by Rep. Rosenthal); H.R.
11301, 89th Congo (1967) (introduced by Rep. Donohue); H.R. 12512, 89th Congo (1967) (introduced by
Rep. Pucinski); H.R. 13054, 89th Congo (1967) (introduced by Rep. Dent). Bills lacking enforcement
provisions are omitted.
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(t) It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or
labor organization-
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited. . . where age is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the particular business, or where the differentiation is
based on reasonable factors other than age.
This section is straightforward. It contains two clauses. The first is the
"BFOQclause," which applies when age is explicitly the basis of decision.
An employer may refuse to hire an older worker who is above a specified
age when being younger is a bona fide occupational qualification. An
octogenarian need not be hired to portray an adolescent. Age is a fact in the
employer's reason for action; the employer is consciously excluding older
workers. Thus, the BFOQclause is the defense to disparate treatment.
The second clause is the "RFOAclause," which applies when age is not
explicitly the basis of decision. An employer may refuse to hire an older
worker based on a factor other than age, provided the factor is reasonable.
A fitness center may require its trainers to be svelte, though older workers
may tend to be plumper than younger workers. Age is a fact in a chain of
events that culminates in the employer's reason for action.204 Accordingly,
the RFOAclause is the defense to disparate impact. Congress would not
have written the defense to disparate impact into the act unless it included
the prima facie case as well. Thus, the text of the RFOAclause demonstrates
that Congress intended the Age Act to include disparate impact. 205
CONargues that the RFOAclause does not state the defense to disparate
impact, but instead completely protects an employer who reasonably bases
a decision on any factor other than age.206 At the risk of pedantry, it must
be pointed out that the word "reasonable" in the RFOAclause modifies the
word "factors." Whether a factor is reasonable is an objective question.
CON argues that "reasonable" is really an adverb modifying the word
"based." This argument is erroneous because it reads the RFOAclause as
~(f)(I)
'Jac!
as well as the
l10nstrate that
'11ination.
le RFOA clause
r[] other than
lIe against age 204. The employer's reason for deciding to hire a younger worker instead of an older worker is that
the younger worker is more trim. Many such decisions cumulate into the result that the employer hires
proportionally fewer older workers than younger workers. The chain of events is that, as people age,
they get less exercise and their metabolism slows, but their appetite does not diminish proportionally;
therefore, they tend to gain weight as they age. Carol Krucoff, Exercise Looks to be the Best Way to
Halt Middle-Age Spread; Aging: Between 40 and 60, Most People Put on Extra Pounds that Can't be
Taken Offby Dieting Alone, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10,2000, at 56.
205. The argument here, that the BFOQ clause in the Age Act is the defense to disparate treatment
and the RFOA clause is the defense to disparate impact, may seem inconsistent with Justice Powell's
theorem. The inconsistency, however, is only facial. The theorem holds that disparate treatment and
disparate impact .were identical in all ways except for their methods of proving causation. The BFOQ and
RFOA clauses pertain, not to causation, but to the plaintiffs' qualifications. Disparate treatment and
disparate impact were identical with regard to qualifications, just as the BFOQ and the RFOA clauses were
substantively identical.
206. See infra Part V(B)(1).
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though it says, "the differentiation is reasonably based on factors other than
age." This misreading shifts the focus to the employer's state of mind: did
the employer have a reasonable belief that the factor was.not age? But the
clause does not say this. The RFOAclause says the factor itself must be
reasonable.
What does it mean to say that a factor is reasonable? It cannot mean
irrational. It cannot include a practice that serves no legitimate business
goal and has an adverse effect on older workers. The purpose here is not to
explore the scope of the defense to disparate impact under the Age Act, yet
it is appropriate to note that Congress may have used the word "reasonable"
to signal that the employer's burden should be somewhat less stringent
under the Age Act than proving job relatedness under Title VII. For
example, it is often said that cost is not a defense to discrimination, but it
should be permissible for an employer to replace a highly paid worker with
a lower-paid worker (or at least to offer the job to the highly paid worker at
the lower rate). Such a practice would often have an adverse effect on older
workers, but it is eminently reasonable.
2. The Legislative History of Section 4(/)(1)
The Secretary's Report demonstrates that the Secretary intended the RFOA
clause to express the defense of job relatedness. Senator Yarborough
agreed, giving an example of a reasonable factor other than age on the
floor of Congress. The example was ajob-related test.
The legislative history of section 4(f)(1) is clear and dispositive. The
Secretary's Report and proposed bill, together with the discussion of the
BFOQ and RFOA clauses on the floor of the Senate, confirm the plain
meaning of the text: Congress intended the act to outlaw disparate impact.
The RFOAclause was contained in S. 830 and H.R. 3651, which were
the proposal of the Secretary of Labor.207 The clause responded to the
Secretary's observation that some age "discrimination" occurred because of
a genuine relationship between a worker's age and ability to perform a
job.208 It follows that the Secretary intended the clause to apply only when
age is genuinely related to ability to perform a job. This perfectly captures
the idea of job relatedness, which is the defense to disparate impact. A
reasonable factor other than age must be job related.
The Senate shared the Secretary's intent. Although the committee
reports of the House of Representatives and the Senate did not explain the
207. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
208. Secretary's Report, supra note 18, at 2.
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BFOQ or RFOA clauses or give examples, Senator Yarborough did.209
Speaking on the floor he said:
The bill provides for four exceptions from the enforcement provisions:
First. Where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the particular business. The example is often given -
although I do not know at what age this limit would apply
- of a jet pilot
who flies a plane at many hundreds of miles an hour. Second. Where
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age. For example,
if a test shows that a man cannot do certain things. He might fail to pass the
test at 35; he might fail to pass the test at 55. Some men slow up sooner
than others. If the job requires a certain speed and the differentiation is
based upon factors other than age, the law would not apply.2lO
It is evident that Congress meant the BFOQ clause to apply when age is
explicitly the basis for decision: an airline may retire a pilot who reaches a
certain age. This understanding confirms what the text states. Forcing a
pilot to retire at a certain age is prima facie disparate treatment, and the
BFOQclause is the defense.
It is equally evident that Congress meant the RFOA clause to apply
when age is not explicitly the basis for decision, as is true in disparate
impact cases. Senator Yarborough's example captures the essence of the
business necessity defense:
. An employer gives a test to a worker.
. The test is job related ("the job requires a certain speed").
. The worker fails the test ("a man cannot do certain things").
. The employer has not violated the Age Act ("the law would not
apply").211
This understanding also confirms our reading of the text of the RFOA
clause. A test that favors younger workers over older workers is prima
facie disparate impact, but the test is a "reasonable factor[] other than age"
because the test is job related.
CONnotes below that Senator Yarborough's example omits an element
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209. S. REp. No. 90-723, supra note 49, at 9. H.R. REp. No. 90-805, supra note 54, at 9.
210. 113 CONGoREc. 31252-53 (1967) (statement of Sen. Yarborough).
211. Senator Yarborough's belief was firm that the Age Act would require tests to be job related.
In a subsequent colloquy, Senator Javits asked Senator Yarborough how the bill would dea] with
discrimination between two persons each of whom is in the protected class; for example, an employer
favors a man aged 42 over a man aged 52 because of age. Senator Yarborough replied:
If two men applied for employment under the terms of this law, and one was 42 and one was
52, naturally, the personnel officer or employer would have a choice to make. . . . [H]e could
not turn either one down on the basis of the age factor, he would have to go into the
capabilities, experience of the two men, or he might have to give them a test. . . to see if they
could do the work.
Jd. at 31255. The Senator did not say that the personnel officer could give the applicants any test at all.
He said the personnel officer would have "to give them a test. . . to see if they could do the work." A
test that determines whether an applicant can do the work is a job related test.
~\f~\
. \ \.~)
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of disparate impact, namely, that the test had an adverse effect on older
workers. This omission, argues CON,shows that the Senator did not have
disparate impact in mind. CON'S error is ignoring that Senator Yarborough
was focusing on the disparate impact defense, not the prima facie case. One
cannot say everything in every sentence. Also, Senator Yarborough
suggested adverse effect when he stated that some men slow up sooner than
others. This statement implies a natural progression. Provided he lives
long enough, any man will eventually fail a test that measures speed of
work. Therefore, more older men than younger men will fail the test. But,
as the Senator said, some older men will be able to pass the test, and they
are entitled to a fair chance. Only ajob related test can provide this chance.
3. The Origins of Section 4(j)(J)
The Secretary of Labor and Congress derived the RFOAclause, not from
exception iv of the Equal Pay Act, but from unsuccessful equal-pay bills in
1963. Exception iv serves the narrow purpose of the Equal Pay Act,
whereas the RFOAclause serves the broad purpose of the Age Act.
The RFOAclause provides a defense "where the differentiation is based
on reasonable factors other than age." Exception iv to the Equal Pay Act
provides a defense for "a differential based on any other factor other than
sex."212 CON argues that the similarity of these texts implies that the RFOA
clause was derived from exception iv of the Equal Pay Act, and, therefore,
the two provisions should be interpreted similarly. If this conclusion were
true, the RFOA clause might preclude disparate impact. The argument
would be based on a Title VII case, County of Washington v. Gunther,213in
which the Supreme Court suggested that exception iv, which was
incorporated into Title VII by the Bennett Amendment, may preclude a
disparate impact claim for sex discrimination in compensation.214
Two objections destroy CON'S argument. The first objection is
obvious: the RFOA clause contains the word "reasonable," whereas
exception iv does not. As suggested above, the word "reasonable" may
make the defense to disparate impact under the Age Act somewhat broader
than the defense to disparate impact under Title VII.215
The second objection is that the RFOAclause was not in fact derived
from exception iv to the Equal Pay Act. The clause was derived from an
equal-pay bill that was never enacted.
212. Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963).
213. 452 U.S. 161, [70-71 (1981).
214. Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) § 703(h), 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(h) (2000).
215. See supra text following note 205.
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The roots of the Equal Pay Act are surprisingly deep, and the first
effort in Congress at establishing the principle of equal pay for equal work
came surprisingly close to success. In 1945, Senators Pepper and Morse
introduced an equal pay bill in the first session of the 79th Congress,2J6and
the Committee on Education and Labor recommended that the bill pass.217
As amended by the committee, section 2 read in relevant part:
SEC.2. It shall be an unfair wage practice for any employer engaged in
commerceor in transactionsor operationsaffectingcommerce-
(a) to discriminatein any way in the payment of wages as between the
sexes; or
(b) to pay wages to any female employee at a rate less than the rate at
which he pays or has paid to male employees for work of comparable
quality or quantity, except where such payment is made pursuant to a
seniority or merit increase system which does not discriminateon the
basis of sex. . .
Representative Woodhouse introduced a similar bill in the second
session of that Congress,218and this bill was also reported favorably; but
neither bill passed.219
Note that these bills did not contain a general exception. Neither bill
provided a defense for "any other factor other than sex" or for "reasonable
factors other than sex."
Equal pay bills were introduced for nearly two decades in the eight
succeeding Congresses.220 None of these bills contained a general
ause, not from
'.lal-pay bills in
'qual Pay Act,
Act.
00).
216. S. 1178, 79th Cong. (1945).
217. S. REp. No. 79-1576, at I, 79th Congo (1946).
218. H.R. 5221, 79th Cong. (1946).
219. H.R. REp. No. 79-2687, at I (1946).
220. S. 1556, 80th Congo (1947) (introduced by Sen. Pepper and Sen. Morse); H.R. 4273, 80th
Cong. (1947) (introduced by Rep. Douglas); H.R. 4408, 80th Congo (1947) (introduced by Rep. Smith);
S. 706, 81st Congo (1949) (introduced by Sen. Pepper and Sen. Morse); H.R. 797, 81st Cong. (1949)
(introduced by Rep. Douglas); H.R. 1584, 81st Congo (1949) (introduced by Rep. Woodhouse); H.R.
2438, 81st Congo (1949) (introduced by Rep. Douglas); S. 1374, 82d Congo (1951) (introduced by Sen.
Murray and Sen. Morse): H.R. 3550, 82d Cong. (1951) (introduced by Rep. Kelly): H.R. 4101, 82d
Congo (1951) (introduced by Rep. Kelly): H.R. 4138, 82d Congo (1951) (introduced by Rep. Rodino):
H.R. 4144, 82d Congo (1951) (introduced by Rep. Anfuso); H.R. 4206, 82d Congo (1951) (introduced by
Rep. Addonizio): H.R. 4299, 82d Congo (1951) (introduced by Rep. Fine): H.R. 4303, 82d Congo (1951)
(introduced by Rep. Howell); H.R. 4319, 82d Congo (1951) (introduced by Rep. Multer); H.R. 4320, 82d
Cong. (1951) (introduced by Rep. Kennedy): H.R. 4367, 82d Cong. (1951) (introduced by Rep. Doyle):
H.R. 4370, 82d Congo (1951) (introduced by Rep. Holifield): H.R. 4374, 82d Congo (1951) (introduced
by Rep. Heller): H.R. 4451, 82d Cong. (1951) (introduced by Rep. Dempsey): H.R. 7470, 82d Cong.
(1952) (introduced by Rep. Kelly): S. 176, 83d Cong. (1953) (introduced by Sen. Murray and Sen.
Morse): H.R. 306, 83d Cong. (1953) (introduced by Rep. Kelly): H.R. 362, 83d Cong. (1953)
(introduced by Rep. Addonizio): H.R. 1014, 83d Congo (1953) (introduced by Rep. Fine): H.R. 1017
83d Cong. (1953) (introduced by Rep. Fine): H.R. 1260, 83d Congo (1953) (introduced by Rep. Heller);
H.R. 1266, 83d Cong. (1953) (introduced by Rep. Multer): H.R. 1387, 83d Cong. (1953) (introduced by
Rep. Howell); H.R. 7172, 83d Cong. (1954) (introduced by (Rep. Bolton); H.R. 7597, 83d Congo (1954)
(introduced by Rep. Buchanan); H.R. 7675, 83d Cong. (1954) (introduced by Rep. Sullivan): S. 2708,
in fact derived
ierived from an
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exception.
A general exception was first proposed in 1963, the year that equal pay
legislation finally succeeded.221 Indeed, two versions of the exception were
84th Congo (1955) (introduced by Sen. Douglas); H.R. 59, 84th Congo (1955) (introduced by Rep.
Addonizio); H.R. 281, 84th Congo (1955) (introduced by Rep. Kelly); H.R. 680, 84th Congo (1955)
(introduced by Rep. Multer); H.R. 3228, 84th Congo (1955) (introduced by Rep. Kelly); H.R. 3767, 84th
Congo (1955) (introduced by Rep. Fine); H.R. 6503, 84th Congo (1955) (introduced by Rep. Green);
H.R. 7759, 84th Congo (1955) (introduced by (Rep. Griffiths); S. 3352, 84th Congo (1956) (introduced
by Sen. Ives, Sen. Allott, Sen. Bender, Sen. Payne, Sen. Purtell and Sen. Bush); H.R. 9830, 84th Congo
(1956) (introduced by Rep. Keams); H.R. 9837, 84th Congo (1956) (introduced by Rep. Bolton); H.R.
10070, 84th Congo (1956) (introduced by Rep. Hayworth); H.R. 10536, 84th Congo (1956) (introduced
by Rep. Rhodes); H.R. 11684, 84th Congo (1956) (introduced by Rep. Roosevelt); H.R. 11793, 84th
Congo (1956) (introduced by Rep. Thompson); S. 1807, 85th Congo (1957) (introduced by Sen.
Kennedy, Sen. Morse, Sen. Murray, and Sen. McNamara); H.R. 394, 85th Congo (1957) (introduced by
Rep. Rodino); H.R. 651, 85th Congo (1957) (introduced by Rep. Green); H.R. 715, 85th Congo (1957)
(introduced by Rep. Kelly); H.R. 840, 85th Congo (1957) (introduced by Rep. Multer); H.R. 4825, 85th
Congo (1957) (introduced by Rep. Roosevelt); H.R. 6307, 85th Congo (1957) (introduced by Rep.
Dwyer); H.R. 6318, 85th Congo (1957) (introduced by Rep. Harden); H.R. 6584, 85th Congo (1957)
(introduced by Rep. Griffiths); H.R. 6797, 85th Congo (1957) (introduced by Rep. Roosevelt); H.R.
8274, 85th Congo (1957) (introduced by Rep. Granahan); S. 1345, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by
Sen. Cooper, Sen. Case, Sen. Javits, and Sen. Prouty). H.R. 313, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep.
Addonizio); H.R. 365, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Green); H.R. 780, 86th Congo (1959)
(introduced by Rep. Griffiths); H.R. 822, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Kelly); H.R. 855, 86th
Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Multer); H.R. 3866, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Keams);
H.R. 3867, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Church); H.R. 3868, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced
by Rep. Rogers); H.R. 3869, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Weis); H.R. 3885, 86th Congo
(1959) (introduced by Rep. Bolton); H.R. 3886, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Dwyer); H.R.
3887, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. May); H.R. 3888, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep.
St. George); H.R. 4361, 86th Congo (1959) (introduced by Rep. Flynn); S. 3926, 86th Congo (1960)
(introduced by Sen. Morse); S. 2494, 87th Congo (1961) (introduced by Sen. McNamara and Sen.
Morse); H.R. 165, 87th Congo (1961) (introduced by Rep. Weis); H.R. 217, 87th Congo (1961)
(introduced by Rep. Griffiths); H.R. 236, 87th Congo (1961) (introduced by Rep. Kelly); H.R. 364, 87th
Congo (1961) (introduced by Rep. Green); H.R. 571, 87th Congo (1961) (introduced by Rep. Sullivan);
H.R. 766, 87th Congo (1961) (introduced by Rep. McDonough); H.R. 834, 87th Congo (1961)
(introduced by Rep. Multer); H.R. 2376. 87th Congo (1961) (introduced by Rep. Addonizio); H.R. 3796,
87th Congo (1961) (introduced by Rep. Rivers); H.R. 8898, 87th Congo (1961) (introduced by Rep.
Green); H.R. 10575, 87th Congo (1962) (introduced by Rep. Dwyer); H.R. 11517, 87th Congo (1962)
(introduced by Rep. Zelenko); H.R. 11634, 87th Congo (1962) (introduced by Rep. Zelenko); H.R.
11677, 87th Congo (1962) (introduced by Rep. Zelenko); H.R. 12062, 87th Congo (1962) (introduced by
Rep. Fulton); H.R. 12155, 87th Congo (1962) (introduced by Rep. Ashbrook); H.R. 12159, 87th Congo
(1962) (introduced by Rep. Goodell); H.R. 12161, 87th Congo (1962) (introduced by Rep. Keams); H.R.
12165, 87th Congo (1962) (introduced by Rep. Hiestand); H.R. 12228, 87th Congo (1962) (introduced by
Rep. Halpern).
22\. Most of the equal pay bills in 1963 continued to lack a general exception. S. 882, 88th Congo
(1963) (introduced by Sen. Case); S. 910, 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Sen. McNamara); H.R. 298,
88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep. Bow); H.R. 409, 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep.
Roosevelt); H.R. 644, 88th Congo (1963) (Rep. Multer); H.R. 896. 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by
Rep. Kelly); H.R. 1075, 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep. Griffiths); H.R. 1151, 88th Congo (1963)
(introduced by Rep. Sullivan); H.R. 1624, 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep. Halpern); H.R. 1936,
88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep. Martin); H.R. 3861, 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep.
Green); H.R. 4022, 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep. Dwyer); H.R. 4033, 88th Congo (1963)
(introduced by Rep. Holland); H.R. 4269, 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep. Thompson); H.R.
4892, 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep. Montoya); H.R. 5063, 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by
Rep. Sickles); H.R. 5672, 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep. Rivers).
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proposed. The first version was in H.R. 5110, introduced by Representative
Goodel1.222 This bill would have authorized "reasonable differentiation
based on a factor or factors other than sex" (the "reasonable-factor
defense"). Soon thereafter, Representative Goodell introduced H.R. 5605,
which also contained the reasonable-factor defense.223 Then, Senators
McNamara, Morse, and Randolph introduced S. 1409, which, instead of the
reasonable-factor defense, contained an exception for "any other factor
other than sex" (the "any-other-factor defense").224 The latter defense
proved more acceptable and was incorporated into a handful of House bills
and into the statute.225
The difference between the reasonable-factor defense and the any-
other-factor defense is significant. The liability clause of the Equal Pay Act
provides that an employer must afford a man and a woman the same rate of
pay for jobs that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and are
performed under similar working conditions.226 If Congress had adopted
the reasonable-factor defense, then the trier of fact would have enjoyed
some degree of discretion in deciding whether a difference between a man's
job and a woman's job sufficed to differentiate them. For example, a jury
might have decided that higher pay for a man on the swing shift than for a
woman doing equal work on the day shift was not a "reasonable
differentiation." In contrast, the any-other-factor defense permits little if
any discretion, and Congress adopted the any-other-factor defense for
exactly this reason. Thus, Congress intended that a differential could be
based on "shift differentials, restrictions on or differences based on time of
day worked, hours of work, lifting or moving heavy objects, differences
based on experience, training, or ability."227 If men and women performed
identical work on an assembly line, except that the men sometimes picked
up heavy boxes, the men could be paid more.228 If female workers were
more costly than male workers, the women could be paid less;229for
222. 88th Congo (1963).
223. 88th Congo (1963).
224. S. 1409, 88th Congo § 3(d)(I) (1963).
225. H.R. 5970, 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep. Thompson); H.R. 5971, 88th Congo (1963)
(introduced by Rep. O'Hara); H.R. 5972, 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep. Sickles); H.R. 6021,
88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep. McDowell); H.R. 6060, 88th Congo (1963) (introduced by Rep.
Green) .
226. 29 V.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2002).
227. H.R. REp. No. 88-309, at 3, 88th Congo (1963); 109 CONGo REC. 9195-96 (1963) (statements
of Rep. Frelinghuysen and Rep. Thompson).
228. 109 CONGoREc. 9196 (1963) (statement of Rep. Frelinghuysen). Cf Shultz v. Wheaton Glass
Co., 421 F.2d 25~ (3d Cir. 1970) (picking up heavy boxes did not justify pay differential).
229. See S. REp. No. 88-176 at 4 (1963); 109 CONGoREc. 9200 (1963) (statement of Rep. Dwyer).
An amendment to the bi]] expressly to a]]ow a differential based on the extra cost of employing women
was defeated because it was redundant. 109 CONGo REc. at 9217 (statements of Rep. Goode]] and Rep.
Pucinski).
.~T"r\ \ \\~"f'j
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example, if state law required longer rest breaks for women, women's pay
could be adjusted accordingly.23O A differential could be based on red
circling.231 A differential might even be based on status as head of a
household, provided it was available to both sexes.232
Willard Wirtz was the Secretary of Labor from 1962 to 1969.233 It is
reasonable to infer that he was familiar with the reasonable-factor defense
in Representative Goodell's bills and with the any-other-factor defense that
was incorporated into the Equal Pay Act. In addition, the Secretary drafted
S. 830 and H.R. 3651, which became the Age Act and contained the RFOA
clause. As for Congress, three-fourths of the senators and representatives in
the Ninetieth Congress who were eligible to vote on the Age Act -
including the leading advocates of the Age Act, namely, Senators
Yarborough and Javits and Representatives Perkins and Dent - had been
members of the Eighty-eighth Congress, which had passed the Equal Pay
Act. 234 Several of them had introduced equal pay bills.235 Thus, when the
Secretary incorporated the reasonable-factor defense into the RFOAclause,
and when representatives and senators voted for it, they knew the origin of
this defense, and they knew how it differed from the any-other-factor
defense.
Secretary Wirtz and Congress had good reason to choose the
reasonable-factor defense for the Age Act. The any-other-factor defense
serves the narrow purpose of the Equal Pay Act; eliminating sex
discrimination in compensation is achieved as long as a pay differential
between a man and a woman is genuinely based on anything other than sex,
even if the basis of the differential is irrational. But the purpose of the Age
Act is broad. Congress sought "to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age."236 Only differentiation based on
230. 109 CONGo REc. 9205-06 (1963) (statement of Rep. Griffin).
231. "This term. . . describes certain unusual, higher than normal wage rates which are maintained
for many valid reasons. For instance, it is not uncommon for an employer who must reduce help in a
skilled job to transfer employees to other less demanding jobs but to continue to pay them a premium
rate in order to have them available when they are again needed for their former jobs." H.R. REP. No.
88-309, supra note 227, at 3.
232. See 109 CONGo REc. 9205-06 (1963) (statement of Rep. Goodell); but cf. id. at 9206
(statement of Rep. Green).
233. See supra note 17.
234. We cannot know who voted for and against S. 830 and H.R. 13054 because, of the several
votes taken on these bills, only one was by roll call, 113 CONGo REc. 34753 (1967), and the bill that was
approved by this vote was subsequently amended. We can know, however, that 533 members of
Congress could have voted on the bills (Representative Younger having died and Representative Powell
having been excluded), and 396 of these members had served in the 88th Congress. See U.S.
CONGRESS, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, [774- [971, S. Doc. No. 92-8, at
459-64,471-6 (1971).
235. See supra notes 220-221.
236. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2003).
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The presence of the word "reasonable" in the RFOAclause, but not in
exception iv of the Equal Pay Act, together with origin of the RFOAclause,
demonstrate that the Secretary and Congress drew the clause, not from the
Equal Pay Act itself, but from bills in 1963 that proposed the reasonable-
factor defense. This choice was purposeful. Employing persons based on
their ability, not their age, means basing decisions on factors that contribute
to the safe or efficient operation of the business, not on factors that do not
predict success on the job. This is the essence of the defense to disparate
impact.
4. Pension Plans and Other Unintended Effects
Section 4(j)(2) indicates that Congress meant to outlaw disparate impact
discrimination, but decided that some practices with an adverse effect
deserved protection.
); but cf id. at 9206
Section 4(f)(2) protected bona fide employee benefits plans, but
prohibited their use as an excuse for refusing to hire older workers. CON
argues that this section reveals that Congress outlawed only disparate
treatment (refusal to hire) and not disparate impact (denial of pension
benefits).237 In fact, however, this section demonstrates that Congress
intended the Age Act to outlaw disparate impact in general, yet also
intended that some practices with an adverse impact be exempted.
Section 4(f) contained several defenses. Section 4(f)(1) stated the
BFOQand RFOAdefenses. Section 4(f)(2) stated the defense of observing a
bona fide seniority system or benefit plan. Section 4(f)(3) stated the
defense of good cause for the discharge or discipline of a worker.
It was no coincidence that the same section of the Age Act protected
both seniority systems and benefit plans. Both of these programs could
have adverse effects on older workers. Congress knew that although
seniority often helped older workers, sometimes it hurt them. For example,
seniority could be company wide or could be limited to a specific unit.
Company-wide seniority protected older workers against lay-off, or, if they
were laid off, helped them when workers were recalled, because an older
worker could claim a job anywhere in the company. Unit-specific seniority,
however, could be detrimental to an older worker, who might be laid off
from one unit while junior workers in other units were retained, or who,
having been, laid off, might find that junior workers (or even new hires)
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were brought into other units.238
Congress also knew that pension and other benefit plans could have
adverse effects on older workers. Senator Yarborough gave the example of
a plan with a normal retirement age of 65 and a twenty-year funding and
vesting schedule.239 An employer might refuse to hire anyone whose
pension could not vest. As a result, an applicant aged 55 would not be
hired. In order to promote the employment of older workers, section 4(£)(2)
required this employer to make the decision on hiring without regard for the
applicant's age. But employers who began hiring older workers would
encounter a significant problem: what to do about pensions, medical
insurance, and other fringe benefits? Older workers are more costly to
these programs.240 Taking pensions as an example, hiring a worker at age
55 and providing a pension at age 65 would allow only half the usual period
in which to fund the benefits. Yet if the plan provided for a twenty-year
funding and vesting schedule, and if only workers whose pensions could
vest could be hired, this individual would be able to establish a prima facie
case of disparate impact.
Section 4(£)(2) contained Congress's solution to the problems of
seniority and fringe benefits. Section 4(£)(2) protected bona fide seniority
systems and benefit plans, just as section 703(h) of Title VII protected bona
fide seniority systems.241 Hence, CON'S argument is mistaken. What need
would there have been for section 4(£)(2) to protect seniority and benefit
plans against challenge based on their adverse effects unless disparate
impact were illegal under section 4(a)(2)?
B. CON: Section 4(j)(l) Precludes Disparate Impact
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The text of the RFOA clause, its legislative history and its true origin
combine to prove that Congress aimed the Age Act only at disparate
treatment.
1. The Text of Section 4(j)(I)
The RFOA clause is a further defense to disparate treatment, not the defense
to disparate impact. The RFOA clause is perhaps superfluous, but so are the
BFOQ and good-cause clauses of the Age Act. The RFOA clause protects an
employer's act based on a reasonable belief
238. Secretary's Report, supra note 18, at 15.
239. 113 CONGo REc. 31255 (1967) (statement of Sen. Yarborough).
240. Secretary's Report, supra note 18, at 16.
241. Int'1 Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 343-55 (1977). 242. Senate He
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PRO'S argument that the RFOA clause in section 4(f)(1) states the
defense to disparate impact rests on the unarticulated assumption that the
section has no other application. The assumption is false. For example,
Senator Jennings Randolph was speaking with Secretary of Labor Wirtz
about the hiring of older workers as pilots on airlines:
SENATORRANDOLPH.Under the FAA rules, the pilot must be retired at age
60. I am told that it costs approximately $250,000 to $300,000 to train
pilots. . . . That period oftraining runs for about 3 years.
I am wondering if there is a possibility of an understanding on your part as
to why the airline might hesitate to invest this sum in, well say, training a
man who is 45 years of age, when the airline would realize that there was
only 12 years before his date of retirement. . . .Would you discuss this
problem I brought to your attention?
SECRETARYWIRTZ.Yes, sir; it would involve in the administration of the
law a determination under section 4(f)(1) [the RFOAclause]. . . . I would
find that question not very difficult in my present understanding of it - it is
subject to change - my answer. I would think where there is that much
training requirement, that that would be a legitimate factor; that you would
weigh the period of the usefulness of that person against the period of the
training that was required, taking full account of the cost factors and human
factors. I should be surprised to find any difficulty with that case and if I
am less than blunt, you will know it is only the proprieties that require my
putting this in any other form. I would not think it would be a violation of
this provision to deny employment on those terms.242
The Secretary did not subsequently change his answer. An employer
may refuse to hire a worker above a certain age if training costs are high
and the employer would have a restricted period in which to recoup those
costs. The refusal to hire is prima facie disparate treatment, but the high
training costs and restricted recoupment period are "reasonable factors other
than age." Thus the RFOAclause has meaning even ifit is not the defense to
disparate impact.
It may be argued that the clause is superfluous if interpreted as
suggested in the preceding paragraph. If an employer discharges a worker
because of a reasonable factor like misconduct or inefficiency, then the
worker has not been denied an opportunity because of age, and
discrimination has not occurred; and there was no need for the RFOAclause
to make this point. The argument is technically correct. The employer who
proves that the worker was disadvantaged due to a "reasonable factor[]
other than age" has destroyed the element of causation in the plaintiffs
prima facie case. It was not necessary for Congress to write into the statute
the right of a.defendant to attack the plaintiffs prima facie case.
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But the argument proves too much. The BFOQ clause is equally
superfluous. If age is a BFOQfor a job and the plaintiff is too old, then the
plaintiff is not qualified for the job. Being qualified for the job is an
element of the prima facie case, and the employer would have been free to
attack it even if Congress had not inserted the BFOQclause in the act.
Likewise, section 4(f)(3) is superfluous. "It shall not be unlawful for
an employer. . . to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good
cause." To prove that a worker was disciplined for good cause is to
confound the worker's attempt to prove that the discharge occurred because
of age.
The RFOAclause, the BFOQclause, and the good-cause clause are not
only superfluous, but also redundant. If an employer disciplines a worker
for good cause, has not the employer acted on a reasonable factor other than
age? If age is a BFOQfor a job and a person is too old to do the work, is not
the basis of the decision the person's lack of ability, and is not lack of
ability a reasonable factor other than age?
Congress simply disregarded the canons of statutory construction.
When the point was important enough, Congress did not hesitate to state the
obvious, or even to repeat itself.
A much more probable reading of the RFOAclause exists. It says a
"reasonable factor[] other than age" is a defense. The clause does not say a
"job-related factor" or a "business necessity." If an employer acts
reasonably in basing a decision on a certain factor, then the decision is
lawful. For example, when an employer has a reasonable belief that a test
selects qualified workers, the RFOA clause protects use of that test,
regardless of its disparate impact. Far from ratifying disparate impact, the
RFOAclause negates disparate impact.
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Secretary Wirtz did not intend the RFOA clause to be the defense to
disparate impact, and Senator Yarborough's example of an employer who
uses a test to select workers did not contemplate disparate impact because
the Senator did not say the test had an adverse effect.
PRO argues that the RFOAclause was Secretary's Wirtz's response to
his observation that some age "discrimination" occurred because of a
genuine relationship between age and ability to perform a job.243 But PRO
cites nothing in the Secretary's Report or in the legislative history to
support this connection. In this connection, PRO asserts that the RFOA
243. See note 208 and accompanying text.
244. See stlI
245. See stlI
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clause captures the defense to disparate impact. Even if the text of the
clause were massaged into this form, the truth would remain that Congress
did not understand disparate impact in 1967 and could not have intended
the RFOAclause to be the defense to a claim that did not as yet exist. PRO'S
argument for disparate impact based on Senator Yarborough's remarks in
the Senate244neglects a crucial fact: The Senator's example did not say that
the employer's test had an adverse effect on older workers. The Senator
said that the man "might fail to pass the test at 35; he might fail to pass the
test at 55." The Senator did not suggest that more older than younger
workers failed the test. Legislators are prolix, and what they know, they
say. If Senator Yarborough had thought he was discoursing on disparate
impact, he would have mentioned the adverse effect of the test. The truth is
simple: neither Senator Yarborough nor any other senator understood
disparate impact.
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The origin of the RFOA clause is not the Equal Pay Act, but bills against age
discrimination dating from 1958. Some bills would have barred age
discrimination by federal contractors, and other bills would have made age
discrimination an unfair labor practice. The reasonableness defense in all
of these bills applied only to intentional discrimination.
~ the defense to
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? impact because
Contrary to PRO'S argument,245the RFOAclause did not originate in
Representative Goodell's bills in 1963. The clause goes back substantially
further than exception iv to the Equal Pay Act. The true origin of the clause
reveals that it was aimed only at disparate treatment.
Many of the bills against age discrimination between 1958 and 1967
contained an exception that would have allowed an employer to deny an
employment opportunity on the basis of age when an older worker could
not reasonably perform the job safely or efficiently. These bills
contemplated only disparate treatment, and it follows that the RFOAclause,
which grew out of the reasonableness exception in the earlier bills, also
applies only to disparate treatment.
The first bill against age discrimination to contain a reasonableness
exception was introduced by Representative Porter in 1958. (Senator
Virtz's response to
Ted because of a
a job.243 But PRO
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244. See supra text accompanying note 210.
245. See supra notes 222-225 and accompanying text.
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246. H.R. 10455, 85th Congo (1958).
247. Id.
248. See supra notes 180-186 and accompanying text.
249. H.R. 11671, 86th Congo (1960).
250. See supra notes 168-171, 187-189 and accompanying text.
such
affec1
becal
Notice tha
the semicolon.
The first (
this role, union
or privileges"
the "reasonabl
Mutatis mutan
reasonablenesE
meaning in be
section 8(b )(8)
The seCOJ
omitted areas
that the clause
RFOA clause s1
explain why
disparate im}
supposedly th
impact as to (
reasonablenes
The true
was meant to
clause was ml
A close readit
Section:
denying empJ
reasonably d(
prohibited un
reasonablene~
because, if 0]
should have t
The reas
of section 8(1
internal affai
membership"
Unions woul
to the disad"
opportunities
clause of se
"reasonable
organization
lavits's National Act did not contain any exceptions.)246 Representative
Porter's bill pertained to government contractors. It read in relevant part:
the contractor will not impose any requirement or limitation of maximum
age with respect to the hiring or employment of persons, except such
requirements or limitations, in accordance with regulations prescribed by
the Secretary of Labor, relating to specific jobs or types of employment as
are reasonably designed to protect older workers from tasks which they
could not ordinarily because of their age be expected to perform safely or
efficiently.247
Thirty-three similar bills were introduced by other representatives and
senators between 1958 and 1964.248All of these bills prohibited maximum
age limitations, which are disparate treatment. It follows that the
reasonableness exception was a defense only to intentional discrimination.
The first bill seeking to make an unfair labor practice of age
discrimination was introduced by Representative Dingell in 1960,249and
seventeen similar bills were introduced thereafter through 1967.zso These
bills would have added section 8(a)(6) to the Labor Act, making it an unfair
labor practice for employers:
(6) to refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, otherwise lawful, because of such
individual's age, when the reasonable demands of the position do
not require such an age distinction. . .
Section 8(a)(6) read like section 4(a)(I) of the Age Act and section
703(a)(1) of Title VII and, therefore, was aimed only at disparate treatment.
If PRO is correct that the RFOA clause is the defense to disparate impact,
what is the reasonableness exception doing in this section of the bill? Far
more likely, the exception for "the reasonable demands of the position" was
intended as a defense to disparate treatment.
Most of the unfair labor practice bills also would have added section
8(b )(8) to the Labor Act, making it an unfair labor practice for unions:
(8) to discriminate against any individual in connection with terms,
conditions, or privileges of his employment, otherwise lawful,
because of such individual's age, when the reasonable demands of
the position do not require such an age distinction; or to limit,
segregate, or classify its membership in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive such individual of otherwise lawful
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
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Notice that section 8(b)(8) had two clauses, which were separated by
the semicolon.
The first clause was directed at unions' role as bargaining agents. In
this role, unions would have been forbidden to negotiate "terms, conditions,
or privileges" of employment that discriminated on the basis of age unless
the "reasonable demands of the position. . . require[d] such distinction."
Mutatis mutandis, this clause was a paraphrase of section 8(a)(6); thus, the
reasonableness exception must have been intended to carry the same
meaning in both sections. It follows that the reasonableness exception in
section 8(b)(8) was a defense to disparate treatment.
The second clause of section 8(b)(8) is equally important because it
omitted a reasonableness exception. This omission devastates the argument
that the clause "limit, segregate, or classify" states disparate impact and the
RFOAclause states the defense. If the argument were correct, how could we
explain why the second clause of the section, which supposedly stated
disparate impact, omitted the reasonableness exception, which was
supposedly the defense? Surely, the exception is as necessary to disparate
impact as to disparate treatment. The omission was not an oversight; the
reasonableness exception qualified the first clause of the same section.
The true explanation is that, whereas the first clause of section 8(b)(8)
was meant to apply to unions' external relations with employers, the second
clause was meant to apply to union's internal relations with their members.
A close reading of sections 8(a)(6) and 8(b)(8) allows no other explanation.
Section 8(a)(6) would have prohibited employers from intentionally
denying employment opportunities to older workers, unless they could not
reasonably do the work, and the first clause of section 8(b)(8) would have
prohibited unions from causing employers to violate section 8(a)(6). The
reasonableness exception was necessary in the first clause of section 8(b)(8)
because, if older workers could not reasonably perform a job, then unions
should have been free to negotiate for appropriate provisions in contracts.
The reasonableness exception was not necessary in the second clause
of section 8(b)(8) because it had a different purpose, namely, to govern the
internal affairs of the union. The words "limit, segregate, or classify its
membership" obviously applied to the relations of unions to their members.
Unions would have been prohibited from organizing themselves internally
to the disadvantage of older workers if the consequence were loss of job
opportunities. The reasonableness exception did not appear in the second
clause of section 8(b)(8) because the exception was not needed. The
"reasonable demands of the position" were irrelevant to the internal
organization of unions.
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As mentioned above, Representative Roosevelt's bills H.R. 10144 in
1962 and H.R. 405 in 1963 each contained a section outlawing age
discrimination by employers and unions, and this section contained the
reasonableness exception. It provided in relevant part:
SEC.6.
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer to fail
or refuse to hire any individual, or to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, otherwise lawful, because of such individual's age, when
the reasonable demands of the position do not require such an age
distinction. . . .
(c) It shall
organization -
(1) to exclude ftom its membership or to discriminate against any
individual because of his age, if the reasonable demands of the
position or positions involved do not require such an age distinction.
As with the bills regarding federal contractors and unfair labor
practices, the liability terms in section 6 contemplated only disparate
treatment, and the reasonableness exception was similarly restricted.251
The present form of the reasonableness exception - the RFOAclause
- appeared for the first time early in 1967 in the legislative proposal of the
Secretary of Labor, S. 830 and H.R. 3651. The changes made to this
proposal by the House of Representatives and the Senate did not affect the
RFOA clause.
What was the origin of the text of the RFOA clause in the
administration's proposal? The answer is obvious. The clause was the
linear descendent of the reasonableness exceptions in the bills that would
have prohibited age discrimination by government contractors, the bills that
would have made age discrimination an unfair labor practice, and the bills
introduced by Representative Roosevelt in 1962 and 1963. As a result, the
RFOA clause contemplates only disparate treatment because the
reasonableness exception in all of those bills applied only to intentional
discriminatiOI
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251. The reasonableness exception was relevant only to employment. In relation to employers, the
exception would have allowed them to exclude older workers when the "reasonable demands of the
position" required youth; in relation to unions, the exception would have allowed them, in their role as
bargaining agents, to negotiate clauses in labor contracts that excluded older workers for the same
reason.
PRO and
disparate imp'
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Issue.
The reasonableness exception did not apply to unions as organizations, that is, to the internal
affairs of unions. However, the exception in section 6(c)(l) seems to seems to apply to unions both as
bargaining agents and as organizations, for it qualifies both the prohibition "to exclude from its
membership" and the prohibition "to discriminate against." Even if this reading were correct, it would
remain that the reasonableness defense applied only to disparate treatment; but the reading is not correct.
More likely, section 6(c)(I) condensed section 8(b)(8), quoted above, that would have made an unfair
labor practice of age discrimination by unions. Understood as a condensation, section 6(c)(I) meant the
reasonableness exception to apply only to unions in their role as bargaining agents.
The ordim
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b. The Reasonable-Factor Defense
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PRO mistakenly argues that the reasonable-factor defense was derived from
an unsuccessful bill callingfor equal pay.
;e for a labor
PRO asserts that the origin of the RFOAclause was an unsuccessful
equal-pay bill introduced by Representative Goodel1.252This assertion rests
on two arguments: one argument is at best an educated guess about what
Secretary Wirtz and members of Congress must have known, and the other
argument is speculation as to how Congress understood the difference
between the "reasonable-factor" defense and the "any-other-factor" defense.
Neither argument is supported by committee reports, statements on the floor
of Congress, or testimony in committee hearings.
PRO also asserts that the RFOA clause captures the essence of the
defense to disparate impact. Reading the BFOQand RFOAclauses together
makes clear what each actually does. The BFOQclause provides a defense
when age is explicitly the employer's reason for a decision; the RFOAclause
provides a defense when age is not explicitly the reason for the decision.
Both of these are defenses to disparate treatment, as Senator Yarborough's
examples make clear. BFOQ: an airline may retire its pilots at age 60.
ROFA: in determining who is qualified for a job, an employer may use
reasonable means, even if it favors a younger worker.253
It is more likely, as just argued, that the true origin of the RFOAclause
was the line of bills against age discrimination that culminated in the Age
Act.
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PRO and CON have presented arguments for and against recognizing
disparate impact under the Age Act. The question now is, which arguments
are more forcible? Which better serve the purpose of the act? Here follows
an evaluation of these arguments by the author and then his views on the
Issue.
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A. Arguments Based on the Text of the Act
The ordinary meaning of the text of the Age Act favors recognition of
252. See supra notes 222-223 and accompanying text.
253. See supra text following note 245.
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The text of the Age Act favors an interpretation that includes disparate
impact. The words "because of. . . age" demand causation, but not intent.
If each section of a statute has its own meaning, section 4(a)(2) must
describe disparate impact. Where Congress found differences between age
discrimination and race or sex discrimination, the Age Act was
differentiated from Title VII; the practical identity of sections 4(a)(2) of the
Age Act and 703(a)(2) of Title VII indicates that Congress saw no
differences in regard to theories of liability. The Supreme Court's decision
in Griggs supports this interpretation.
It may be argued that Congress put the RFOAclause in the Age Act in
order to rule out disparate impact. The text of the clause, however,
approximates the defense to disparate impact. In the context of an
employment decision, a "reasonable factor[] other than age" can only be a
practice that genuinely serves a legitimate goal of the business.
B. Arguments Based on Legislative History Justice Po
disparate i~
to prove dis
The legislative history of Title VII and the Age Act militate against
recognizing disparate impact.
Senator Yarborough's remarks on the BFOQ and RFOAclauses can
easily be read to embrace disparate impact, but the remarks make sense
even if he had only disparate treatment in mind. That Congress was not
aware of disparate impact three years earlier when Title VII was considered,
that none of the troubling issues to which disparate impact gives rise were
raised in 1967, that the closest the Secretary of Labor's Report came to
disparate impact was to recommend further study of practices that
motivated employers to impose age limits, and that Congress directed the
Secretary to study ways of overcoming other "barriers" to the employment
of older workers, amount to convincing proof that Congress did not have
disparate impact in mind in 1967.
This conclusion demonstrates the RFOA clause was not written to
preclude disparate impact. Congress could not have intended the clause to
forfend a theory of which no one was aware.
Justice F
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C. Arguments Based on the Origins of Section 4(a)(2) and the RFOA
Clause
The origins of section 4(a)(2) ("to limit, segregate, or classifY") and
section 4(j)(1) (the RFOAclause) suggest these sections were aimed only
at disparate treatment.
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Both section 703(a)(2) of Title VII and section 4(a)(2) of the Age Act
originated in bills introduced shortly after the end of the Second World
War. The sections were directed at intentional discrimination by labor
unions, and neither their text nor their meaning changed over time. These
sections were not intended to outlaw practices with a disparate impact.
The origin of the RFOAclause in section 4(f)(l) is less certain. It has
roots in early bills against age discrimination, suggesting the clause is an
outgrowth of an exception in those bi11sthat allowed employers to establish
reasonable age limits. These bills, both in what they prohibited and in what
they excepted, were aimed only at disparate treatment. But the RFOAclause
also has roots in the Equal Pay Act, suggesting that the change in wording
of the exception trom "any factor" to "reasonable factors" was intended to
narrow the exception to the point that it is congruent with the defense to
disparate impact. There is truth in both of these arguments, though the
former seems to be stronger.
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Justice Powell's theorem is correct. Both disparate treatment and
disparate impact, as legal theories or methods of proof, should be available
to prove discrimination.
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Justice Powell's theorem is convincing. Disparate treatment and
disparate impact were legal theories or methods of proof under Title VII,
not separate claims. Eight justices of the Supreme Court subscribed to the
theorem in Watson v. Fort Work Bank & Trust. The only difference
between disparate treatment and disparate impact is the way in which
causation is proved. It follows that both disparate treatment and disparate
impact should be available as methods of proof under the Age Act.
ts not written to
lded the clause to
VII.
THE PURPOSE OF THE AGE ACT
The words of the statute and Justice Powell's theorem favor disparate
impact. The legislative history of the statute and the origins of the text
point the other way. The purposes of the statute are the tiebreaker.
)
and the RFOA A. Employment Based on Ability
. classifY") and
vere aimed only
The main purpose of the Age Act was to promote employment decisions
based on ability. Outlawing disparate impact would further this goal.
The overriding purpose of the Age Act is to promote employment
based on ability. Congress believed it was unjust to deny a job to a
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254. S. REp. No. 90-723, supra note 49, at I. H.R. REp. No. 90-805, supra note 54, at I.
255. 113 CONGo REc. 34740 (1967) (statement of Rep. Perkins) ("H.R. 13054, a bill to bar arbitrary
discrimination in employment based on age, in fact is more than a bill to bar age discrimination. It is a
bill to promote employment of middle aged and older persons based on their ability"). See also id. at
34742 (statement of Rep. Steiger) ("This bill will. . . insure that all our citizens have an opportunity,
commensurate with their abilities, for productive employment."), 34744 (statement of Rep. Hawkins)
("Unless we can bring about a closer relationship between employment and ability - regardless of age
- our longer lifespan is of little avaiL... The purpose of H.R. 13054... is 'to promote the
employment of older workers based on their ability"'), 34746 (statement of Rep. Daniels) ("employers
willleam to judge prospective employees on the basis of ability"), id. (statement of Rep. Olsen) ("a
statement of national policy to promote the employment of older workers on the basis of their ability
alone has long been overdue"), 34747 (statement of Rep. Dent) (the bill "provides relief only when a
qualified person who is ready, willing, and able to work is unfairly denied or deprived of a job solely on
the basis of age"), 34749 (statement of Rep. Halpern) ("This bill. . . is carefully designed to promote
employment of older persons based on ability rather than age.").
256. 113 CONGo REC. 31253 (1967) (statement of Sen. Yarborough) ("this is a bill to give every
American the opportunity to be equally considered for employment and promotional opportunity").
America was and still is the great land of opportunity, and the reason is clear: It is a land
where a premium is put on ability
-
not rank, not privilege, and, if the system worked to
perfection, not nationality, not religion, not sex, not race, and not age. But, Mr. President, we
are confronted with the fact that as well as the system does work, there are still some
shortcomings.
Id. at 31254 (statement of Sen. Javits)
SENATOR YARBOROUGH. Mr. Secretary, what we really seek to do about this legislation is to
get away from arbitrary age distinctions and go to judgment of individuals on their merits.
SECRETARY WIRTZ. That is correct.
SENATOR YARBOROUGH. How much should we even think of these situations where age
might have some relation to ability but not in relation to an individual's merits?
SECRETARY WrRTz. I am wondering whether we should strike any reference to age at all in
any connection and look at employment only in terms of whether the individual does or does
not have the capacity to do whatever [sic] job it is that the individual is seeking.
Senate Hearings, sllpra note 15, at 51-2.
257. Secretary's Report, supra note 18, at 2 ("Employment discrimination because of race is
identified, in the general understanding of it, with non-employment resulting from feelings about people
entirely unrelated to their ability to do the job. There is no significant discrimination of this kind so far
as older workers are concerned."). The report further states:
Discrimination in employment based on race, religion, color, or national origin is
accompanied by and often has its origins in prejudices that originate outside the sphere of
employment. There are no such prejudices in American life which would carry over so
strongly into the sphere of employment. . . . We have found no evidence of prejudice based on
dislike or intolerance of the older worker.
Id. at 5-6. However, the Secretary's Report also said, "This is not to say that there is no intolerant
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qualified worker simply because of age. Section 2(b) of the act states: "[I]t
is therefore the purpose of this Act to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age. . . ." The committee reports in the
House of Representatives and the Senate echoed this purpose,254as did
individual representatives,255senators, and the Secretary ofLabor,zs6
In order to promote employment on the basis of ability, not age,
Congress sought to identify and eliminate the cause of age discrimination.
Our lawmakers believed that age discrimination differed from race or sex
discrimination in that employers were not prejudiced against older persons
as people. So said the Report of the Secretary of Labor,257so testified the
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257so testified the
Secretary258 and other witnesses before committees of Congress,259 and so
believed senators260 and representatives.261 For example, Representative
Burke said on the floor of the House:
Age discrimination is not the same as the insidious discrimination based on
race or creed prejudices and bigotry. These discriminations result in
nonemployment because of feelings about a person entirely unrelated to his
ability to do a job. This is hardly a problem for the older job seeker.262
The author believes that Representative Burke and the others were
mistaken on this score. Prejudice against older persons may not have been
the dominant reason for age discrimination, but American worship of youth
is not a new phenomenon, and it played
- and continues to play - a large
role in the work place.263 Age discrimination was particularly problematicnote 54, at 1.
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prejudice against older persons as such. Determinations not to employ older workers can become deep-
seated and even emotional in character." Id. at 6.
258. House Hearings, supra note 52, at 13 ("this kind of discrimination is entirely different from
race discrimination; the root of race discrimination is pure bigotry. That is not true here. Age
discrimination, I think, develops because of oversight, lack of sense, lack of realization of the capacity
of an older person.").
259. !d. at 45 (statement of Norman Sprague, Director, Employment and Retirement Program,
National Council on the Aging) ('The problem of age discrimination is a complex one because it is
seldom a matter of blind or arbitrary prejudice which often exists for reasons of race, creed, color,
national origin, or sex"), 61 (statement of Peter J. Pestillo, Labor Counsel, Chamber of Commerce of the
U.S.) ("the age barriers that exist in employment due to employer attitudes stern from misconceptions
about ability rather than from ill feelings toward older workers"). See also Senate Hearings, supra note
15, at 106 (statement of Anthony Obadal, Secretary, Advisory Panel on Older Workers, U.S. Chamber
of Commerce) (using exactly the same words as Mr. Pestillo), 146 (statement of Mr. Sprague) (repeating
before the Senate committee the statement he made to the House committee).
260. 113 CONGoREc. 31254 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits) ("What we have learned, essentially,
is that a great deal of the problem sterns from pure ignorance: there is simply a widespread irrational
belief that once men and women are past a certain age they are no longer capable of performing even
some of the most routine jobs.").
261. House Hearings, supra note 52, at 53 (statement of Rep. Dent) ("I would like to believe that at
least in this area of discrimination it is not a matter of personal prejudice or bias, it has nothing to do
with the normal type of discrimination we would be faced with in our generation.").
262. 113 CONGoREc. 34742 (1967).
263. "The present age has been called on [sic] age where the cult of youth seems to prevail over
everything else." Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 28 (statement of Sen. Javits).
[A] nation which already worships the whole idea of youth must approach any problem
involving older people with conscious realization of the special obligation a majority assumed
with respect to "minority group" interests. This is, to be sure, one minority group in which we
all seek, sometimes desperately, eventual membership. Discrimination against older workers
remains, nevertheless, a problem which must be met by a majority who are not themselves
adversely affected by it and may even be its temporary beneficiaries. ").
Secretary's Report, supra note 18, at 3. See also SEGRAVE, AGE DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS,
supra note 130, at 4-5 ("David Hackett Fischer described an intense age prejudice in employment in the
late 19th and early 20th century. A cult of youth, he said, developed in America during the 19th century
and grew rapidly in the next one."). Segrave continues:
When H. L. Douse looked at the issue historically in the International Labour Review, he
remarked that the twentieth century belonged to youth. . . . 'This glorification of the attributes
of youth has been enhanced by contemporary authors and playwrights who almost invariably
make their heroes and heroines young dynamic individuals, often bestowing upon them
; is a bill to give every
.nal opportunity").
clear: It is a land
system worked to
Mr. President, we
~re are still some
lis legislation is to
n their merits.
lations where age
ts?
lce to age at all in
idual does or does
ng.
on because of race is
n feelings about people
ltion of this kind so far
ational origin is
:ide the sphere of
lId carry over so
.rejudice based on
-,,~\\\\\
76 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 25:1 2004
for women, as Congress knew. While it considered the Age Act in 1967,
Congress learned about the airlines' common practice of retiring
stewardesses as young as 30 or 32 years of age.264 Indeed, age
discriminatio]
superior qualities quite incompatible with the inexperience of youth," he said. It all led to a
lowered appreciation of the attributes of older people Douse concluded that age
discrimination existed mainly because of prejudice and fallacious beliefs. . . .
Id. at 94 (citing H. L. Douse, "Discrimination Against Older Workers," 83 INT'L LABOUR REv. 349-351,
366 (1961».
Albert Abrams, director of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of
the Aging, pointed out:
that America's national heroes were not physicists or philosophers but 20-year-old baseball
players and teen-age Hollywood stars. "Many respectable corporate fortunes are being made
today by successfully conditioning the public to a dread of aging. The purveyors of face
creams, liver pills, slenderizing mechanisms, and so forth hold before us the grim prospect of a
wrinkled, obese, ill old age." He continued, "Youth, youth, youth! We idealize it. We crave
it. We fear its loss."
SEGRAVE, AGE DISCRlMINATION By EMPLOYERS, supra note 130, at 98.
See also id. at 12 (quoting Daniel Motley, president of a small Christian college on the topic of
older workers in 1915: "yet it is more delightful to be surrounded by the young, with hopefulness,
gladness, and outlook in their eyes"), 26 (quoting the director of the American Vocational Exchange on
the preference of her clients for younger girls in 1927: "there is, of course, the natural human element in
favor of youth"), 27 (quoting the head of a women's shelter in 1928 on the difficulty faced by middle-
aged homeless women when trying to find employment: "Employers naturally prefer to have young
good-looking women in their employ"), 59 (responses to a 1937 questionnaire sent to 18 large New
York employment agencies asked whether employers preferred younger clerical workers; the answer
was yes, and the reasons included "'the youth cult,' 'party looks,' 'Older women are not as attractive as
young girls"'), 65 (citing findings from a New York State legislative committee formed in the late
1930's that among the causes of age discrimination in employment was "public demand for younger
people in certain occupations"), 97 (noting that Alfred Abrahms, director of the New York State Joint
Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging, believed in 1952 that "the glorification of youth and
high energy" was one of the barriers faced by older workers), 127 (noting Secretary of Labor James P.
Mitchell's comment in 1954 that, underlying the reasons for age discrimination was "the national
tendency to glorify the values of youth and minimize the values of maturity. This constant association
of undesirability with age and desirability with youth tends to embed in our society a viewpoint that
shunts the aged out of business, family, and community life").
Prejudice against older persons continues. Id. at 146 (noting that Newsweek's survey oflabor
conditions in 1974 supported the conclusion that "both subtly and blatantly society had exalted youth
and shnmk from what were euphemistically called the golden years. And that pervasive attitude,
declared Newsweek, translated itself into 'widespread job discrimination against older workers. . . '[I]t
was not a conscious bias but represented 'an underlying corporate value"'), 172-73 (noting that a survey
done by James Haefner of Illinois employees in 1977 led Haefner to conclude, "Employees would prefer
not to work with blacks, women, older individuals. . .").
264. S. REp. No. 90-723, supra note 49, at 6, 15; H.R. REP. No. 90-805, supra note 54, at 6, 13-14.
113 CONGo REc. 31253 (! 967) (statement of Sen. Yarborough), 32155 (statement of Sen Javits), 34741
(colloquy of Reps. Mink and Perkins), 34743 (remarks of Rep. Mink and Rep. Matsunaga), 34748
(statement of Rep. Van Deerlin), 34750 (statement of Rep. Pepper).
Congress decided not to protect stewardesses because "a further lowering of the age limit
proscribed by the bill would lessen the primary objective; that is, the promotion of employment
opportunities for older workers." S. REP. No. 90-723, supra note 49, at 6; H.R. REP. No. 90-805, supra
note 54, at 6. But the problem was remedied, in part by Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination
(stewards were not required to retire at such a young age) and in part by the Age Act itself (women aged
40 who wished to be stewardesses are protected).
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discrimination has always affected women more severely than men.265
265. SEGRAVE, AGE DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS, supra note 130, at 14-15 (noting that in
1905-1911, "women suffered from the double discrimination of both gender and age, and. .. age
discrimination against women began at an earlier age. . . ."), 20 (a female officer with the Cooperative
Action Membership Corporation observed in 1927, "much was said about middle-aged men looking for
work but little about middle-aged women, whose problem was equally great, if not greater....
[E]mployment agencies often advised middle-aged women to lie about their ages when applying for
jobs"), 33 (one firm in 1929 maintained a maximum hiring age of 45 for men, 35 for women), 40
(generally acknowledged in 1934 that many employers had a maximum hiring age of 45 for men, 40 for
women; article in 1936 argued that there was a maximum hiring age of 26 for waitresses, of 30 for
clerks), 41 (a Works Progress Administration study of 198,157 workers in 1936 found that older male
workers were unemployed for longer periods than younger male workers; "the same trend was true for
female workers who were, however, younger in all groups"), 42 (three speakers at a 1930 gathering of
the American Women's Association in New York agreed that "women over 40 did not get anything like
the same opportunity for employment that men that age did;" placement of workers through the U.S.
Employment Service in ] 937 "showed a very marked falling off in rates of placement in the older age
groups. Among men the decline started in the 40s; among women, in the 50s for service workers, and in
the 30s for white-collar women workers"); 42-43 (Ollie Randall, assistant director of welfare in 1938 for
the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor observed, "[n Jot many years ago forty was a
hazardous age for a woman to seek re-employment. Employers have lowered this standard now to an
age limit of 35 years, which is considered the maximum age for re-employment today. In some classes
of work, such as secretarial jobs, 28 years is the absolute top with the personnel directors"), 43 (the
American Engineering Council noted in 1930 that the hiring age limit for engineers was 40, and a study
in the early 1930's by a carpenter's union in New York revealed that carpenters over 45 were
unemployed four times longer than younger carpenters; but opportunities for women disappeared at
even younger ages, for example, jobs for librarians started to diminish at age 35, vanished at age 40, and
"every change of position which they made after the age of 30 'must be to a library in which they will be
willing to stay until retirement'" according to the American Library Association in 1940); 48 (according
to the founder of the Executive Women's Association of New York, formed in 1940, "prejudice among
employers against women over 35 was as widespread as the reluctance to hire men over 40"), 56 (a
survey conducted by the Maryland Commissioner of Labor & Statistics in 1930 revealed the hiring age
limit for women lower than for men), 58 (the New York State Commission on Old Age Security in 1931
"found that age first became a handicap in obtaining employment after 35 for men and after 30 for
women;" "o]der people were not among the first to be laid off, except when they attained old age. . . 65
for males, 55 for females"), 59 (the National Conference Board conducted a survey in 1937 and
concluded, "Wherever age limits had been set, the age restrictions were lower for women. Almost 75
percent of the companies with limits set the maximum hiring age for women at 45 or less, while only
about 40 percent of the firms with limits fixed them that low for men;" employment agencies in 1937
reported that "the average age limit set by employers when seeking clerical workers. . . was: men 25 to
30, women 23 to 25"), 60 (according to a 1937 Massachusetts study, "Beginning at age 45 . . . the
chances of reemployment in Massachusetts factories were less than one in four for men and one in 10
for women;
'"
employers prefer to hire males under 30 and females under 25 years of age "'), 72 (a study
by the Joint Legislative Committee on Unemployment of New York State in 1933 concluded that in
New York, the "[c]ommonest age limit set for men was 45 years. Age limits set for women were
regularly lower; 'forty years or less appears to be the general rule. "'), 76 (a pamphlet released by the
Public Affairs Committee in 1939 stated, "[F]rom the age of 35 onward the proportion of unemployed
began to rise, at first graduaUy, then, after 45, more steeply. . . . Women were also affected earlier. For
them the decline in employability set in at 30 instead of 35, and it increased much more rapidly. "), 77
("Roswell Phelps, director of statistics for the Massachusetts Labor Department. . . found discrimination
in Massachusetts beginning at around 34 for men, 29 for women" in the late ]930's), 83-84 ("Edward
Rhatigan, former New York City welfare commissioner disclosed during a speech in 1948 [that a]
woman over 30 and a man over 45 were seldom hired;" Irving Barshop, supervisor of the Federation
Employment Service, stated during a 1949 speech that "unemployment of women as young as 35 or men
as young as 38 constituted a problem that most employers refused to face"), 85 (in a 1955 profile of the
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Nevertheless, our interpretation of the Age Act must be informed by what
our legislators believed, and they believed that there was little prejudice
against older persons.
If prejudice was not the cause of age discrimination, what was? The
cause was "assumptions about the effect of age on [older workers'] ability
to do a job when there is in fact no basis for these assumptions."266 Once
again, Representative Burke put it well:
Discrimination arises for [the older worker] because of assumptions that are
made about the effects of age on performance. As a general rule, ability is
ageless. A young man with ability does not lose it with age, unless his
capabilities are dependent upon his physical characteristics or the speed of
his reactions. In most instances a worker's skills are honed and sharpened
by experience. Studies have shown that the older worker brings qualities to
a job that tend to make him a very desirable employee. He is dependable,
has a lower rate of absenteeism than young coworkers, he has a high rate of
job stability, and his rate of work injuries is lower than that of the younger
worker. 267
problems facing older workers, U.S. News & World Report noted that "new jobs were becoming harder
to get for a man after he reached the age of 45, or for a woman past 35"), 86 (the American Mercury
reported in 1959 that "[s]eventy percent of Houston firms would not consider men for office
employment if they had passed the age of 44; for women there the percentage was 'discouragingly
higher"'), 87 (interviews conducted by the University of California at Berkeley during 1959 revealed,
"At one airline age limits were as follows: 27 for stewardesses, 35 for stewards"), 88 ("females faced an
even bleaker situation than did men." Ollie Randall noted in a speech before the Women's City Club in
New York in 1950, "[C]ommercial old age for women was 35 years. . . based on a recent study by the
United States Employment Service of the diminishing number of jobs for women over 35 and for men
over 45 years of age"), 89 (the International Labour Organization stated in a 1955 report that "older
women were more subject to unemployment than men of the same age or younger workers of either
sex. . .." Cited as examples by the International Labour Organization were Columbus, Ohio, and
Houston, Texas, where 81 percent of job vacancies for women (at state employment centers) were
subject to age restrictions, as compared with 64 percent for male vacancies"), 97 ("Data on job orders
filled by public employment service agencies in 1950 showed that in Columbus, Ohio, of3,925 jobs, 81
percent had age restrictions for women, 75 percent for men"), 98 (in the early 1950's "[i]n commercial
offices the age limit was frequently 35 for women and 45 for men"), 114 (a survey conducted during the
late 1940's and sponsored by the United States National Association of Manufacturers revealed that "the
downward path in employability for men began around the ages 40 to 45; for women it started five to 10
years earlier"), 115 (employment agencies reported in 1956, "'The chances for being placed begin to
diminish most noticeably at age 35 for both men and women, while for women alone, the age handicap
is significant even at 30'''), 151 (surveying the early 1990's and noting, "As in all previous periods, age
discrimination hit women harder than men. Males experienced big employment drops in their mid 50s;
it came 10 years earlier for women").
But compare id. at 86 (one survey showed men encountered difficulty in being hired at age 30
as compared to age 35 for women), 101 (noting that in the late 1950's "difficulty in obtaining
employment apparently began to occur earlier for men than for women in a number of occupational
fields
-
clerical, sales, and semiskilled"
266. Secretary's Report, supra note 18, at 2 (emphasis in original). See a/so id. at 5 ("We do find
substantial evidence of arbitrary practice in the second category of discrimination
-
discrimination
based on unsupported general assumptions about the effect of age on ability. . .").
267. 113 CONGo REC. 34742 (1967).
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e informed by what
was little prejudice
Other legislators also believed that age discrimination was caused by
employers' false assumptions and generalizations about the effect of age on
older workers.268
Congress was certainly right that employers often discriminated
against older workers based on false generalizations. Stereotyped
conceptions of older workers have been a blight on the American economy
and society since the Nineteenth Century.269 For example, employers
widely believed that hiring an older worker would increase costs for
pensions27Oand workers' compensation insurance.271 There was a grain of
truth in these generalizations. Older workers were a slightly greater
expense to pension plans.272 Older workers who were injured on the job
took a little longer to recuperate than younger workers did,273and the
expansion of workers' compensation coverage to conditions like heart
disease and diabetes benefited primarily older workers.274 But employers
exaggerated the magnitude of these costs and ignored off-setting benefits.
Thus, the extra cost to an employer was modest when pensions were geared
to years of service, so that newly hired older workers received lower
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268. !d. at 31254 (statement of Sen. Javits) ("a great deal of the problem stems from pure
ignorance: there is simply a widespread irrational belief that once men and women are past a certain age
they are no longer capable of performing even some of the most routine jobs"), 34745 (statement of
Rep. Eilberg) ("discriminatory practices in hiring... are the result of only stereotyped thinking,
thoughtlessness, and prejudice about the abilities of older workers"), 34746 (statement of Rep. Olsen)
("Unfavorable beliefs and generalizations about older persons have grown up over the years. . . . The
stereotype of an inflexible person, in physical decline, capable of only low productivity, bars the
employer from a fair evaluation ofthe applicant's actual ability and performance record.").
269. SEGRAVE, AGE DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS, supra note 130, passim.
270. Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 34 (statement of Sen. Murphy) ("Employers gave many
reasons why they do not hire older workers. In a 1959 study done in my state of California, the
following reasons were given for not hiring older workers: . . . 10.1 % mentioned pension and insurance
costs. . ."), 161 (Sen. Yarborough: "I think one of the big problems in the hiring of the aged is the
problem ofthe pension rights." Sen. Morse: 'That is right."). See also SEGRAVE, AGE DISCRIMINATION
BY EMPLOYERS, supra note 130, at 5 (several experts believe that a major cause of age discrimination
between 1895 and 1935 was union demands for pension plans), 100 (according to a federal Labor
Department study in the 1950's, "Companies without pension plans hired about 45 older workers per
100 employed, while firms with pension plans hired only about 17 per 100"), 13, 14,29,31,32,34,36-
37, 59, 64, 73, 87, 92, 94, 97, 101, 105, 115-120, 128, 129, 174 (from 1916 to 1983, employers were
reluctant to hire older workers because they would soon retire and need pensions, or would be forced to
retire before qualifying for pensions).
271. SEGRAVE, AGE DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS, supra note 130, at 29,32,35 (during the
late 1920's, employers justified maximum hiring ages by claiming a need to keep workers'
compensation rates low), 63, 65, 92-93, 114-15, 130 (employers continued to use workers'
compensation insurance as a reason not to hire older workers during the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's, and
also believed that older workers were more likeJy to be injured on the job).
272. Secretary's Report, supra note 18, at 16 (explaining that age can, but does not have to, affect
the cost of a p~nsion plan); Secretary's Research Materials, supra note 18, at 40-45; Senate Hearings,
supra note 15, at 159-61 (statements of Sen. Morse and Sen. Yarborough).
273. SEGRAVE, AGE DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS, supra note 130, at 65.
274. Secretary's Report, supra note 18, at 15.
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pensions than their younger counterparts;275 and, vesting of rights could
actually make younger workers more expensive.276 Regarding workers'
compensation insurance, the dominant fact was that premiums were based,
not on the age of the work force, but on the incidence of injuries - and
older workers tended to have fewer injuries on the job than younger
workers.277
Congress knew these facts. It believed that older workers brought
substantial benefits to their companies, benefits that usually outweighed the
costs. As Representative Donohue said,
the best employee is one of maturity and stability and possessed of a high
sense of responsibility. This is a summarized but exact description of the
economic value of our middle-aged citizens. . . . It has been further found
that older workers have a 20 percent better attendance record than younger
employees; that employees 45 and older had 2.5 percent fewer disabling
injuries, and 25 percent fewer nondisabling injuries than younger workers;
that voluntary turnover rates are less among older employees; that the older
worker is very likely to possess more skills, training, and all-around
knowledge than younger people.278
Representative Matsunaga agreed. He said that employers justify age
discrimination with
the insupportable assumption that most of the workers over 40 have health
problems which would detrimentally affect their efficiency and work
attendance. Studies have shown, however, that the job performance of the
older worker at many tasks does not decrease significantly with age. Even
after 55, the older worker is usually able to keep up with the pace set by his
younger coworkers. These studies also reflect an absence of any
appreciable difference in the work attendance between the age groups.279
Representative Dent also agreed: "The evidence is that, in general, the
experience that older people possess fully compensates for any loss of work
capacity which might otherwise in varying degrees be occasioned by their
age."280 So thought Representatives Burke281and Hechler as well.282And in
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275. SEGRAVE, AGE DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS, supra note 130, at SS, 100, 116-119, 12S-29
(presenting arguments by experts in the 1940's and 1950's that pension costs were not in fact higher for
older workers). See generally Secretary's Research Materials, supra note IS, at 40-45.
276. See generally Secretary's Research Materials, supra note IS, at 43-44. Yet younger workers
often changed jobs before their pensions vested, giving the employer the benefit of the use of pension
contributions. Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 160 (statement of Sen. Morse).
277. See SEGRAVE, AGE DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS, supra note 130, at 35,63,65, 114-15,
lIS (discussing evidence trom the 1920's through the 1950's showing that age discrimination was
caused in part by many employers' belief that older workers suffered more injuries on the job than
younger workers and therefore increased the cost of workers' compensation insurance, whereas in fact
older workers suffered fewer injuries).
278. 113 CONGo REc. 34749 (1967).
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the other body, Senator Yarborough said:
Everyone who testified at our hearings felt that the greatest need in this area
was to educate employers to the facts - facts which show that older
workers are at least as productive as younger workers and that on average
they stay with their employers for a longer period of time. Despite the
general notion to the contrary, it is the younger workers who are the big job
shifters. Older workers are usually more experienced and more stable
workers. It will be the major job of the Department of Labor under this bill
to educate the country to the fact that older workers are just as capable
employees as younger workers.283
Generalizations and assumptions are not vices in themselves. We
could not function without them. Indeed, one could hardly act if one
demanded rigorous proof of every proposition antecedent to action. But
generalizations and assumptions can be vicious when they are false.
Congress intended the Age Act to combat false assumptions and to cause
employers to rely on accurate information. Accurate information would
serve the primary goal of the statute: promoting employment on the basis of
ability instead of age.
The disparate impact method of proving discrimination is perfectly
suited to achieving the intent of Congress. Our lawmakers believed that the
dominant cause of age discrimination was "assumptions about the effect of
age on [older workers'] ability to do ajob when there is in fact no basis for
these assumptions.,,284 Disparate impact roots out such assumptions. An
employment practice that is not "based on reasonable factors other than
age" is based on a false assumption, namely, that the practice serves a
legitimate goal of the business. If such a practice has an adverse effect on
older workers, then the practice is discriminatory and should be unlawful.
For example, a selection criterion that is not job related produces false
information. The criterion purports to predict success on the job, but in fact
selects at random with respect to qualifications. Thus, the invalid criterion
generates false information as to which workers are qualified and which are
not. If the criterion has an adverse effect on older workers, this false
information leads an employer to deny employment opportunities to
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281. "In most instances a worker's skills are honed and sharpened by experience. Studies have
shown that the older worker brings qualities to a job that tend to make him a very desirable employee.
He is dependable, has a lower rate of absenteeism than younger coworkers, he has a high rate of job
stability, and his rate of work injuries is lower than that of the younger worker." Id. at 34742.
282. "Frequently, older workers make better workers because they are more experienced, more
level-headed and also more stable. .
."
Id. at 34750.
283. Id. at 31253 (1967). Sen. Murphy concurred. See Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 35 (Sen.
Murphy relies on a study by the National Association of Manufacturers of 3107 companies, indicating
that older work.;:rs are considered to be superior or equal to younger workers in work performance by 93
percent of respondents, in attendance by 98 percent of respondents, in safety by 97 percent of
respondents, and in work attitudes by 99 percent of respondents).
284. Secretary's Report, supra note 18, at 2 (emphasis in original).
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qualified older workers. This is exactly what Congress meant the Age Act
to prevent.
B. Increasing Economic Productivity
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Another purpose of the Age Act is to increase the productivity of the
economy. Outlawing disparate impact promotes productivity by outlawing
employment decisions that irrationally deny jobs to qualified older workers.
Age discrimination wastes valuable human resources. Congress
expected the Age Act to ameliorate this evil. Secretary of Labor Wirtz
found "clear evidence of the Nation's waste of a wealth of human resources
that could be contributed by hundreds of thousands of older workers. . . ."285
He estimated that "a million man-years of productive time are unused each
year because of unemployment of workers over 45."286 Yet, he found, in
most jobs older workers are as competent as younger workers:
4. The competence and work performance of older workers are, by any
general measures, at least equal to those of younger workers.
The Bureau of Business Management at the University of Illinois in a study
of supervisory ratings in manufacturing establishments in 1954 found that
11 percent of the workers 60 years old and over received excellent ratings
for overall performance; only 3 percent received poor ratings. On work
quality, 32 percent were rated better than young workers, 60 percent the
same and 8 percent poorer.
A Canadian study of sales persons in retailing showed that workers hired
above the age of 40 attained higher performance ratings in a shorter period
than workers hired below 30 years of age. They reached their peak
performance in their fifties.
Department of Labor studies of factory production work involving physical
effort indicate that a slight decrease in productivity occurs after age 45; but
that decrease does not become substantial until age 60. In office or other
sedentary work little, if any, decline occurs prior to age 60, and the
subsequent decline is minor?87
Older workers experienced the greatest difficulty, not in retaining their
jobs, but in securing new jobs after, for example, a lay-off. As early as
1911, an executive of the American Federation of Labor testified to the
Employers' Liability Commission that "the man over 40 with a few gray
hairs could not get a new position if he lost his job, but he could hold on if
he had a place."288 Fifty years later, Secretary Wirtz noticed the same
285. Id. at 5.
286. Id. at 18.
287. Id. at 8-9.
288. SEGRAVE, AGE DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS, supra note 130, at 10. See also id. at 11,
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meant the Age Act phenomenon: "It is significant that employers and supervisors often rate
their own older workers high on overall performance, but are at the same
time reluctant to hire new employees in the same age brackets."289 A survey
by the Department of Labor in 1965 revealed that in 20 percent of firms no
workers over age 45 had been hired, and in 50 percent of firms, only 5
percent of new hires were over age 45.290
Several legislators agreed with the Secretary. They commented that
outlawing age discrimination would end the loss of a valuable resource.
Representative Burke said, "[B]usiness and industry would gain skills,
wisdom, and experience accumulated during long working years. . . ."29] So
said Representative Reid: "Many of our ablest citizens are in their senior
years and they have yet to make some of their most valuable contributions
to meaningful jobs and service to their country."292 Other legislators
concurred.293
Because older workers' greatest problem is finding new jobs, let us
focus on selection criteria used in hiring. If a criterion has an adverse effect
y
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20,24,99 (citing evidence from 1910 through 1957 that older workers sometimes kept their jobs beyond
their employers' cut-off age for hiring new employees).
289. Secretary's Report, supra note 18, at 9.
290. Id. at 7.
291. 113 CONGoREc. 34742 (1967).
292. Id. at 34745.
293. Jd. at 34744 (statement of Rep. Hawkins) ("Can we afford to continue wasting the ability and
experience of 850,000 Americans over the age of 451''), 34745 (statement of Rep. Eilberg) ("at a time
when we desperately need the talents and energies of older workers... the harm that [age
discrimination] bring[s] to the strength of this Nation is intolerable. . .. [T]he loss to society because of
age prejudice borders on the irresponsible."), 34746 (statement of Rep. Daniels) ("I believe that
Congress can have no greater goal than to maximize our labor resources through ful1 employment of the
skills and experience of all our people."), 34752 (statement of Rep. Dwyer) ("job discrimination hurts
not only the deprived applicants but the employers and our economy and society as a whole''). See also
Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 23 (statement of Sen. Javits) ("Age discrimination in employment is
a tragedy. . . from the standpoint of the nation as a whole. For it represents a great waste of one of our
most precious resources - in this case the talent and experience accumulated by our older workers over
many years."), 55 (Sen. Yarborough ordered printed in the record "Unused Manpower: the Nation's
Loss," which was Manpower Research Bulletin No. 10 from the Department of Labor. The report
identified an "employment gap" of 725,000 workers, which cost the economy 7 billion dollars in gross
national product; men between ages 55 and 64 accounted for two-fifths of the gap), 31 (statement of
Sen. Randolph) ("by helping older workers to help themselves, we shall make them a buoyant effect on
the economy instead of a drag on it..." The Senator quoted Dr. 1. T. Richardson of Marshal1
University: "Our waste of resources because of age in this country is one of the greatest tragedies of our
modem culture and civilization." Then the Senator observed, "Our Nation cannot afford this waste.
With the enactment of legislation before us... we shal1 release the time, talents, energies, and
enthusiasm of older workers to benefit not only themselves but the entire nation as well"), 214
(statement of Sen. Williams) ("witnesses. . . have told us that older workers are needed to give us badly
needed skills at a time when heavy demands are being made on our labor force. Others have said that
the economy cannot sustain losses caused by idle workers"). See also House Hearings, supra note 52, at
90 (William 1. Hutton, Executive Director of the National Council of Senior Citizens, testified that Time
magazine estimated the cost of discrimination in hiring against workers over 45 cost the economy $4
billion per year).
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c. Decreasing Cost to the Government
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older workers are denied jobs, and the economy loses, in Representative
Burke's words, the workers' "skills, wisdom, and experience." Interpreting
the Age Act to outlaw disparate impact will serve Congress's purpose of
reducing this loss.
The Age Act also sought to decrease the costs of social programs like
unemployment compensation and welfare. Outlawing disparate impact will
provide more jobs to qualified older workers and minimize their draw on
social programs.
Saving money on unemployment compensation and welfare transfers
was another benefit that Congress intended the Age Act to achieve.
President Johnson's message to Congress, "The Older American Worker,"
estimated that unemployment insurance payments for workers 45 and older
cost three-quarters of a billion dollars annually.294 The Secretary of Labor's
Report to Congress stated:
A substantialportion of the unemploymentinsurancepaymentsof $1 billion
a year to workers 45 and older can be attributedto unemploymentresulting
in one way or another from the fact of the employee's age. Some of these
payments,of course,would go to workerswho are betweenjobs even under
conditions of full employment; nonetheless, a large but incalculable
proportion involves long-durationunemploymentthat reflects the difficulty
which the older workerfaces in attemptingto find a newjob,z95
Later, the Secretary confirmed the President's calculation that "over
three-quarters of a billion dollars in unemployment insurance was paid out
in 1964 to workers 45 and 01der.,,296
Legislators were well aware that age discrimination cost the
government a great deal of money in unemployment compensation to older
workers. Representative Reid pointed out that 27 percent of the
unemployed were aged 45 to 65,297and Representative Perkins said that 40
percent of the long-term unemployed fell into this age groUp,z98 Senator
Murphy noted that the average duration of unemployment in 1964 for males
aged 45 to 64 was 20.8 weeks, whereas the average duration for all males
was only 14.5 weeks,z99 Other legislators mentioned similar statistics.3Oo
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Representative Dent concluded that older workers "are probably the largest
single draw on unemployment in the country."301
Congress also anticipated that the Age Act would save on welfare
costs. Senator Williams said that an older worker who cannot find a job
sometimes has to resort to welfare.302 Representative Dent made the same
observation303and added, "we might find, if investigation were made, that
the workers between perhaps 40 and 65 may make up the bulk of the so-
called chronic relief recipient cases. If so, in my opinion that makes this
legislation even more desirable at this time."304 In fact, such investigations
had been made. Harold L. Sheppard of the Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research informed the House committee, "among adult
groups, even if we exclude those over the age of 65, we find that after the
age of 45 the rate of poverty among heads of families is directly related to
being 0Ider."305 Charles S. Manning, Executive Vice President of Towers,
Perrin, Forester & Crosby, testified to the House committee that the older
worker is far more likely to exhaust one's unemployment insurance benefits
and to withdraw from the labor market. In consequence,
we are requiredto face the prospect of a growingarmyof displacedworkers
that need to be fed, clothed and housed and yet are barred from productive
membership in our labor force. Their support in the form of spiraling
welfare costs, old age insurancepayments and social securitypensions will
necessarily impose an increasingly burdensome toll on the production of
our younger workers.306
Employment practices with a disparate impact take jobs away from
older workers, often cause them to apply for unemployment compensation,
and sometimes force them to seek public assistance for themselves and their
dependents. This waste would be mitigated by recognizing disparate
impact under the Age Act.
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VIII.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, Congress intended the Age Act
. to promote the employment of older persons based on their ability
rather than their age
. to maximize the productivity of the economy by making full use of
tatement of Rep. Dent),
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the skills, wisdom, and experience of older workers,
. to minimize the cost to government of unemployment compensation
and welfare, and .
. to eradicate an injustice.
Outlawing disparate impact would serve these purposes. Disparate
impact should be recognized as a legal theory or method of proving
discrimination under the Age Act.
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